Romance of the Three Kingdoms

You may be familiar with the opening line of the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, a famous novel from the late Yuan-early Ming period. As Wikipedia translates it,

The world under heaven, after a long period of division, will be united; after a long period of union, will be divided.  話說天下大勢，分久必合，合久必分。

A heavy sentence like that carries a lot of weight when applied to the Taiwan situation, especially as Taiwan and China are undeniably in dis-union, regardless of how one views sovereignty issues.

And as you also might imagine, the metaphor might come to seem prophetic if you switch up the opening phrase to "after a long period of unity, will be divided; after a long period of division, will be united." And that's exactly what President Ma Ying-jeou said June 28th when attending a ceremony conferring promotions of higher-level ROC military officers. Of all possible places.

The context of this remark is even more baffling to me:

他表示，中國歷史上分分合合，合久必分、分久必合，但不論那一次分？那一次合？都靠戰爭解決；這次是第一次用和平解決爭端，這是中華民族、炎黃子孫的創舉，大家應該要有這個勇氣，把這段歷史寫好。 [President Ma] said that Chinese history was full of both division and unity; after a long period of unity it must divide, and after a long period of division it must be united. But when to divide? When to unite? Both had always been decided by war. Yet this time is the first time that peaceful methods have been used, a pioneering effort of the Zhonghua Minzu and the decedents of the Yellow Emperor. Everyone should have courage and make sure this section of history is written well [A-gu: aka, a peaceful union comes to fruition].

I find this a remarkably strong statement of the KMT's aspirations to realize unification. That degree of directness is not at all typical: remember how the President did a 180 after his 'ultimate unification' (終極統一) remark back in 2007ish, and how the KMT constantly accused the Greens of "smearing" Ma when they trotted out his own words? Or how the KMT threatened to sue DPP politicians for harping on the "One China Market" (一中市場) philosophy of Vincent Siew?  So I was just stunned to see this remark at all, much less this close to the election, much less at a military ceremony at a time where Ma's administration  spends much media time defending their commitment to the country's defense.

But I was completely beside myself to find that while newspapers had picked it up, the remark wasn't making the sort of waves I would have expected. I mean, this is GOLDEN material for DPP election ads. What am I missing here?   

DPP thinks it up

The DPP just officially established a pair of think tanks.The Taipei Times reports:

The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) yesterday introduced two new think tanks to enhance its policy initiatives while strengthening dialogue with China and the rest of the world....

The Economic and Social Affairs Research Center and the Security and Strategy Research Center are part of the party’s revamped New Frontier Foundation, created under former DPP chairman Lin I-hsiung (林義雄), and include retired government ministers and former representatives abroad.

The value of these think tanks as mechanisms for dialogue with China should not be underestimated. A great deal of communication and probing is done through academic channels and the DPP could use a few more of those in formulating it's China stance.

At the ceremony for the founding of the think tanks, DPP Chair Tsai Ing-wen also gave a speech about cross strait policy. While short on details about the future, Tsai's speech did place the cross-strait relationship through the lens of the international community and she sees Taiwan's current status as a result of modern East Asian history (read: not merely a Chinese civil war). She rejected political preconditions for discussions (read: One China) but said Taiwan must do it's part to maintain peace and stability across the strait (read: maintain dialogue with China). These think tanks are part of that effort.

I'm psyched about the think tanks and imaginative policy initiatives, but I wonder if the DPP can come to any further internal consensus on Taiwan's status and future which will be received warmly by Beijing. Unfortunately, Beijing holds the veto on that and has no reason to show flexibility with the DPP right now when things are going so swimmingly with the KMT. 

Su's "Taiwan Consensus"

I fully expect Su Chen-chang's phrase of "Taiwan Consensus" will end up defining the DPP position vis-a-vis the KMT come 2012, though I imagine we can expect some internal wrangling between heavy weights for a share of the credit.

Su's statement is summerized in this article:

蘇貞昌認為，台灣歷經四次總統直選，是主權獨立的國家，不隸屬於中華人民共和國，依據憲法，目前名稱是中華民國，改變現狀要全民同意，已是全體國人最大的共識。

Su Chen-chang believes that Taiwan has had four direct presidential elections; that it is a sovereign and independent country,  not part of the People's Republic of China; that according to the constitution, the national name is currently the Republic of China; that changing the status quo [thus defined] must be agreed to by the people as a whole; and that these points already form the broadest consensus [of cross-strait relations] in the country.

Tsai Ing-wen's Apple Daily interview

There's much less buzz about it in the bloglosphere than I expected! First, an article about the interview and later related remarks:

On Friday last week, she suggested in an interview with the Chinese-language Apple Daily that the DPP would most likely continue Ma’s cross-strait policies and that any changes would have to be supported by public consensus and legislative approval.

In a previous meeting with the international press in May, she also insisted the DPP had learned from its eight years in office and would work on a more predictable China policy. She has said that stable cross-strait relations would form a key component of the DPP’s 10-year policy guidelines....

While she acknowledged that, compared with the Ma administration, there was a general expectation the DPP needed to be firmer on sovereignty and national security-related issues in the face of growing Chinese pressure, she said the issues could be overcome through greater cross-strait interaction.

However, she maintained increasing cross-strait exchanges would not be conducted at the expense of Taiwan’s ties with the rest of the world.

“This is distinct from the KMT government approach, which embraces China as a [corridor] to the world,” she said.

The Presidential Office has responded by saying DPP cross-strait policy is opportunistic, inconsistent and disingenuous; after all, they say, if the DPP intends to keep the ECFA and other policies in place, why are they attacking the KMT policy? China's Taiwan Affairs Office has shrugged, claiming they don't know if this is simply election language or a sincere change of course.

I have to agree with the criticism of Tsai's remarks, although I sense she's responding to the tendency of the ever-important moderate voter; I also note she wasn't terribly specific. But if the only difference she wants to highlight between DPP and KMT policy is that last paragraph in the quote above, I have to say that's not much of a distinction. Mostly rhetorical.

My question for Tsai would be: would the DPP continue to negotiate with China under the "one China" framework currently in place?

If the answer is yes, isn't the battle for Taiwan's independence essentially over? If the answer is no, will the DPP stand a chance at the polls in 2012?

Warp Zone

For some reason, I occasionally find myself reading editorials in the KMT's mouthpiece, the Central Daily News. Perhaps it's because the paper sometimes says what the Ma administration won't announce from the podium. Here is the article I read today.

The editorial mocks DPP positions on the ECFA; denigrates Lee Teng-hui's "two countries" and Chen Shui-bian's "one side, one country" formulations as "not only completely unworkable but bound to bring about disastrous consequences;" and finally notes that shooting for de jure independence is sure to bring economic ruin and war.

But what really caught my eye was the final paragraph, where the writer throws a curve ball:

Up to this point, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have had the wisdom to define their relations as a unique, non-international and non-domestic relationship. Thus agreements have been signed on the principles of equality and mutual respect by [Taiwan's] Straits Affairs Foundation [SEF] and [China's] Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits [ARATS]. The agreements have been mutually beneficial and won the praise of the international community, just as the ECFA has. Taiwan independence supporters, though, continue to blow hot air about dealing [with "the mainland"] on a nation-to-nation basis. The Taiwanese people have already experienced the tangible benefits of setting aside political differences, fostering warm economic relations, and reducing the danger of a military conflict. If the independence supporters keep mouthing the same old platitudes, they will not win any hearts or minds.

　兩岸如今都有智慧把雙方關係定位為非國際、亦非國內的特殊關係，故以海基、海協兩會來進行協商簽署，合乎對等、尊嚴原則，互蒙其利，亦獲國際社 會讚賞，ＥＣＦＡ也是一樣。獨派卻仍鼓吹以國與國來處理兩岸關係。台灣人民已體驗到了兩岸政治上擱置爭議、經濟上合作互惠、軍事上化解危機的實際利益，獨 派再唱其陳腔濫調，是不會有市場的。

It is obviously and pointedly false to suggest that China views relations with Taiwan as anything other than domestic, unless you ignore everything they say about the subject.

But far more baffling is when the CDN tries to suggest the KMT defines relations [with China] as a unique, non-international and non-domestic relationship.

When was that the definition? Certainly not in 2008 when Ma drew a firestorm of criticism for saying relations were "a non-international, special relationship." Certainly not today, when fantasies of China recognizing a "shared sovereignty" situation are the domain of deluded academics. In fact, there's not a peep about "non-domestic" anywhere.

To prove the point, go search for the Chinese phrase "non-domestic special relationship" (非國內的特殊關係). That search turns up only this CDN article. Even when broken up into two phrases,"non-domestic" and "special relationship," we see nothing else about this topic on the internet. This terminology is newly minted, not official policy, and certainly not the policy of both China and Taiwan.

Why would the official KMT mouthpiece make up one definition of a policy -- one where nuance in phrasing matters a lot -- when the KMT has a different official policy? Is the editor simply living in la-la land? Does he have access to insider information about progress in negotiations with China? Is he making an effort to fool the public in Taiwan (presumably because people don't actually have the stomach to accept relations with China as "domestic" yet)? Or what?

One China, same interpretation

Please find here the translation of an article by Liu Shing-Ren (劉性仁), an NUU part-time lecturer and ROC constitutional scholar, which was featured on the President's website. I believe Professor Liu starts off presenting his views well, but degenerates into a bizarre, whiny patriotic rant.

The article and its translation are rather long, so I've just linked them above. But to sum up Professor Liu's argument:

1. "One China, same interpretation" is a great idea if each side could accept that the ROC + PRC = One Complete China [quote: "the unified, complete China is made up of a 'Mainland China' and a 'Taiwan China' separated by civil war."]
   


2. The Ma government's current position, though, is that One China = ROC.
   


3. If the Ma Government tried to adopt a "One China, same interpretation" position, those pesky Greens would accuse him of preparing to surrender to the Communists. So it's politically unwise.
   


4. When the election rolled around, the Blues would just fall back on China = ROC to avoid political heckling, and mainland China can't accept that, now can it?


5. That makes "One China, same interpretation" a great ideal for the future, but impractical for now.
   


6. Rather, the top priority right now is to arrive at a Blue + Green consensus -- not by compromising toward a middle ground, mind you, but by convincing the Greens to come on over to the Blue understanding.
   

Despite some sarcasm on my part, that's a pretty fair portrayal of the professor's argument.

Nevertheless, I find the idea of "One China, same interpretation" as defined above rather interesting, if impractical as the professor does. What do you think?

Chinese President Hu Jintao's pre-Lunar New Year address to Taiwanese businessmen in China was mostly boilerplate material; no surprises in the speech. However, when reading the speech I was struck by one particular phrase:

...把堅持大陸和台灣同屬一個中國作為推動兩岸關係和平發展的政治基礎...

...to make "insistence that Taiwan and the Mainland are both part of One China" the political foundation for promoting peaceful cross strait development...

Now of course this is nothing new, but what struck me is that for all the KMT's promotion of a constitutional or legal "One China," I don't believe any KMT official has actually used the term "Taiwan and the Mainland are both part of One China." Naturally, the KMT does accept that position (with a different wording preference), or there would be no basis for negotiations at this time.

In fact, I appear to be right about KMT non-use of the phrase. A quick search of the KMT website and other news articles shows that the phrase "同屬一個中國" makes appearances, but always in reference to the "mainland" Chinese position. In fact, President Ma prefers emphasizing that Taiwan and Chinese people "are both part of the Zhonghua Minzu," but does not overtly say they belong to the same "One China."

Here is another example where the DPP rhetoric would be more effective at driving home the KMT's one China policy. If the DPP made sure to mention all the time that "The KMT accepts Taiwan and China are the same country," I think it would strike a bit more of a chord than talking about the ROC legitimacy or theoretical, upcoming "sell outs."

And it would leave the KMT in a rhetorical pickle, as they cannot deny that position but equally, cannot promote it domestically. If you frame the language of the debate in the CCP terms, the KMT can only lose ground.

Taiwan Disaster

Yuan Hongbing (袁紅冰), and exiled Chinese law professor, released his new book Taiwan Disaster last November. I learned about the book at the Taiwanese Heritage Society of Houston yesterday, which displayed an ad for the book. I decided to do a little research into the book, which posits that the Chinese Communist Party plans to complete a loose unification by 2012, including full economic integration, and to form its own proxy party in Taiwan for the 2016 elections.

One of the first things I discovered is that Yuan Hongbing is apparently as crazy as the Falun Gong's Epoch Times, since he apparently believes the Chinese intend on enslaving the entire human race, starting with Taiwan. That does not exactly inspire confidence in his other findings. But let's move on.

The second thing is that Yuan Hongbing claims to be quoting a few very primary sources. The Epoch Times reports the most important as being Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao's June 2008 speech at the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP. The document was apparently highly classified, and the leaking source was risking their life. The other three sources, listed in a Liberty Times article, are from that same meeting, and are three particular plans Yuan says the Central Committee passed: specifically, the Political Strategy for Resolving the Taiwan Problem, Plans for Potential Clashes with the Taiwanese Military, and Plans for Dealing with Taiwan Political Laws Post-Unification.

As Yuan outlines the plan, we see a relatively tight schedule that requires China do the following:

1. Fully integrate Taiwan's economy into China's, turning China into the major export market of Taiwan (snatching 90% plus of exports, including agricultural ones). Given Taiwan's dependence on exports and importation of natural resources, China feels this will finish the goal of economic unification. [A-Gu: It's well-known that China is using the economic crisis and general trends to get Taiwan to agree to economic integration terms they'd otherwise deplore; the Economic Minister just admitted Taiwan will eventually have to remove all Chinese factory products from the current import ban list, and that Taiwan's just trying to get a more favorable time table for those openings. Further, China's not giving in on Taiwan's plans to block Chinese produce and labor for the ECFA.]


2. China intends to be able to fully manipulate the Taiwan stock market through a number of well-paid Taiwan proxies, an expensive goal but one which would give the CCP huge leverage. [A-Gu: I would think so. I thought this would be an ideal investment for the CCP years ago, and I would certainly imagine they would pursue it. Why beat into submission what you can just buy?]


3. Get KMT and DPP heaveyweights alike to profit from investments in China, starting with the KMT; threaten economic ruin for those that don't cooperate; weaken the DPP's social standing and turn the KMT into a partner of unification by 2012. [A-Gu: I think these are also rather obvious, long running strategies, but really still beyond Chinese control.]
   


4. Perhaps most unbelievably, Yuan says the CPP has plans to create its own puppet "Democratic Socialist Party" in Taiwan after 2012. They intend for it to win the presidential election in 2016, and have lined up a number of high profile individuals from the media, religion, political circles, and business to back it. [A-Gu: I don't really see that happening. Too many things could go wrong to bother with this plan for it even to be seriously considered.]

It seems to me that Yuan's book reveals very little new information that is believable. We already knew China seeks economic unification as a basis for further political unification; that it openly seeks to make life easy for politically-connected investors; and that it tries to manipulate Taiwan's domestic politics when it can, but that it's given up using the ham-fist.

But forming a puppet party seems too difficult to be realistic to me, and I think the CCP would conclude the same thing. Likewise, a 2012 time table seems to be more optimistic than even most PLA hawks would hope for. I just don't believe Yuan can have authentic documents on these points, but if I'm wrong we'll know in just a few very short years.

On the other hand, I'd really like to read the book (Eslite is selling it, the LT article indicates). Has anyone read it, or do you have a more interesting review of the book handy?

Wait a second, what?

China claims a missle intercept test went well:

China says it has successfully carried out a test of military technology to shoot down missiles in mid-air. The news comes in the wake of tensions between Beijing and Washington because of American missile sales to Taiwan, an island China considers part of its territory.

Jiang says Monday's test of "ground-based, mid-course missile intercepting technology" had what she describes as "the expected result."

There have been few details about the test....

She emphasizes that the anti-missile test is in line with what she calls China's path of peaceful development and is not targeted at any country.

Wait until everyone gets their hands on that.

My guess? The test didn't go very well. And I believe Taiwan media will go crazy about the report, with the pro-unification media emphasizing that any test like this was aimed at the US, not Taiwan.

And for the record ...

Global Views Monthly has a new survey out showing a whopping 82.8 percent of respondents agree Taiwan and China are two separate countries (full results here [pdf]).

So make no mistake: more than ever before (and we have covered this before), the public is overwhelmingly in support of the DPP's most sacred core principle, and in direct opposition the the KMT and Ma administration's rarely trumpeted but clearly stated view that Taiwan and China belong to the same country.

But we also see that over 80% of the respondants consider themselves members of the Zhonghua Minchu, that modern invention which Ma has used so well as a blanket to cover his "One China" policies.

Further, the voters are overwhelmingly in favor of using cross-strait negotiations to accomplish the following goals, in this order of popularity: reduce China's opposition to Taiwan's participation in international affairs, remove the missles pointed at Taiwan, signing a peace treaty and "increasing freedom and democracy in China." That last goal is newly added to the survey and is something we all wish for in an ideal world, but which I see as a KMT talking point that isn't going to happen.

The only thing to make of this result is issues other than cross-strait terminology are more important to the voters, including "reducing hostilities." If the DPP wants to sell people on the idea that peace treaty = capitulation, they've got a lot of work to do and it could well backfire.

The people of Taiwan are not voting for the KMT because of the One China principle, and the DPP will not repulse voters by saying "one side, one country." The public wants nothing to do with unification but doesn't mind being called what is probably best translated as "ethnically Chinese."

And this is not just a matter of blue-media brianwashing, though people are undoubtedly poorly informed about the DPP, CCP and KMT's position on these issues by blue-leaning media.

If the DPP wants to win, they must get out of the echo chamber and give the public what it wants, as I have been trying to emphasize. That doesn't mean they become KMT Lite; it means coming out swinging with a constructive policy, capable spokesmen and not sounding so paranoid -- even if there is good reason to be paranoid.

The public will not buy it. The island is not going to suddenly "wake up" to the CCP's ongoing threat as long as the CCP stays quiet. Like it or not, believe it or not, the public agrees with the KMT on one major point, which is that there are ways forward in cross-strait issues that don't involve unification or declarations of de jure independence. The DPP must present their version of that middle way to achieve domestic policy goals and constructive relations with China, even if Beijing threatens to boycott it.

Breaking

Twenty three minutes ago, CNA reported the list of industries in Taiwan which mainland Chinese investment will be allowed into during the next round of cross-strait economic liberalization.

A total of 99 industries are listed and include Chinese medicine, automobile production, paper and plastics products, the wholesale business, retail, tourism, air and sea cargo, other service industries.

In all, 65 manufacturing industries will be open, or about 30% of Taiwan's total manufacturing industry, though the wafer and LCD industries along with a few other high tech industries will not be on that list. And twenty three service industries will be opened up as well, though those service industries requiring special certification like law and accounting will remain off the list.

Chinese will also be able to invest in public infrastructure firms, though Chinese firms will not be allowed to directly win public infrastructure contracts themselves here.

You can expect some stock market reaction to that tomorrow!

Another two sets of 16 characters.

Nearly one year ago, on April 30^th, 2008, I analyzed two different 16 character formulas that were seemingly guidelines for how the KMT and CCP wanted to approach cross-strait relations:

When VP-elect Vincent Siew (蕭萬長) met with Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) met a few weeks ago at the economic conference, he raised a sixteen character phrase that he hoped would be the guiding principles of cross-strait relations:

「正視現實，開創未來，擱置爭議，共創雙贏」
"Face reality, start a new future, set aside disputes, and create a win-win situation."

Well, today Hu Jintao responded in kind, using his own slightly modified formula:

“建立互信、求同存异、搁置争议、共创双赢”
"Establish mutual trust, seek common ground while reserving differences, set aside disputes, and create a win-win situation."

Today I bring you a third set of 16 characters that spoken by Premier of the People's Republic of China "Grandpa" Wen Jiabao (温家宝) on the 18^th of this month at the 2009 Boao Forum for Asia. This third formula appears to be another direct response to the KMT's 16 character formula. Wen called on Taiwan and China to:

“面向未来，捐弃前嫌，密切合作，携手并进”
"Face the future, relinquish grudges, closely cooperate, and move forward hand-in-hand."

In the same speech, Wen Jiabao calls on Taiwan to be more open to Chinese imports and for more completely integrating the economic situation. He also called for "discussing and solving the political and economic problems" under the One China principle.

A China time article on the same subject notes a 16 character phrase of Ma's which is also very closely related to all of these discussions:

「同舟共濟，彼此扶持，深化合作，開創未來」
Cross the stream on the same boat, give support to one another, deepen cooperation, and start a new future.

So you can see where all of this is going.

I'm not sure how I feel about it all.

Obviously I have no trust whatsoever in China's willingness to accept anything but full annexation of Taiwan, but I have no doubt they would be willing to form an intermediate agreement which will (a) buy time to make coercion unnecessary (sway Taiwanese public opinion) to achieve a "one country, two systems" unification, or failing that, (b) reduce all other foreign interest in the Taiwan question, thereby making economic or military coercion a piece of cake that the rest of the world will ignore.

On the other hand, part of me wonders what sort of possibility there may be for truly creative solutions. Many US professors I had talked to before were convinced China wanted nothing more than to "save face" on the Taiwan question. I wonder how true this is. I think you could talk people on Taiwan into a federalist "union," but China will have none of that; and likewise, the Chinese "one country, two systems" package won't fly here.

I've previously (and repeatedly) speculated on what an intermediate peace agreement would look like, but basically came up blank. I still believe it's unthinkable that the core issue (sovereignty) could be compromised by either side, so have a lot of trouble figuring out how the the intermediate agreement could be significant.

I think we are going to learn a lot more in the next year or two about the real plans of both the KMT and CCP. I think these are exciting times and that Taiwan will continue to maintain both its de facto independence & grow increasingly close to China on the economic and cultural fronts. I think the KMT will continue to be a bunch of dastardly authoritarian crooks while the DPP continues to be a bunch of whiners who can't even run candidates at the lowest levels or put together a compelling and comprehensive platform.

Time will tell.

Becoming a vassal of Beijing

Becoming a vassal of Beijing
by Lin Chuo-shui (林濁水), former DPP legislator, published first in the Liberty Times
Translated by your truly

Since the 1970's, Taiwan has had difficulty establishing and keeping foreign relations. With the help of the United States and other countries, Taiwan adopted a policy of internationalization and slowly made its way back into international society, joining APEC since 1991 and entering the WTO in 2002. Although participating in these organizations forced Taiwan to make some concessions on her designation, Taiwan did not accept "One China" as a condition for its participation, and Taiwan made full membership the goal.

However, the Hu [Jintao] - Lian [Chan] press communique of 2005 affirms that "Under the principle of One China, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait can negotiate Taiwan's participation in international organizations." Ever since Ma Ying-jeou won the presidential election, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have come to a consensus that cross strait consultations should be held when it comes to Taiwan's participation in international activities.

Since the Ma administration has come to power, they have announced a number of policies, including acceptance of the '92 consensus & one China, two interpretations; KMT-CCP negotiations for Taiwan's international space; a détente in competition for foreign allies; an emphasis that America need not get involved in cross-strait relations; giving up the pursuit of mutual recognition [between Taiwan and China]; and stating that "the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are not in a country-to-country relationship, but are two regions of the same country." In the thinking of the Ma administration, Taiwan's status is now:

1. higher than Hong Kong's, since Taiwan already administers control over its
   own territory and can choose its own leaders and representatives.
2. lower than Belarus or Ukraine under Soviet rule, as Taiwan is not a member
   of the United Nations.
3. lower than the Korean state on the periphery of China during the dynastic
   era, as Korea was allowed to send ambassadors to all countries.
4. giving up not only its legal sovereignty, but its actual
   sovereignty.

To summarize, the Ma government's sees Taiwan's status as a bit improved over "one country two systems," and a bit better than being a vassal state. But it gives up our independent sovereign status as a nation in favor of making us a vassal-state-in-training . But in fact, even this lowly status was refuted in "Hu's six points," and China has emphasized it will never accept Taiwan's independence, and certainly not partial independence (which basically defines the status of a vassal-state-in-training).

Faced with this kind of pressure, presentation of a unified front to the world by all [Taiwanese] parties ought to be a fundamental policy principle. But in the past few years, the parties have used international and cross-strait relations as a pretext to engage in internal fighting. The KMT-CCP forums are a product of that environment; KMT officials running off to China, drinking and laughing with those who seek to swallow Taiwan. The two groups work as one, crushing their common political enemy in Taiwan. This is a wonder of mankind's political history. [With the KMT's adoption of] such a bizarre "If I'm going down, I'm taking you with me" policy, national sovereignty is quickly disappearing and domestic opposition will only increase. To submit to becoming a vassal state of Bejing has already become the current administration's basic policy; and that is currently the single largest danger to Taiwan's sovereignty.

Anti-secession law

As the fourth anniversary of the of China's anti-secession law approaches, and as speculation mounts about what Ma will (or will not) say on that date, I opted to reread some of the documents from that time.

First, take a look at some of the clauses in the official English version of the law:

Article 2 There is only one China in the world. Both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. China's sovereignty and territorial integrity brook no division. Safeguarding China's sovereignty and territorial integrity is the common obligation of all Chinese people, the Taiwan compatriots included.

Article 3 The Taiwan question is one that is left over from China's civil war of the late 1940s....

Article 4 Accomplishing the great task of reunifying the motherland is the sacred duty of all Chinese people, the Taiwan compatriots included.

The DPP government's response at that time, translated by me:

The Republic of China is a sovereign and independent country, and the country's sovereignty belongs to the 23 million people of Taiwan. Any change in Taiwan's future [status] can only be decided by the 23 million people of Taiwan. This is the current social consensus on national sovereignty in Taiwanese
society, and is the common conviction of both the ruling and opposition parties. Recent surveys demonstrate that over 90% of Taiwanese people uphold this principle. Although China has again stated that it will "place its hope in the Taiwanese people," the Anti-secession law in fact completely goes against Taiwanese public opinion. A march survey demonstrates that 93.4% of people do not support the Chinese passing this law as an excuse to use force against Taiwan, and the Legislative Yuan passed a bi-partisan resolution on March 4thcalling on the Beijing authorities to reconsider its actions.

Now I've been tending to dismiss recent DPP claims that Ma is selling out Taiwan's sovereignty, mostly because I believe the DPP are neglecting real problems in favor of rants about what seems like an unlikely hypothetical end result -- that Ma wants to sell out an island that he can already run. I've felt this argument will leave behind middle voters and is probably not true -- while I trust Ma wants Taiwan to unify with China eventually, I also trust he doesn't see it happening in his own lifetime.

But when I reread the DPP statement from that time, it strikes me that the DPP's argument would be infinitely stronger if they nailed Ma on the second half of the statement I highlighted: that sovereignty belongs to Taiwan's 23 million people. Ma agrees the ROC is a sovereign, independent country, but has never stated who that sovereignty belongs to, and tactically denies it belongs to Taiwanese people with his "one China, two interpretations" policy. And the DPP needs to hammer that home, since Ma will be forced to respond with silence, instead of shrilly yelling about how Ma is selling us out.

CECA FTA CEPA ... but no WTO or ASEAN

The proposed Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) between Taiwan and China has been a main focus of the news over the last few days. Read today's Taipei Times article on the subject here. Note that since no formal negotiations on this topic have begun, there is no substance or specifics that can be debated at this time. One favorite quote from the Washington Post article on the subject:

In an interview with the Taipei Times published Friday, Ma seemed to imply that the agreement is a certainty, but he hesitated to respond directly to questions about whether signing it would be tantamount to acknowledging that Taiwan belongs to China.

"As to how the international community perceives the issue, it depends on the stances of different countries," Ma said. "Some countries agree with us, and our allies won't think Taiwan becomes part of communist China when it signs an agreement."

Now to translate some information from blogger Weichen, who takes an ideological tone but has some good information:

Is the CECA an FTA?

The group around Ma Ying-jeou who are selling out Taiwan, who intend to hasten the unification of the countries of China and Taiwan, are strongly insisting on signing a CECA, an important step in the march to unification. This news [link mine] was reported by the Washington Post and created a political firestorm. Ma Ying Jeou of Sell Out Corp. and the Chinese Annexation Group are both working on damage control, and on the front lines of that effort is Li Fei (李非), [deputy director of the Taiwan Studies Center at Xiamen University who the Washington Post quotes as saying the CECA is "a start toward full cross-strait economic integration and a necessary condition for marching forward toward final unification."] Li Fei has now clarified his statement and said the Washington Post misquoted him.

[Note: I just reviewed Li Fei's clarification and it appears the Washington Post quoted him fairly; the main problem seems to have been Taiwanese media rewriting and distorting headlines.]

Our Ministor of Jokes [Economic Minister] even said that the CECA is just an FTA. But this really is funny, since in the book previously written by [MAC chair] Lai Shin-yuan (賴幸媛), she stated a CECA is a completely open FTA, which is to say that CECA would keep Taiwan's economy at a slightly greater distance from China's economy than an FTA would [I don't really follow the logic here]. Ma Ying-jeou, the brains behind Sell Out Corp., has said that a CECA is a "third method" that is somewhere between an FTA and a CEPA, which is to say that a CECA would bring Taiwan's economy closer to China than an FTA would. Three people all have three entirely different explainations, so which one actually describes a CECA?

Now Sell Out Corp realizes they've been busted, but they are in denial, so they're planning on just changing the name from CECA and treating the public like idiots. First they wanted to sign a CEPA, then only after being criticized did they say they wanted a CECA instead. Whatever name they use now, it's still the same thing.

Weichen finishes the post by showing an editorial in the super-blue United Daily News that blames the DPP for confusing the CECA with an FTA -- which is especially hilarious now that the Finance Minister has said they are the same thing.

My own thoughts on the CECA: it does appear that many Taiwanese businesses, with our without investment in China, are convinced that in order to remain competitive on exports to China or imports into Taiwan, CECA is absolutely critical. Of course they'd love to get the deal with all ASEAN countries and sign an FTA with Japan, the US, and Korea as well. But they see that as much more difficult -- in large part due to China's pressure.

So I think there are very legitimate reasons to be concerned about increasing over dependence on China, but I also sympathize with business concerns and hopes for elimination of tariffs. As long as labor doesn't factor in, and safety measures are taken on food products especially, I think the CECA would probably be a good thing on balance and in the long run.

Will some Beijinger please photograph this?

The joint Cape No. 7 / Taiwan beer event scheduled for Valentine's day in Beijing.

Taiwanese businessmen as Chinese officials

The Liberty Times carried a report this morning claiming a number of Taiwanese businessmen have been active in local Chinese Political Consultative Conferences (政治協商會), a sort of advisory council to the Communist Party in different areas.

The name list included Cheng Fon-yuan (程豐原), who heads up the Guangzhou Taiwanese businessman's association and ten others. Being on these councils constitutes holding a Chinese government position and is clearly forbidden by Taiwanese law, specifically article 33 of the Act Government Relations between the Taiwan and Mainland areas, (台灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條例第33條) which states "People, legal officers, organizations and other units from the Taiwan region may not hold positions in the mainland's party branches, military affairs, administration or organizations which are political in nature." (台灣地區人民、法人、團體或其他機構，不得擔任大陸地區黨務、軍事、行政或具政治性機關（構）。 )

However, to date not a single Taiwanese businessman has been fined for being on the councils, and the Liberty Times reported that it's because this is a "politically sensitive" topic and the Mainland Affairs Council would rather ignore the problem. (This is not the first time this issue came up; I've also covered it here when the Ma administration said they may considering allowing Taiwanese to serve on these councils).

MAC spokesman Liu Te-shun (劉德勳) refuted the details of the report today, saying the MAC was still "in the process" of understanding the Political Consultative Conferences' inner workings, including differences between regular members and 'honorary members' (特聘委員), though Liu says that the MAC's initial studies indicate honorary members are still full committee members.

Liu also stated that if there were any proof that Taiwanese businessmen were serving in such capacities, the MAC would ask them to resign and if the businessmen refused to do so, the MAC would ask the SEF to fine the businessmen. Liu also said the MAC was not considering loosing these restrictions "at the present time."

My view is that Liu is hedging enough in his answers that I suspect the MAC had heard this news before and had decided not to act on it.

Letting Taiwanese businessmen on the council is a win-win situation for both the businesses and the Chinese government; it attaches influential Taiwanese to the Chinese political system and gives the Taiwanese businessmen some voice in defending their own interests there. But it is illegal and dangerous to Taiwan for obvious reasons, especially conflicts of interest and national loyalty complications.

Ma: Improved cross-strait relations have

President Ma has noted that warming cross strait relations, driven by Taiwan's acceptance of a 'one China' policy, has actually strengthened Taiwanese sovereignty and improved trust between Taiwan and American officials.

The RTI article does not quote Ma directly using the phrase Taiwanese sovereignty (台灣主權), but the Liberty Times article confirms the quote and extends on it (Update: Taipei Times article indicated he may have used ROC sovereignty instead of Taiwan sovereignty), paraphrasing Ma's comments as "Taiwan is already a democratic society, and of course Taiwan's future must be decided by Taiwanese people. The government's policy is to make Taiwanese sovereignty and respect for the people the top priority.

Ma also claims that his "no unification, no independence, no force" policy is so awesome that it allowed the new government to make the US arms purchase last October (despite it having been on the table for years already but boycotted by the KMT); Ma also cited a number of small issues which seem to demonstrate that Taiwan already has more international space because of his China policy.

Ma is of course living in an alternate reality.

China labeling Taiwan as a threat

This has already been picked up by others in the Taiwan blogosphere, and everyone has noted the obvious attempt to get the US to discontinue arms sales to Taiwan. But there was one particular thing I thought worth noting:

China's security has been improving as its economy grows and the PLA embraces modernization, the defense "white paper" said, but pro-independence forces in Taiwan, Tibet and the energy-rich western region of Xinjiang still "pose threats to China's unity and security."

"On this issue, there can be no compromise and no concessions," Defense Ministry chief spokesman Hu Changming said at a news conference to launch the document.

I would need the original transcript to be sure that this 'no compromise' and 'no concessions' remark refers to Taiwan in particular, but that's a pretty blunt statement.

SEF forum

Taiwan's Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) held a forum today and invited a number of speakers to discuss cross-strait relations and development. You can read about what some of the speakers said here in Chinese. Below is a paraphrased English version of that report.

Assistant Secretary of the SEF Ma Shao-chang (馬紹章), also a man in the KMT's think tank (the National Policy Foundation), said that he believes the 92 consensus is the foundation for trust across the strait. He believes there are various levels of trust and he hopes that the two sides of the strait can work together for the benefit of people on both sides. [Fluff!]

Yang Kai-huang (楊開煌), president of the Association for Mainland China Studies (中國大陸研究學會), and a man who has said the PRC should recognize the ROC's existence but who has also not been a fan of the referendums held so far in Taiwan, used his speaking time to mention that Hu's six points have become the center of Chinese policy toward Taiwan, and that it outlines a three-fold plan of economic cooperation, strengthening of cultural and educational exchanges, and finally the beginning of political dialogue.

Yang also believes that Hu, in his capacity as China's leader, managed to redefine what unification means as "the end of the political confrontation across the Taiwan Strait" (終止兩岸政治對立). He also believes China has put a huge emphasis on peaceful development as a replacement of constantly mentioning unification. [I find this framing of 'redefining unification' tempting to accept, and perhaps worth discussing with Beijing, but unlikely to be true.]

Yang suggested tri-partisan dialogue (CCP, KMT, and DDP) forums that would allow each side to make themselves heard, despite the difficulty of getting that started.

Du Jhen-hua (杜震華), professor at the NTU's Graduate Institute of National Development, had some more cautionary words; he does really follow Ma's vague stance toward unification, and believes that it will be difficult to really develop complete mutual trust between China and Taiwan or convince China to relax on political and economic promises unless Ma makes a direct, clear response to Hu's six points.

Central Police University professor Tung Li-wen (董立文) pointed out that since Hu's six points, Taiwanese political parties have been rather low key and he believes they have created a sort of strange atmosphere here in Taiwan. Tung said that Hu's speech was clearly aimed at beginning political dialogue on the point of unification with Taiwan, and therefore the Ma government's response would be very important.

Tung believes that Beijing will seperate the principles of signing a peace accord and Taiwan's participation in international bodies. For example, he believes Beijing will allow Taiwan observer status in the WHA first, but he that unless discussing the peace accord's terms could begin this year, he believes the mainland will change its policy toward the Ma government.