GG Caijing

For a clearly pro-China but reasonably well measured analysis of the Senkaku dispute, see this Caijing article. Its ultimate conclusion is that neither China nor Japan have much room to back down on the dispute, but this makes negotiations and cool heads all the more critical, especially now that setting aside the dispute is becoming a less realistic option.

Warp Zone

For some reason, I occasionally find myself reading editorials in the KMT's mouthpiece, the Central Daily News. Perhaps it's because the paper sometimes says what the Ma administration won't announce from the podium. Here is the article I read today.

The editorial mocks DPP positions on the ECFA; denigrates Lee Teng-hui's "two countries" and Chen Shui-bian's "one side, one country" formulations as "not only completely unworkable but bound to bring about disastrous consequences;" and finally notes that shooting for de jure independence is sure to bring economic ruin and war.

But what really caught my eye was the final paragraph, where the writer throws a curve ball:

Up to this point, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have had the wisdom to define their relations as a unique, non-international and non-domestic relationship. Thus agreements have been signed on the principles of equality and mutual respect by [Taiwan's] Straits Affairs Foundation [SEF] and [China's] Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits [ARATS]. The agreements have been mutually beneficial and won the praise of the international community, just as the ECFA has. Taiwan independence supporters, though, continue to blow hot air about dealing [with "the mainland"] on a nation-to-nation basis. The Taiwanese people have already experienced the tangible benefits of setting aside political differences, fostering warm economic relations, and reducing the danger of a military conflict. If the independence supporters keep mouthing the same old platitudes, they will not win any hearts or minds.

　兩岸如今都有智慧把雙方關係定位為非國際、亦非國內的特殊關係，故以海基、海協兩會來進行協商簽署，合乎對等、尊嚴原則，互蒙其利，亦獲國際社 會讚賞，ＥＣＦＡ也是一樣。獨派卻仍鼓吹以國與國來處理兩岸關係。台灣人民已體驗到了兩岸政治上擱置爭議、經濟上合作互惠、軍事上化解危機的實際利益，獨 派再唱其陳腔濫調，是不會有市場的。

It is obviously and pointedly false to suggest that China views relations with Taiwan as anything other than domestic, unless you ignore everything they say about the subject.

But far more baffling is when the CDN tries to suggest the KMT defines relations [with China] as a unique, non-international and non-domestic relationship.

When was that the definition? Certainly not in 2008 when Ma drew a firestorm of criticism for saying relations were "a non-international, special relationship." Certainly not today, when fantasies of China recognizing a "shared sovereignty" situation are the domain of deluded academics. In fact, there's not a peep about "non-domestic" anywhere.

To prove the point, go search for the Chinese phrase "non-domestic special relationship" (非國內的特殊關係). That search turns up only this CDN article. Even when broken up into two phrases,"non-domestic" and "special relationship," we see nothing else about this topic on the internet. This terminology is newly minted, not official policy, and certainly not the policy of both China and Taiwan.

Why would the official KMT mouthpiece make up one definition of a policy -- one where nuance in phrasing matters a lot -- when the KMT has a different official policy? Is the editor simply living in la-la land? Does he have access to insider information about progress in negotiations with China? Is he making an effort to fool the public in Taiwan (presumably because people don't actually have the stomach to accept relations with China as "domestic" yet)? Or what?

UOCN 中国泛蓝联盟

You'll be interested to know that the Union of Chinese Nationalists (中国泛蓝联盟), which is a pro-KMT outfit in China which promotes Sun Yat-sen's doctrines and hopes to use the KMT as a sort of basis for Chinese democratization, has a functional website and active forum.

A number of members of this group have been harassed and arrested over the years such as Zhang Zilin (张子霖).

The KMT makes no effort to support or even acknowledge the group. The DPP has in their past send their best wishes to the group.

Taiwan Disaster

Yuan Hongbing (袁紅冰), and exiled Chinese law professor, released his new book Taiwan Disaster last November. I learned about the book at the Taiwanese Heritage Society of Houston yesterday, which displayed an ad for the book. I decided to do a little research into the book, which posits that the Chinese Communist Party plans to complete a loose unification by 2012, including full economic integration, and to form its own proxy party in Taiwan for the 2016 elections.

One of the first things I discovered is that Yuan Hongbing is apparently as crazy as the Falun Gong's Epoch Times, since he apparently believes the Chinese intend on enslaving the entire human race, starting with Taiwan. That does not exactly inspire confidence in his other findings. But let's move on.

The second thing is that Yuan Hongbing claims to be quoting a few very primary sources. The Epoch Times reports the most important as being Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao's June 2008 speech at the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP. The document was apparently highly classified, and the leaking source was risking their life. The other three sources, listed in a Liberty Times article, are from that same meeting, and are three particular plans Yuan says the Central Committee passed: specifically, the Political Strategy for Resolving the Taiwan Problem, Plans for Potential Clashes with the Taiwanese Military, and Plans for Dealing with Taiwan Political Laws Post-Unification.

As Yuan outlines the plan, we see a relatively tight schedule that requires China do the following:

1. Fully integrate Taiwan's economy into China's, turning China into the major export market of Taiwan (snatching 90% plus of exports, including agricultural ones). Given Taiwan's dependence on exports and importation of natural resources, China feels this will finish the goal of economic unification. [A-Gu: It's well-known that China is using the economic crisis and general trends to get Taiwan to agree to economic integration terms they'd otherwise deplore; the Economic Minister just admitted Taiwan will eventually have to remove all Chinese factory products from the current import ban list, and that Taiwan's just trying to get a more favorable time table for those openings. Further, China's not giving in on Taiwan's plans to block Chinese produce and labor for the ECFA.]


2. China intends to be able to fully manipulate the Taiwan stock market through a number of well-paid Taiwan proxies, an expensive goal but one which would give the CCP huge leverage. [A-Gu: I would think so. I thought this would be an ideal investment for the CCP years ago, and I would certainly imagine they would pursue it. Why beat into submission what you can just buy?]


3. Get KMT and DPP heaveyweights alike to profit from investments in China, starting with the KMT; threaten economic ruin for those that don't cooperate; weaken the DPP's social standing and turn the KMT into a partner of unification by 2012. [A-Gu: I think these are also rather obvious, long running strategies, but really still beyond Chinese control.]
   


4. Perhaps most unbelievably, Yuan says the CPP has plans to create its own puppet "Democratic Socialist Party" in Taiwan after 2012. They intend for it to win the presidential election in 2016, and have lined up a number of high profile individuals from the media, religion, political circles, and business to back it. [A-Gu: I don't really see that happening. Too many things could go wrong to bother with this plan for it even to be seriously considered.]

It seems to me that Yuan's book reveals very little new information that is believable. We already knew China seeks economic unification as a basis for further political unification; that it openly seeks to make life easy for politically-connected investors; and that it tries to manipulate Taiwan's domestic politics when it can, but that it's given up using the ham-fist.

But forming a puppet party seems too difficult to be realistic to me, and I think the CCP would conclude the same thing. Likewise, a 2012 time table seems to be more optimistic than even most PLA hawks would hope for. I just don't believe Yuan can have authentic documents on these points, but if I'm wrong we'll know in just a few very short years.

On the other hand, I'd really like to read the book (Eslite is selling it, the LT article indicates). Has anyone read it, or do you have a more interesting review of the book handy?

Wait a second, what?

China claims a missle intercept test went well:

China says it has successfully carried out a test of military technology to shoot down missiles in mid-air. The news comes in the wake of tensions between Beijing and Washington because of American missile sales to Taiwan, an island China considers part of its territory.

Jiang says Monday's test of "ground-based, mid-course missile intercepting technology" had what she describes as "the expected result."

There have been few details about the test....

She emphasizes that the anti-missile test is in line with what she calls China's path of peaceful development and is not targeted at any country.

Wait until everyone gets their hands on that.

My guess? The test didn't go very well. And I believe Taiwan media will go crazy about the report, with the pro-unification media emphasizing that any test like this was aimed at the US, not Taiwan.

Why does this feel like a sales pitch?

If it looks like a duck...

Deputy Minister Mainland Affairs Council The Executive Yuan Chien-min Chao (趙建民) spoke today in his role as a Professor of political science at a conference titled, The establishment of Chinese Communist rule and sixty years of separate administration across the Taiwan strait.

(Just so you know, he'll also be at this upcoming conference [pdf] on Grassroots Democracy and Local Governance in China in early November if you want to see him).

The professor argued that the old label of party-state system (黨國體制) is an inaccurate description of China, and was not even accurate under Mao, when it was more of a one-man authoritarian dictatorship. Chao also said while some scholars think "post-party-state system" (後黨國體制) is a good label, the label ignores the role of the social and political changes in China. Today, Chao argues, now that the market economy is the driving factor in political decision making, China is seeing many of the kind of incidents like Taiwan's "Formosa Incident" and an increase in social movements. Why then can't we label China as a country in the early stages of democratic development?

I'm going to put aside for the moment that Chao seems to be selling me something. I'll just address his arguments. I agree that China shows some of the same symptoms of a society crying out for greater democracy, but there are no signs that CCP leadership intends to ever allow a multi-party system or a truly democratic society, and the weak civil society in China means there are no signs that a collapsed CCP would be replaced with anything but the PLA;. In contrast, while the KMT leadership was reluctant to allow democratic changes, it was always committed to that transition in principle.

You may want to know how I reach this conclusion. First, as has been well-documented within The First Chinese Democracy: Political Life in the Republic of China on Taiwan (Chao and Myers), by the time of the Formosa Incident, the KMT was regularly losing elections at multiple levels to independents. To the KMT's credit, it had for years allowed somewhat free local elections -- plenty of vote buying on all sides, but ballot box stuffing was not as serious a problem, and local rivals were more likely to be co-opted than threatened -- and so although an organized opposition party was still completely out of the question for the KMT leadership, and although there was constant cracking down on political dissidents, the momentum for reform had been building for sometime (it took Lee Teng-hui's determination to drag the rest of the KMT elite into ending one party rule).

Similarly, as Chao and Myers document, while the KMT leadership was not willing to tolerate an opposition party at that time, it remained rhetorically committed to an eventual Western-style, multi-party democracy. Though the KMT claimed that Taiwan was not ready for such a transition yet, eventually, it would be. And as David blogged, the Wild Lily protest movement was able to push the country significantly in that directly in 1990.

That's a bit of an overview on Taiwan; what about China? While China has made some breakthroughs at creating real competition at the village chief level (He 2003 [PDF]), though these officials have little control beyond the village and the party remains strictly authoritarian at the national level. Unlike the Wild Lily movement, the Tiananmen Square protests ended in tragedy.

Further, the CCP has no rhetorical commitments to any multi-party system; instead, the party promotes "Intra-party democracy," basically a 'harmonious' consultative process that hopes to bring in innovative ideas and heed local demands, but without the risk of a transition of power. Chinese scholars remain committed to the one-party state. And the party continues to promote its one-party democracy on its own news sites.

If there is to be real hope that China will experience a democratic transition, a few pre-conditions must be met: a stronger civil society to help form the skeleton outline of a capable opposition, a relaxation on crushing censorship rules, perhaps greater autonomy in the autonomous zones (to relax tensions there and fears that democracy will lead to the break-up of the country), and most importantly of all, willingness at the CCP leadership center to accept the prospect of losing power.

So far, the CCP shows no signs of relaxing its control over China, nor in fact of wanting anything but greater power -- over Taiwan, the Spratly Islands, Aranchul Pradesh, the Senkaku Islands... and who knows what would be next.

Deputy Minister Chao, I wish you were right. I hope I'm delusional and you're right. But I think we both know better. China shows no signs of heading toward a Taiwan-inspired path to a democratic transition.

Wu's trip to Hong Kong

New premier Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) may have have bitten off a bit more than he can chew today, as today's lead in the Taipei Times points out.

Wu made a public trip to Hong Kong recently, apparently to research how to combat mudslides. So the trip wasn't the news.

The part that leaked Sunday night wasn't so much of the trip, but of the only by the Hong Kong pol and likely future Special Administrative Region head, Leung Chun-ying (梁振英). That ignited speculation that Wu was going there for an interview or discussion with Beijing before his taking up the post. Some read this as an atempt by Ma to "get permission" for Wu's appointment.

Wu’s trip to Hong Kong on Sept. 5 was first reported on Wednesday, with Wu saying he had gone to learn from Hong Kong’s experience dealing with mudslides.

A report in the Liberty Times (the Taipei Times’ sister newspaper), cited Wu’s secretary as saying that Wu had visited Hong Kong with his wife, newly wedded son and daughter-in-law for a “family gathering.”

His secretary said Wu had also taken the opportunity to learn about measures Hong Kong had taken to combat mudslides.

Paul Lin (林保華), a commentator on Chinese Communist Party (CCP) history, told the Taipei Times yesterday that Leung is an “underground member” of the CCP and well-trusted by Beijing.

So you can see the main problem here: the Executive Yuan clearly kept the most important factor of Wu's trip off the iternerary, put up a rather shady excuse (Wu visited the Civil Engineering and Development Department on a Saturday in Hong Kong to get mudslide information? Really?). Then Wu got busted, still hasn't released a complete itenerary, and would now like to blow off the trip as no big deal.

Leung might not be a CCP heavyweight, but his very close relationship with the party is well described further in the article. This was not an innocent mudslide adventure.

I smell a rat. And Wu may be in for more scrutiny than he can stand up to.

Yes, no, maybe so.

Last Wed., Ma "clarified" (muddled, really) part of his Three Nos pledge: no unification, no independence, and no war.

"No unification," Ma said, "does not mean we rule out the option of unification." The topic has already been covered at Taiwan Matters, among other blogs.

That article remains the hottest topic on Yam's news site today, and one of the more astute commentators asked how this applies to his other pledges.

No independence does not mean we rule out the option of independence?
No use of force does not mean we rule out the option of the use of force?

What sort of pledge is it, really then?

I think that there is some possibility that Ma's comment come sin light of Chinese pressure, but it's impossible to say for sure.

Hu makes no secret of agenda

Following the meeting between KMT chairman Wu Po-hsiung and CCP chairman Hu Jintao, Chinese media has made a large deal of two particular formulations: first is Hu's new 'six ideas' and second is a five point consensus reached during the meeting, a consensus Liberty Times said the KMT really had no idea existed until reports on it surfaced.

What is the five point consensus?

第一，双方都表示要继续推动落实“两岸和平发展共同愿景”，不断促进两岸关系和平发展； 第二，都认为要维护反对“台独”、坚持“九二共识”的共同政治基础，不断增强和深化互信；第三，都强调要加强两岸经济合作，尽快商谈两岸经济合作协议，以 利建立两岸经济合作机制；第四，都赞同要积极促进两岸文化教育交流，举办以文教交流为主题的两岸经贸文化论坛，开始探讨协商两岸文化教育交流协议；第五， 都主张两岸在涉外事务中避免不必要的内耗，增进中华民族整体利益。

First, both sides expressed their intent to continue to implement their common wish for peaceful cross-strait development and would constantly work to improve peaceful cross-strait relations. Second, both sides will guard against "Taiwanese independence" while strongly upholding the common political foundation of the '92 concensus, in order to constantly improve and deepen mutual trust. Third, both sides emphasized their intent to strengthen cross-strait economic cooperation, to quickly sign a cross strait economic cooperation agreement, and to establish mechanisms for cross-strait economic cooperation. Fourth, both sides agreed to actively promote cross-strait cultural and educational exchanges, to hold economic and cultural forums that focus on those exchanges, and to discuss how to come to an agreement on cross-striat cultural and economic exchanges. Fifth, both sides support avoiding 'bad news' when it comes to foreign matters in order to promote the interests of the Zhonghua Minzu [A-gu: probably a reference to Ma's détente with China in seeking allies].

Well, not a lot of new information there. What about the six ideas?

　第一，关于增进两岸政治互信。去年５月以来，两岸双方在反对“台独”、坚持“九二共识 ”的基础上建立了互信，从而推动解决了两岸关系中一系列复杂问题。考虑到今后两岸关系的发展前景，包括需要逐步破解一些政治难题，巩固和增进双方的政治互 信尤为重要。坚持大陆和台湾同属一个中国是关键所在。

The first deals with strengthening cross-strait political trust. .. [opposing TI, supporting the 92 consensus, etc]... Strongly supporting the idea that Taiwan and China both belong to one China is vital.

　　第二，关于两岸经济合作。今后一个时期仍然要把全面加强两岸经济合作作为重点， 当前最突出的任务是共同应对国际金融危机冲击。考虑到两岸同胞是一家人，我们采取了一些实际措施同你们共克时艰。今后，如果形势需要，我们还会继续这样 做。签定两岸经济合作协议，关键是协议内容要有利于两岸经济共同发展、两岸同胞福祉增进，有利于建立具有两岸特色的经济合作机制。双方应该共同推进商签协 议准备工作，争取今年下半年谈起来。

The second deals with economic cooperation... [Cooperation good, dealing with current financial crisis]... Keeping in mind that comrades on both sides of the strait belong to the same family, we are choosing a practical method to get through these hard times together. Afterwards, if circumstances require, we will continue to help... [Economic agreement good for both sides, get ECFA done by end of year].

　　第三，关于加强两岸文化教育交流。新形势下，开展两岸文化教育交流，既有巨大需求和潜力，也显得更为重要。我们要比以往更加努力地开展两岸文化教育交流，共同传承和弘扬中华文化，增强中华文化认同、中华民族认同。

The third deals with economic and cultural exchanges. [Important, helps heal wounds....] Both sides should promote Chinese culture together, strengthen identity with Chinese culture and with the Zhonghua Minzu.

　 　第四，关于涉外事务。几天前，中华台北卫生署应邀派出人员作为观察员参加了今年的世界卫生大会。这表明，两岸中国人有能力、有智慧妥善解决台湾参与国际 组织活动问题，也表明我们促进两岸关系和平发展的诚意。我们希望，这有利于增进台湾同胞对大陆的了解，有利于两岸关系和平发展。

The fourth deals with foreign affairs... [WHA observer status breakthrough great, demonstrates Chinese good will]... We hope that this helps the Taiwanese compatriots better understand the mainland and contributes to peaceful cross-strait development.

　　第 五，关于结束两岸敌对状态、达成和平协议。促进正式结束两岸敌对状态、达成和平协议，是“两岸和平发展共同愿景”提出的目标，已经成为两岸双方的重要主 张。我们提出，两岸可以就国家尚未统一的特殊情况下的政治关系问题、建立两岸军事安全互信机制问题进行务实探讨，表明了我们解决问题的积极思考。两岸协商 总体上还是要先易后难、先经后政、把握节奏、循序渐进，但双方要为解决这些问题进行准备、创造条件。双方可以先由初级形式开始接触，积累经验，以逐步破解 难题。

The fifth deals with the cross-strait tension and seeking a peace agreement. Putting a formal end to hostilities and reaching a peace agreement is the common aspiration for peaceful cross-strait development and has already become an important principle of both sides. We would point out that both sides can discuss how political relations should be handled in this special circumstance preceding national unification, can debate how to establish a confidence building on military affairs, and express our thoughts on how to solve these problems. We still need to deal with cross-strait agreements by dealing with the easy ones first. First economics, then politics...

　　第六，关于国共两党交流对话。国共两党交流对话特别是高层交往对保持两岸关系发展势头具有不可替代的重要作用。国共论坛是一个 成功的论坛，应该继续办下去，而且要越办越好。同时，两岸关系发展需要两岸广大同胞特别是基层民众参与。两岸各界举办的海峡论坛，突出了两岸民众的参与和 互动。

The sixth deals with KMT-CCP dialogue and exchanges... [It's been important so far, we should continue, and improve communication. Need to bring in common people to participate. Need more exchanges between people on both sides.]

There you have it! Now time to get back to work. Remember, try to ignore all these things coming out of the CCP's mouth if you want to pretend they're not going to push for unification.

I make special note of the wording "this special circumstance preceding national unification," because you can bet your bottom dollar that the CCP will want that sentence in the peace agreement, even if exactly when and how the unification is to be achieved is not specified.

I speculate Ma will re-activate the National Unification Council sometime before that. Before the signing of the peace agreement, expect a further emphasis that the Council's guidelines will still be used to determine when unification is possible (namely, once China has democratized and gotten as rich as Taiwan). And finally, I imagine the CCP will ask for revisions to those guidelines a few years later.

More confusing still

At the El Salvador presidential inauguration ceremony which President Ma Ying-jeou was attending, he ran into Sec. of State Hillary Clinton and introduced himself as "President of Taiwan." This seemed almost like an intentional contrast to Wu Po-hsiung's mention of daonei while in China.

But, Ma clarified his introduction during a tea session with reporters, whenever he says "President of Taiwan," he means "President of the Republic of China," certainly not "President of the Republic of Taiwan."

Well, fair enough if you think, like A-bian did, that Taiwan = the ROC, a position Ma may or may not have endorsed at some point, depending on how you interpret that famous pre-election statement, 台灣就是中華民國.

So to wrap up what we've learned by carefully watching KMT statements before and after the election last year, the KMT position is:

1. Taiwan and the Chinese mainland are both parts of the Republic of China, a fact that the constitution mandates -- neither independence or unification are possible without constitutional amendments. So Taiwan is not a country.
2. Still, thanks to doublethink, "Nobody thinks Taiwan isn't a country."
3. Taiwan's sovereignty belongs to the ROC, and the ROC's sovereignty belongs to all of the ROC citizens. Therefore Taiwan's sovereignty belongs to the people on both sides of the Taiwan strait.
4. However, the future of cross-strait relations should be decided "on the Taiwan side" by the Taiwanese people through referendum, but not until a generation from now.
5. But first, Taiwan and China should sign a peace agreement in Ma's first term. Scratch that, make it the theoretical second term.
   

What to make of the shifts which one commenter on this blog accurately called a "merry-go-round" of policy statements? I doubt Ma is confused about his position on this -- he's merely trying to pander to both the CCP and the Taiwan electorate, who hold incompatible positions, because he needs both of their support to have a chance at re-election or legacy.

And -- if Taiwan's military becomes an otherwise worthless paycheck factory, if the economy becomes fully dependent on China, if countries like Japan and the US write off Taiwan, all while Beijing refuses to renounce the use of force and openly maintains the goal of unifying under the one country, two systems formula sooner rather than later-- does it matter what the Taiwan government's position is? Would China stop short of simply demanding compliance with their preferred terms for unification? All signs suggest making such a demand wouldn't bother them a bit.

More of the same...

Update: cctang has been kind enough to provide some corrections to my rushed translation in comments.

Yesterday, Chinese Nationalist Party chairman Wu Po-hsiung gave a "Taiwan as part of China" speech at Nanjing university, just days after President Ma Ying-jeou voiced support for the right of the Taiwanese to decide questions of sovereignty by referendum.

The Liberty Times captured some of the choice gems in the speech. Let's hear some soon-to-be-classic lines, Wu!

「台灣有一股逆流叫『去中國化』，去了半天不可能成功，因為生活不是意識形態所能改變的！」

"Taiwan has a non-mainstreem 'de-Sinicization' movement, but it was unable to succeed at the end of last year because ideology can't change [the facts of] life."

Taiwanese, not Chinese, identity is the mainstream position. Don't believe Wu's statement, which so closely resembles Chinese Communist propaganda. Remember, the latest statistics indicate that 65% of the population call themselves Taiwanese while only 11.5% Chinese and 18.1% claim both as identities.

Also, 'de-Sinicization' is a blue word (greens use things like "enhance native identity," "name rectification" and "locally-oriented" when discussing related topics).

「今天對我來說是一生非常難忘的時刻」，「這個榮譽應給兩岸千千萬萬有智慧的中華民族，他們覺得兩岸繼續對立、敵對、衝撞是錯誤方向，我只是代表接受。」

"I will remember [correction: receiving this honorary degree] for for the rest of my life." "This honor really belongs to the incredibly brilliant Zhonghua Minzu, who feel that continued confrontation, animosity and provocation is not the correct path for cross-strait relations. I can only accept this as their representative."

If you're like me, that made you a little sick to your stomach. But there is a reason that the term Zhonghua Minzu has been so closely embraced by both KMT and CCP while discussion of the '92 consensus or other political topics: and that is because a full 60% of people believe both sides of the strait are governments established by Zhonghua Minzu, including 45% of greens. Not too far off from saying 60% of people consider themselves to be part of the Zhonghua Minzu. Notice how that differs from the identification results if you use more phrases that are considered more political in Taiwan, like Zhongguoren and Taiwanren in your questions. Of course, as far as the Chinese are concerned Zhonghua Minzu = Zhongguoren.

So Zhonghua Minzu is the non-political tether that can hold Taiwan to China, the thing both sides can make claim to and that has majority support in Taiwan. Which is badly needed, especially since the last MAC opionion poll for how to decide Taiwan's future looked like this:

Maintain the 'status quo' forever: 27% (record high)
Maintain the ‘status quo’ and decide later: 35%
Maintain the ‘status quo’ and then become independent: 15.1%
Maintain the ‘status quo’ and then unify [with China]: 7.6%
Declare independence as soon as possible: 6.7%
Immediate unification with China: 1.2%
(No response: 7.4%)

And 82% percent of people oppose China's "one country, two systems" model.

Last quote from Wu:

提到兩岸，他指出，一年來兩岸關係發展非常關鍵，得來不易，但「想通了就通了」，有智慧就知道該怎麼走。他認為，兩岸有些問題短期內無法解決，可用智慧先擱置爭議，從異中求同，「兩岸共同基礎就是血緣、同屬炎黃子孫的民族情感，另外就是文化」。

Regarding cross-strait relations, Wu pointed out that the next last year of developing those relations was crucial and fraught with difficulty, but "As long as we want to work through it we can," and by applying wisdom both sides would know where to go.

Although there are a great many problems in the cross-strait relationship that cannot be fixed in the short term, those disputes can wisely be set aside, the two sides could find common interests despite their difficulties. "Both sides have the common affection of a people whose foundations are build on blood and common descent from the Yellow Emperor, not to mention a common culture."

I won't argue much on the cultural front (even though Wu's phrasing is just meant to fit into a political narrative), but the purely racist language used here is neither entirely accurate nor acceptable.

Ma endorses sovereignty referendum theory

President Ma Ying-jeou's latest comments to Taiwanese media in Belize constitute a fundamental shift on Ma's position regarding whether Taiwan's future status be determined through the referendum process. Using that process is a key demand and central plank of the DPP platform.

Only issues of greater importance, such as those involving Taiwan’s sovereignty,
need to be put to a referendum, he said.

“There won’t be any political items, such as ‘one nation, two systems,’ in the ECFA,” he said.

Stressing that the proposed ECFA was an economic agreement, Ma said holding referendums is time-consuming and expensive, and it would be difficult for the government to operate if it had to hold a referendum on every major policy issue. “It would be meaningless if referendums were held too often and on less important issues,” the president said.

While "the ECFA won't address sovereignty issues, so it doesn't need a referendum" is a frequent refrain from the Ma administration, before now they've carefully avoided vocalizing the implied point, which is that sovereignty issues do require a referendum. This appears to mark a reversal in that strategic ambiguity.

The quote in Chinese is reported by the Liberty Times as follows: 「我一向都主張台灣的前途必須由二千三百萬台灣人民來決定，涉及主權議題才需要公投」"I have always held that Taiwan's future is to be determined by Taiwan's 23,000,000 people; only topics related to with sovereignty need a referendum."

It could be that Ma's using the opportunity to improve his opening hand before going into peace talks with Beijing. Or maybe feeling some sort of heat from some unknown source. Or perhaps neither -- maybe he really hadn't noticed he and his spokesmen were avoiding putting the word sovereignty and referendum in the same sentence, and he truly does want to endorse the referendum process.

In any case I welcome this development.

Just great

In the 24-hour news cycle world, a new Biggest Story Ever gets marched out on at least a daily basis. One of those big stories yesterday was related to the Hu-Wu meeting.

Emphasizing that Taiwan and China belonged to “one China,” Hu said the two had agreed to promote peace, oppose Taiwanese independence, stand by the so-called “1992 consensus” and strengthen mutual trust.

Hu said that the two sides should engage in “pragmatic discussions” of political relations ­before carrying out unification and establish a military confidence-building mechanism. It is the goal of both sides to put a formal end to hostility by signing a peace agreement, he said.

Hu said Taiwan and China should forge ahead with preparations for an ECFA and aim for negotiations on the agreement in the latter part of the year.

An ECFA would be beneficial to economic development and public welfare on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, Hu said.

Wu did not mention President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) or Taiwan’s sovereignty during the meeting. He repeatedly used the phrase daonei (島內, “within the island”) when referring to Taiwan.

Last week, Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu (陳菊) earned plaudits from lawmakers across party lines when she referred to Ma by his title during a meeting with Beijing’s mayor.

Taiwan is, of course, an island. But Green politicians were upset Wu did not use the phrase guonei (國內, "within the country").

Now it will come as no surprise to readers of this blog that Wu does not consider Taiwan a country; indeed, the current KMT position is basically a reversion to the Chiang Ching-kuo policy, where unification, democratizing the mainland and upholding the Three People's Principles are interlocking goals.

But you wouldn't know that by watching blue media yesterday. Oh no. You see, Wu was merely avoiding saying guonei because using the phrase might cause friction with China. Likewise, saying "the Republic of China" might result in Hu Jintao retorting with "the People's Republic of China." The Chinese media would probably block it anyway, depriving the Chinese people of a chance to hear from Taiwan's political leaders. And even if the Chinese aired it, the masses wouldn't understand that guonei was acutally a reference to Taiwan; they'd take it as a reference to all of China. All of that is best avoided, you see.

Ultimately this is a relatively trivial matter, but honestly, the way the blue media covers for the KMT, you'd think the blues had a "two China" policy.

Chinese black jail sites

What is up with this guy?

No points for answering that question correctly.

Ma can't get his story straight.

I was surprised and confused on the 19^th when Ma said "Taiwan is the Republic of China," which seemed like a policy shift to me, but the Presidential Office spokesman cleared that up quickly by correcting Ma's statement to "Taiwan is the Republic of China's." Ma reinforced that on May 20^th by saying "Taiwan is a part of the Republic of China." (As the DPP asked that day, what's the other part?)

Well, yesterday, the 21^st, when answering a question about 'Chinese Taipei's participation in the WHO, Ma noted that while it is difficult for Taiwan/the ROC to get formal recognition in the WHA and other international organizations, "nobody thinks Taiwan's not a country." (Except of course Ma himself.)

A few days ago I wrote that Ma's contradictory statements force one to conclude he is either lying to the electorate or the CCP about his intentions, since they have very different ideas of where he is leading the island. Considering the sequence of his dissembling -- where pro-unification sentiment or statements are repudiated and replaced with the kind of statements you'd expect from pro-TI die hard Chen Shui-bian -- I think it's rather obvious whose eyes he's pulling the wool over.

Footnote: I rarely participate in the comments section of this site, except to post brief "thanks for reading" notes, and that's mostly because I don't want to dominate every aspect of this blog. :)

But I do want to make particular note that while I try to sprinkle my posts with healthy doses of realism and skepticism, I have no doubt that political subservience to China is an outcome that Taiwanese public opinion will roundly reject for the foreseeable future. All evidence says so.

More dissaembling Ma's dissembling

Ma made one other statement at his international press conference that struck me as, well, false:

外籍媒體也詢問馬總統對大陸領導人的看法，馬總統說，儘管對岸在台灣議題的立場上沒太大改變，但策略已經有所不同，過去10年對岸堅持「一國兩制、和平統一」，最近則開始重視預防台灣走向獨立，而非一味宣揚要達到統一的目的，已展現更大彈性。

When asked by a foreign reporter about his view on the mainland leadership, President Ma said that although there had not been a major change in the mainland's Taiwan policy, there had been a shift in their strategy; the last ten years of emphasizing "one country, two systems" and peaceful unification has already switched to a focus of preventing Taiwan from going toward independence. This shift away from advocating unification is a demonstration of [the mainland's] greater flexibility.

Certainly the tone of China's rhetoric has shifted dramatically, and this is because Ma has already accepted the one China principle and that Taiwan's sovereignty belongs to all Chinese people on both sides of the strait.

My objection is his characterization of the Chinese position. Hu mentioned one country, two systems and peaceful unification in a major speech just as recently as March 18. Realizing the peaceful unification of the motherland through 'one country, two systems' was a topic on this year's political section of the Chinese Gaokao. And the Chinese leadership even refuses to admit that the '92 consensus' can be fairly stated as "one China, two interpretations."

What is accurate to say is that the CCP and KMT have never been closer on either their ultimate goals, which include unification and preventing formal Taiwanese independence. They are also in agreement on the means (just study Hu Jintao's Six Point proposal). Both parties avoid saying "unification" now because talking about the elephant in the room would ruin the plan -- less because those two parties are in disagreement and more because talking about unification would alert the Taiwanese people to the final stop on this ride. Or so I like to think.

Straits Forum

The rally wasn't the only thing happening this weekend. Also check out the program from this year's Straits Forum. My favorite part has to be an article about a performance put on during the evening of the 16th titled Chinese Spirit, Straits Fate (中华情·海峡缘).

The performance included a song called One Hundred Surnames 《百家姓》which included lyrics like:

百家姓里你姓李我姓张，骨血里淌着都是黄河长江；百家姓里你姓赵他姓王，心脏里装的都是龙族的荣光…

You're name is Li and my name is Zhang, but our bones and are blood all flow with the waters of the Yellow and Yangzi Rivers; You're name is Zhao and my name is Wang, but our guts and hearts are filled with the glory of the Dragon People...

The chair of the event had a little cute poem to read that included the following:

“离我们不远的地方，就是欢腾的海峡。”“每一阵海风，都是亲人的消息。”“我们是知己，不分我和你，咱若有代志（闽南话，指事情），互相来扶持，因为你是我的兄弟。” Not far from me is the great [Taiwan] Strait. Every time the wind blows in from the sea, it brings news of relatives. We are intimate friends, and we do not distingish ourselves from each other. Whatever the situation, we can count on each other, because we are brothers."

Best of all have to be lyrics from a Beijing opera titled I am Chinese 《我是中国人》. This reads like it's jumped out of a time warp in the Cultural Revolution where even all the Beijing Opera was political:

“中国人，同是华夏好子孙；中国人，海角天涯一条根。你和我逢盛世担大任，做一个坦坦荡荡、磊磊落落、堂堂正正中国人……”

Chinese people are all decedents of the Yellow Emperor. Chinese people even in far off regions still have the same roots. You and I have a great mission in this world, to be honest, proud and true Chinese ...

If that closing line doesn't ring a bell, may I direct your attention to Taiwanese elementary school textbooks from not that long ago (more images here):

gulp?

Hat tip to the New Dominion, which notes that 9 members of the the pro-Xinjiang Independence Turkistan Islamic Party (Türkistan Islam Partiyisi (TIP) تۈركىستان ئىسلام پارتىيىسى), have been extradited to China from Pakistan as part of the mutual extradition treaty.

While the prospect of Taiwanese Independence activists being sent to China for prosecution still remains a paranoid fantasy here in Taiwan, news like this is hardly encouraging.

Ma: Delay that peace treaty

Ma gave an interview yesterday morning to Taiwan's China Television (CTV, 中視) which covered quite a lot of ground and touched on everything from peace talks with Beijing to the Assembly and Parade Law to the WHO and Beijing's MOU with them.

I'm going to start with the peace talks article, which was the lead today in the Taipei Times. Let's get right to the text:

President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) yesterday said he would not negotiate unification with China during his presidency, but would consider launching talks on a peace agreement if re-elected in 2012....

This is clearly a retreat off of earlier Ma statements about wanting to have a peace agreement signed during his first term. That could mean either Beijing and Taipei plan to break up the agreement into two parts, one less controversial and one more, and sign those before the election (to give Ma a boost) and the second one after. Or, perhaps Beijing or Taipei simply fear backlash if such steps are taken within such a short four year period. It could also mean that the gaps between Beijing and Taipei on the key sovereignty question is simply too big to imagine the agreement being signed in the first four years.

... He said that he had promised in his inauguration address, under the framework of the Republic of China Constitution [A-gu: emphasis mine], not to discuss unification with Beijing during his presidency, not to pursue or support de jure independence and not to use military force to resolve the matter of Taiwan’s status.

“I will not engage in talks on unification with mainland China during my presidency, regardless of whether it lasts four years or eight,” he said.

Does this imply that according to Ma's reading of the ROC Constitution, he can no more discuss the prospect of unification than he can try to declare independence? I hate to say it, but that would be a very useful wedge indeed that would help keep Beijing at bay. In fact, such a reading could serve as a basis for internal political consensus on cross-strait relations (as if either party would want that).

Also note that Ma does assures voters that they can vote for him twice without fear of bieng fully sold out.

Nor would political negotiations necessarily have to start in 2012, he said, adding that it would depend on developments and whether more pressing issues such as the economy had been addressed.

This statement seems to just be a way of denying a 'unification time table,' a charge that was thrown at Ma right after the interviews Friday with Singapore media.

Ma said he was aware of China’s efforts to achieve unification, but that his administration was focusing on more urgent, less controversial matters, including the economy.

Although these negotiations inevitably touch on some political matters, both sides have sought to avoid sensitive topics, he said.

Ma said the political agenda behind Beijing’s economic engagement with Taiwan was no secret, yet “some administrations handle it well, some not so well.”

“I think my administration handles it rather well,” he said, adding that Beijing does not seek political gains in all its dealings with Taiwan and that a win-win situation for both sides of the Strait is possible.

Besides the swipe at the Chen administration, Ma also reinforces that he really does see the economic and political issues as separate ones, and to be honest I hope he's right (but doubt it). He also may be implying that even though the CCP sees the economic and political issues as going hand in hand, the Ma administration is just not going to let them use one to leverage the other. Again, sounds great, but awfully difficult to put into practice.

Ma said Beijing was hesitant to sign an economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA), possibly because of differences between Taiwan’s ruling and opposition parties. However, Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) and Premier Wen Jiabao (溫家寶) have both expressed interest in an ECFA....

Beijing might also be hesitant to sign because they are holding out for further KMT concessions.

...Ma said the economic pact would likely be one topic at the next round of cross-strait talks, scheduled for the second half of the year.

The president said he did not have any immediate plans to visit China, adding that high-level visits were complicated by issues of security and national sovereignty and dignity.

“My approach has always been to deal with a problem if we cannot solve it,” he said. “You’ll achieve nothing by fixating on sovereignty. Cross-strait relations have developed since we came to power because both sides set aside their differences and focused on more pressing and solvable matters.” [A-gu: emphasis mine]

In principle I could agree, except I don't see China setting aside the sovereignty issue (despite CCP propaganda events meant to imply otherwise). That doesn't seem like truly setting aside differences. It seems to me that it's more like the KMT just closing its eyes to Beijing's oft-repeated position.

Further, the KMT for its part is fixating on sovereignty, not in its daily rhetoric but in its claim to own an ROC that includes all of mainland China. It was the DPP that proposed begininng negotiations without any "One China" or even "One China, One Taiwan" preconditions, and Beijing that refused that point.

In response, DPP spokesman Cheng Wen-tsang (鄭文燦) said Ma should not lie to the public about unification with China.

Cheng said the DPP viewed Ma’s policies as geared at achieving unification. Ma’s strategy for dealing with criticism is to lie to the public, Cheng said.

The DPP urged Ma to put an end to policies that move toward unification.

Here's a classic case of the DPP speaking with such a lack of refinement or substance that even if their ultimate conclusion is correct, nobody will listen to them.

Not with a bang

See Michael Turton's critical, perhaps pivotal, post on Connecting the Dots. In light of other recent moves of the KMT along with recent revival of the Treaty of Taipei I made a comment there amounting to this: I now believe the upcoming peace treaty will declare a formal end to hostilities of the Chinese civil war (not far fetched at all), will make some sort of statement about the place of Taiwan, autonomous region of China, will authorize conditional de facto self-administration by the ROC government on Taiwan, and will postpone ultimate discussions on joint administration/unification/annexation for a set period of time.

Before he made the post we were chatting online about the same topic, and I realized why I hadn't been able to visualize what a peace agreement will look like. In my mind, the sovereignty question was still untouchable and unresolvable, because the KMT would be forcibly constrained by public opinion in Taiwan, and because practical benefits of de facto independence would outweigh any ideological tendency to resolve the Taiwan question in a way that would be so decisive.

Now I believe they will sign an agreement which effectively resolves the Taiwan question, pass it off as Chinese recognition of the "status quo," get China to do a lot of investing and perhaps job creation as the election approaches, and pretend like nothing really happened on the sovereignty issue at all.

The KMT could well manage to do what I had believed to be unthinkable, formally wrap this all up in one term.

The DPP had better put together a real platform fast and begin collecting signatures for a referendum topic that might be able to head off the end game (no point waiting around now) -- perhaps something like "Do you agree that any change to Taiwan's current 'de facto' independence from the People's Republic of China' or agreements signed with that polity require approval by the people through referenda?"