More details on the 92 consensus

Related post: 92 all over again

In the light of Ma Ying-jeou's creative interpretation posted over at Thirsty Ghosts, I thought I'd contrast Ma and Beijing's interpretations of this so called consensus again.

Ma: In the early 1990s, we were able to acquire F-16s from the US, and also Mirage-2005s from France. At the same time we reached a 1992 consensus with the mainland. The 1992 consensus is an important milestone because that's the first effort from the two sides to … manage the problem of 'one China'.

Once we developed that formula, 'One china, respective interpretations,' that effectively shelved the problem. Then we could turn our attention to more urgent issues. So what I've been calling for is that both sides simultaneously return to the original version of the 1992 consensus.

And I think our effort has actually made some inroads. The mainland realizes that now Ma Ying-jeou is president, and he supports the 92 consensus, [which is] 'One China, different interpretations.' If they don't [cooperate], then cross-strait relations would not have a breakthrough, and four years later people may choose the DPP.

Ma thinks the CCP is more interested in keeping the KMT in power than in ending 'splittist activity,' it seems.

Here's what the CCP said following the DPP victory in 2001, via People's Daily:

In fact, the intention of the new leader of the Taiwan authorities is crystal clear, and that is attempting to replace the "92 consensus" with the "92 spirit", and using the "laying aside disputes" to evade the important contents of the "92 consensus", i.e., accepting the one China principle.

Anyone with a discerning eye can see that the new leader of the Taiwan authorities tried his utmost to negate the fact that both sides of the Taiwan Straits belong to one China, and Taiwan is part of China; and intended to deny that cross-Strait negotiation is the internal affair of one China. What he wanted to deny is precisely the consensus reached in the discussion between the two institutions through consultation on an equal footing.

So when you see Wen Jiabao reiterating "his call for the early resumption of negotiation and dialogue on the basis of the 1992 consensus"

And Chang Jung-kung, deputy executive director of the KMT Policy Committee, saying

"cross-Taiwan Strait peace talks could be held on the basis of the '92 consensus' under which the two sides agreed to the notion of 'one China, two interpretations'"

And most of the Western reporters using the KMT fantasy definition when they site the 92 consensus (see AFP and Bloomberg), you've got to wonder about the cognitive dissonance involved here.

And I'm sorry, but even assuming Beijing and the KMT government can agree on a "One China, two interpretations" formulation as the bluer-than-blue China Post believes, if Taiwan insists the Republic of China somehow is the legitimate government of all territory including the PRC's, the position will still be absolute bullocks that can only weaken Taiwan's already weak negotiating position.

The Taiwanese cannot agree to a "One China" framework as a way of opening negotiations. It will lock Taiwan into only one future choice. That does not qualify as "setting aside" the thorny issue of sovereignty.