Romance of the Three Kingdoms

You may be familiar with the opening line of the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, a famous novel from the late Yuan-early Ming period. As Wikipedia translates it,

The world under heaven, after a long period of division, will be united; after a long period of union, will be divided.  話說天下大勢，分久必合，合久必分。

A heavy sentence like that carries a lot of weight when applied to the Taiwan situation, especially as Taiwan and China are undeniably in dis-union, regardless of how one views sovereignty issues.

And as you also might imagine, the metaphor might come to seem prophetic if you switch up the opening phrase to "after a long period of unity, will be divided; after a long period of division, will be united." And that's exactly what President Ma Ying-jeou said June 28th when attending a ceremony conferring promotions of higher-level ROC military officers. Of all possible places.

The context of this remark is even more baffling to me:

他表示，中國歷史上分分合合，合久必分、分久必合，但不論那一次分？那一次合？都靠戰爭解決；這次是第一次用和平解決爭端，這是中華民族、炎黃子孫的創舉，大家應該要有這個勇氣，把這段歷史寫好。 [President Ma] said that Chinese history was full of both division and unity; after a long period of unity it must divide, and after a long period of division it must be united. But when to divide? When to unite? Both had always been decided by war. Yet this time is the first time that peaceful methods have been used, a pioneering effort of the Zhonghua Minzu and the decedents of the Yellow Emperor. Everyone should have courage and make sure this section of history is written well [A-gu: aka, a peaceful union comes to fruition].

I find this a remarkably strong statement of the KMT's aspirations to realize unification. That degree of directness is not at all typical: remember how the President did a 180 after his 'ultimate unification' (終極統一) remark back in 2007ish, and how the KMT constantly accused the Greens of "smearing" Ma when they trotted out his own words? Or how the KMT threatened to sue DPP politicians for harping on the "One China Market" (一中市場) philosophy of Vincent Siew?  So I was just stunned to see this remark at all, much less this close to the election, much less at a military ceremony at a time where Ma's administration  spends much media time defending their commitment to the country's defense.

But I was completely beside myself to find that while newspapers had picked it up, the remark wasn't making the sort of waves I would have expected. I mean, this is GOLDEN material for DPP election ads. What am I missing here?   

Warp Zone

For some reason, I occasionally find myself reading editorials in the KMT's mouthpiece, the Central Daily News. Perhaps it's because the paper sometimes says what the Ma administration won't announce from the podium. Here is the article I read today.

The editorial mocks DPP positions on the ECFA; denigrates Lee Teng-hui's "two countries" and Chen Shui-bian's "one side, one country" formulations as "not only completely unworkable but bound to bring about disastrous consequences;" and finally notes that shooting for de jure independence is sure to bring economic ruin and war.

But what really caught my eye was the final paragraph, where the writer throws a curve ball:

Up to this point, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have had the wisdom to define their relations as a unique, non-international and non-domestic relationship. Thus agreements have been signed on the principles of equality and mutual respect by [Taiwan's] Straits Affairs Foundation [SEF] and [China's] Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits [ARATS]. The agreements have been mutually beneficial and won the praise of the international community, just as the ECFA has. Taiwan independence supporters, though, continue to blow hot air about dealing [with "the mainland"] on a nation-to-nation basis. The Taiwanese people have already experienced the tangible benefits of setting aside political differences, fostering warm economic relations, and reducing the danger of a military conflict. If the independence supporters keep mouthing the same old platitudes, they will not win any hearts or minds.

　兩岸如今都有智慧把雙方關係定位為非國際、亦非國內的特殊關係，故以海基、海協兩會來進行協商簽署，合乎對等、尊嚴原則，互蒙其利，亦獲國際社 會讚賞，ＥＣＦＡ也是一樣。獨派卻仍鼓吹以國與國來處理兩岸關係。台灣人民已體驗到了兩岸政治上擱置爭議、經濟上合作互惠、軍事上化解危機的實際利益，獨 派再唱其陳腔濫調，是不會有市場的。

It is obviously and pointedly false to suggest that China views relations with Taiwan as anything other than domestic, unless you ignore everything they say about the subject.

But far more baffling is when the CDN tries to suggest the KMT defines relations [with China] as a unique, non-international and non-domestic relationship.

When was that the definition? Certainly not in 2008 when Ma drew a firestorm of criticism for saying relations were "a non-international, special relationship." Certainly not today, when fantasies of China recognizing a "shared sovereignty" situation are the domain of deluded academics. In fact, there's not a peep about "non-domestic" anywhere.

To prove the point, go search for the Chinese phrase "non-domestic special relationship" (非國內的特殊關係). That search turns up only this CDN article. Even when broken up into two phrases,"non-domestic" and "special relationship," we see nothing else about this topic on the internet. This terminology is newly minted, not official policy, and certainly not the policy of both China and Taiwan.

Why would the official KMT mouthpiece make up one definition of a policy -- one where nuance in phrasing matters a lot -- when the KMT has a different official policy? Is the editor simply living in la-la land? Does he have access to insider information about progress in negotiations with China? Is he making an effort to fool the public in Taiwan (presumably because people don't actually have the stomach to accept relations with China as "domestic" yet)? Or what?

This time, a blast from the back to the future

Taipei Times:

President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) yesterday morning thanked the outgoing Solomon Islands ambassador at the Presidential Office, but referred to his administration as the “Chunghua government” (中華政府) or “Chinese government....”

Realizing his mistake, Ma immediately corrected himself and said he meant the “government of the Republic of China.”

I'm no native speaker, but I'd argue that the Chinese term used here seems really bizarre and forced. “Chunghua government” (中華政府) is not *quite* a coinage, as the phrase appears when searched for online, mostly in relation to some sort of Taiwan military surplus dealer which uses the phrase in their name (though I'd argue the deep structure is different for their title).

So although the phrase isn't entirely invented, it does not roll off the tongue. Frankly, "Chinese government (中國政府) would be not only smoother but probably preferable to this bizarre formation that is riding on the back of Zhunghua Minzu. And there's no reason the good old "Taiwan government" (臺灣政府) should have been avoided here.

However, I'll give Ma the benefit of the doubt and assume this was a misspeak leaving out two words (should have been 中華民國政府), not an attempt to start using new terminology.

Taiwan Disaster

Yuan Hongbing (袁紅冰), and exiled Chinese law professor, released his new book Taiwan Disaster last November. I learned about the book at the Taiwanese Heritage Society of Houston yesterday, which displayed an ad for the book. I decided to do a little research into the book, which posits that the Chinese Communist Party plans to complete a loose unification by 2012, including full economic integration, and to form its own proxy party in Taiwan for the 2016 elections.

One of the first things I discovered is that Yuan Hongbing is apparently as crazy as the Falun Gong's Epoch Times, since he apparently believes the Chinese intend on enslaving the entire human race, starting with Taiwan. That does not exactly inspire confidence in his other findings. But let's move on.

The second thing is that Yuan Hongbing claims to be quoting a few very primary sources. The Epoch Times reports the most important as being Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao's June 2008 speech at the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP. The document was apparently highly classified, and the leaking source was risking their life. The other three sources, listed in a Liberty Times article, are from that same meeting, and are three particular plans Yuan says the Central Committee passed: specifically, the Political Strategy for Resolving the Taiwan Problem, Plans for Potential Clashes with the Taiwanese Military, and Plans for Dealing with Taiwan Political Laws Post-Unification.

As Yuan outlines the plan, we see a relatively tight schedule that requires China do the following:

1. Fully integrate Taiwan's economy into China's, turning China into the major export market of Taiwan (snatching 90% plus of exports, including agricultural ones). Given Taiwan's dependence on exports and importation of natural resources, China feels this will finish the goal of economic unification. [A-Gu: It's well-known that China is using the economic crisis and general trends to get Taiwan to agree to economic integration terms they'd otherwise deplore; the Economic Minister just admitted Taiwan will eventually have to remove all Chinese factory products from the current import ban list, and that Taiwan's just trying to get a more favorable time table for those openings. Further, China's not giving in on Taiwan's plans to block Chinese produce and labor for the ECFA.]


2. China intends to be able to fully manipulate the Taiwan stock market through a number of well-paid Taiwan proxies, an expensive goal but one which would give the CCP huge leverage. [A-Gu: I would think so. I thought this would be an ideal investment for the CCP years ago, and I would certainly imagine they would pursue it. Why beat into submission what you can just buy?]


3. Get KMT and DPP heaveyweights alike to profit from investments in China, starting with the KMT; threaten economic ruin for those that don't cooperate; weaken the DPP's social standing and turn the KMT into a partner of unification by 2012. [A-Gu: I think these are also rather obvious, long running strategies, but really still beyond Chinese control.]
   


4. Perhaps most unbelievably, Yuan says the CPP has plans to create its own puppet "Democratic Socialist Party" in Taiwan after 2012. They intend for it to win the presidential election in 2016, and have lined up a number of high profile individuals from the media, religion, political circles, and business to back it. [A-Gu: I don't really see that happening. Too many things could go wrong to bother with this plan for it even to be seriously considered.]

It seems to me that Yuan's book reveals very little new information that is believable. We already knew China seeks economic unification as a basis for further political unification; that it openly seeks to make life easy for politically-connected investors; and that it tries to manipulate Taiwan's domestic politics when it can, but that it's given up using the ham-fist.

But forming a puppet party seems too difficult to be realistic to me, and I think the CCP would conclude the same thing. Likewise, a 2012 time table seems to be more optimistic than even most PLA hawks would hope for. I just don't believe Yuan can have authentic documents on these points, but if I'm wrong we'll know in just a few very short years.

On the other hand, I'd really like to read the book (Eslite is selling it, the LT article indicates). Has anyone read it, or do you have a more interesting review of the book handy?

Yes, no, maybe so.

Last Wed., Ma "clarified" (muddled, really) part of his Three Nos pledge: no unification, no independence, and no war.

"No unification," Ma said, "does not mean we rule out the option of unification." The topic has already been covered at Taiwan Matters, among other blogs.

That article remains the hottest topic on Yam's news site today, and one of the more astute commentators asked how this applies to his other pledges.

No independence does not mean we rule out the option of independence?
No use of force does not mean we rule out the option of the use of force?

What sort of pledge is it, really then?

I think that there is some possibility that Ma's comment come sin light of Chinese pressure, but it's impossible to say for sure.

台海安全考察

Recently I've been checking out a book called An Investigation of Security in the Taiwan Strait (台海安全考察) by scholar Li Peng (李鵬), who was at Xiamen University's Taiwan Research Institute. The 2005 work would be seemingly outdated, except it is apparently spot on in a couple of key observations.

I would call your attention to two paragraphs near the end of this book, where options for resolving the cross-strait 'problem' are outlined. One of the two outlined solution gains the author's grudging acceptance as a potentially workable plan.

In January 1998, [American scholar] Kenneth Lieberthal (李侃如) suggested that the two sides of the strait sign an interim agreement that would remain unaltered for 50 years, creating a comprehensive political framework that would normalize development in cross strait relations under the One China principle and guarantee 50 years of peaceful stability in the Taiwan Strait. Under this framework, Taiwan would not seek de jure independence and would acknowledge it is part of China; the mainland would promise not to use force against Taiwan; before unification, both sides would be responsible for both their own internal affairs and foreign policies, subject to limitations set forth in the agreement; and both sides would use different terminology to reduce tensions. The PRC could call itself China, the "ROC" could call itself "Taiwan, China," and both sides could try using the term "Greater China" or other similar language.

I will note that the outline above closely mirrors the direction we seem to be going in now. Ma has announced a détente in foreign affairs, which has for the most part been reciprocated by China. Taiwan has agreed it is part of one China, and Ma's core policy for cross-strait relations is "no unification, no independence, no use of force." Hu Jintao is referring to the upcoming peace agreement as a way to settle the political relations "in this special period before unification." Ma has used terms like "let the next generation decide" and even raised the 50 year time table before, though he is not overly attached to that time frame. All this has been covered extensively on this blog even in just the last couple of weeks. So it seems that it is a plan like this which has become the consensus for how to proceed.

On to what I think is the key part of the other interesting paragraph.

In the 2004 version of his plan [which also suggests China clearly define what constitutes independence and suggests international recognition as the standard], Lieberthal emphasizes that both sides of the strait can use their own language. He says "China can continue to uphold the One China principle, but must renounce the use of force; Taiwan can also continue to emphasize the reality of the sovereign independence of the ROC, but give up seeking de jure independence." To some degree this sort of silent acknowledgment of "actual independence" would be very difficult for the Chinese mainland to accept. Secondly, setting international recognition as the standard for what constitutes "independence" would be difficult for either side of the strait to accept. If the Taiwan authorities openly declare independence, but the international community fails to recognize it, the most we could say is that their declaration had been void; we could not lie to ourselves and others by claiming that Taiwan was not implementing an actual splittist policy of Taiwanese independence. If the Chinese government sat by and did nothing, it would be an excuse for Taiwanese authorities to bellow on about "actual independence" or silent mainland recognition of "Taiwan independence...."

Well, this is also certainly true. China still maintains there is no ROC, but at this point they don't really care if Taiwan talks about the ROC as long as they agree to the One China principle at the same time.

So, while there's no startling revelations here, it really does bolster the idea that all of these moves have been part of a coordinated plan to come to an interim agreement, which will be labeled a peace agreement, and which China will really, really want [read: insist] to include a phrase like "during this period before unification."

Now for the question I struggle with and which will inevitably become the debate when the peace agreement is presented: is such an agreement really so bad? Is 50 years of peace and self-administration worth a trade off of just saying we're part of China? Will it really mean the end of Taiwanese independence potential?

I suppose there are two points worth mentioning before trying to come to a conclusion. The first is that the Taiwanese public is about equally averse to drawing Chinese ire with a formal independence declaration as they are to subjecting themselves to Chinese administration; but on everything in the middle, there's probably room to shift public opinion from the current "We're already independent" to "we're a special region of China that rules ourselves." At the same time, we must remember how such an agreement would change the defense, international and domestic education formula.

Second is that, as Rank reminded me in a chat with me the other day, the Taiwanese public will be perfectly willing to elect the KMT to extract maximum concessions from the CCP, and then willingly turn on a dime to elect the opposition if they felt their freedoms or security were in danger.

So is such an agreement worth the price? I doubt it, and I can't see the CCP ultimately accepting anything short of one country, two systems. But this sort of plan just might sell. And even if it does, that doesn't mean the fat lady has sung.

Hu makes no secret of agenda

Following the meeting between KMT chairman Wu Po-hsiung and CCP chairman Hu Jintao, Chinese media has made a large deal of two particular formulations: first is Hu's new 'six ideas' and second is a five point consensus reached during the meeting, a consensus Liberty Times said the KMT really had no idea existed until reports on it surfaced.

What is the five point consensus?

第一，双方都表示要继续推动落实“两岸和平发展共同愿景”，不断促进两岸关系和平发展； 第二，都认为要维护反对“台独”、坚持“九二共识”的共同政治基础，不断增强和深化互信；第三，都强调要加强两岸经济合作，尽快商谈两岸经济合作协议，以 利建立两岸经济合作机制；第四，都赞同要积极促进两岸文化教育交流，举办以文教交流为主题的两岸经贸文化论坛，开始探讨协商两岸文化教育交流协议；第五， 都主张两岸在涉外事务中避免不必要的内耗，增进中华民族整体利益。

First, both sides expressed their intent to continue to implement their common wish for peaceful cross-strait development and would constantly work to improve peaceful cross-strait relations. Second, both sides will guard against "Taiwanese independence" while strongly upholding the common political foundation of the '92 concensus, in order to constantly improve and deepen mutual trust. Third, both sides emphasized their intent to strengthen cross-strait economic cooperation, to quickly sign a cross strait economic cooperation agreement, and to establish mechanisms for cross-strait economic cooperation. Fourth, both sides agreed to actively promote cross-strait cultural and educational exchanges, to hold economic and cultural forums that focus on those exchanges, and to discuss how to come to an agreement on cross-striat cultural and economic exchanges. Fifth, both sides support avoiding 'bad news' when it comes to foreign matters in order to promote the interests of the Zhonghua Minzu [A-gu: probably a reference to Ma's détente with China in seeking allies].

Well, not a lot of new information there. What about the six ideas?

　第一，关于增进两岸政治互信。去年５月以来，两岸双方在反对“台独”、坚持“九二共识 ”的基础上建立了互信，从而推动解决了两岸关系中一系列复杂问题。考虑到今后两岸关系的发展前景，包括需要逐步破解一些政治难题，巩固和增进双方的政治互 信尤为重要。坚持大陆和台湾同属一个中国是关键所在。

The first deals with strengthening cross-strait political trust. .. [opposing TI, supporting the 92 consensus, etc]... Strongly supporting the idea that Taiwan and China both belong to one China is vital.

　　第二，关于两岸经济合作。今后一个时期仍然要把全面加强两岸经济合作作为重点， 当前最突出的任务是共同应对国际金融危机冲击。考虑到两岸同胞是一家人，我们采取了一些实际措施同你们共克时艰。今后，如果形势需要，我们还会继续这样 做。签定两岸经济合作协议，关键是协议内容要有利于两岸经济共同发展、两岸同胞福祉增进，有利于建立具有两岸特色的经济合作机制。双方应该共同推进商签协 议准备工作，争取今年下半年谈起来。

The second deals with economic cooperation... [Cooperation good, dealing with current financial crisis]... Keeping in mind that comrades on both sides of the strait belong to the same family, we are choosing a practical method to get through these hard times together. Afterwards, if circumstances require, we will continue to help... [Economic agreement good for both sides, get ECFA done by end of year].

　　第三，关于加强两岸文化教育交流。新形势下，开展两岸文化教育交流，既有巨大需求和潜力，也显得更为重要。我们要比以往更加努力地开展两岸文化教育交流，共同传承和弘扬中华文化，增强中华文化认同、中华民族认同。

The third deals with economic and cultural exchanges. [Important, helps heal wounds....] Both sides should promote Chinese culture together, strengthen identity with Chinese culture and with the Zhonghua Minzu.

　 　第四，关于涉外事务。几天前，中华台北卫生署应邀派出人员作为观察员参加了今年的世界卫生大会。这表明，两岸中国人有能力、有智慧妥善解决台湾参与国际 组织活动问题，也表明我们促进两岸关系和平发展的诚意。我们希望，这有利于增进台湾同胞对大陆的了解，有利于两岸关系和平发展。

The fourth deals with foreign affairs... [WHA observer status breakthrough great, demonstrates Chinese good will]... We hope that this helps the Taiwanese compatriots better understand the mainland and contributes to peaceful cross-strait development.

　　第 五，关于结束两岸敌对状态、达成和平协议。促进正式结束两岸敌对状态、达成和平协议，是“两岸和平发展共同愿景”提出的目标，已经成为两岸双方的重要主 张。我们提出，两岸可以就国家尚未统一的特殊情况下的政治关系问题、建立两岸军事安全互信机制问题进行务实探讨，表明了我们解决问题的积极思考。两岸协商 总体上还是要先易后难、先经后政、把握节奏、循序渐进，但双方要为解决这些问题进行准备、创造条件。双方可以先由初级形式开始接触，积累经验，以逐步破解 难题。

The fifth deals with the cross-strait tension and seeking a peace agreement. Putting a formal end to hostilities and reaching a peace agreement is the common aspiration for peaceful cross-strait development and has already become an important principle of both sides. We would point out that both sides can discuss how political relations should be handled in this special circumstance preceding national unification, can debate how to establish a confidence building on military affairs, and express our thoughts on how to solve these problems. We still need to deal with cross-strait agreements by dealing with the easy ones first. First economics, then politics...

　　第六，关于国共两党交流对话。国共两党交流对话特别是高层交往对保持两岸关系发展势头具有不可替代的重要作用。国共论坛是一个 成功的论坛，应该继续办下去，而且要越办越好。同时，两岸关系发展需要两岸广大同胞特别是基层民众参与。两岸各界举办的海峡论坛，突出了两岸民众的参与和 互动。

The sixth deals with KMT-CCP dialogue and exchanges... [It's been important so far, we should continue, and improve communication. Need to bring in common people to participate. Need more exchanges between people on both sides.]

There you have it! Now time to get back to work. Remember, try to ignore all these things coming out of the CCP's mouth if you want to pretend they're not going to push for unification.

I make special note of the wording "this special circumstance preceding national unification," because you can bet your bottom dollar that the CCP will want that sentence in the peace agreement, even if exactly when and how the unification is to be achieved is not specified.

I speculate Ma will re-activate the National Unification Council sometime before that. Before the signing of the peace agreement, expect a further emphasis that the Council's guidelines will still be used to determine when unification is possible (namely, once China has democratized and gotten as rich as Taiwan). And finally, I imagine the CCP will ask for revisions to those guidelines a few years later.

More confusing still

At the El Salvador presidential inauguration ceremony which President Ma Ying-jeou was attending, he ran into Sec. of State Hillary Clinton and introduced himself as "President of Taiwan." This seemed almost like an intentional contrast to Wu Po-hsiung's mention of daonei while in China.

But, Ma clarified his introduction during a tea session with reporters, whenever he says "President of Taiwan," he means "President of the Republic of China," certainly not "President of the Republic of Taiwan."

Well, fair enough if you think, like A-bian did, that Taiwan = the ROC, a position Ma may or may not have endorsed at some point, depending on how you interpret that famous pre-election statement, 台灣就是中華民國.

So to wrap up what we've learned by carefully watching KMT statements before and after the election last year, the KMT position is:

1. Taiwan and the Chinese mainland are both parts of the Republic of China, a fact that the constitution mandates -- neither independence or unification are possible without constitutional amendments. So Taiwan is not a country.
2. Still, thanks to doublethink, "Nobody thinks Taiwan isn't a country."
3. Taiwan's sovereignty belongs to the ROC, and the ROC's sovereignty belongs to all of the ROC citizens. Therefore Taiwan's sovereignty belongs to the people on both sides of the Taiwan strait.
4. However, the future of cross-strait relations should be decided "on the Taiwan side" by the Taiwanese people through referendum, but not until a generation from now.
5. But first, Taiwan and China should sign a peace agreement in Ma's first term. Scratch that, make it the theoretical second term.
   

What to make of the shifts which one commenter on this blog accurately called a "merry-go-round" of policy statements? I doubt Ma is confused about his position on this -- he's merely trying to pander to both the CCP and the Taiwan electorate, who hold incompatible positions, because he needs both of their support to have a chance at re-election or legacy.

And -- if Taiwan's military becomes an otherwise worthless paycheck factory, if the economy becomes fully dependent on China, if countries like Japan and the US write off Taiwan, all while Beijing refuses to renounce the use of force and openly maintains the goal of unifying under the one country, two systems formula sooner rather than later-- does it matter what the Taiwan government's position is? Would China stop short of simply demanding compliance with their preferred terms for unification? All signs suggest making such a demand wouldn't bother them a bit.

More of the same...

Update: cctang has been kind enough to provide some corrections to my rushed translation in comments.

Yesterday, Chinese Nationalist Party chairman Wu Po-hsiung gave a "Taiwan as part of China" speech at Nanjing university, just days after President Ma Ying-jeou voiced support for the right of the Taiwanese to decide questions of sovereignty by referendum.

The Liberty Times captured some of the choice gems in the speech. Let's hear some soon-to-be-classic lines, Wu!

「台灣有一股逆流叫『去中國化』，去了半天不可能成功，因為生活不是意識形態所能改變的！」

"Taiwan has a non-mainstreem 'de-Sinicization' movement, but it was unable to succeed at the end of last year because ideology can't change [the facts of] life."

Taiwanese, not Chinese, identity is the mainstream position. Don't believe Wu's statement, which so closely resembles Chinese Communist propaganda. Remember, the latest statistics indicate that 65% of the population call themselves Taiwanese while only 11.5% Chinese and 18.1% claim both as identities.

Also, 'de-Sinicization' is a blue word (greens use things like "enhance native identity," "name rectification" and "locally-oriented" when discussing related topics).

「今天對我來說是一生非常難忘的時刻」，「這個榮譽應給兩岸千千萬萬有智慧的中華民族，他們覺得兩岸繼續對立、敵對、衝撞是錯誤方向，我只是代表接受。」

"I will remember [correction: receiving this honorary degree] for for the rest of my life." "This honor really belongs to the incredibly brilliant Zhonghua Minzu, who feel that continued confrontation, animosity and provocation is not the correct path for cross-strait relations. I can only accept this as their representative."

If you're like me, that made you a little sick to your stomach. But there is a reason that the term Zhonghua Minzu has been so closely embraced by both KMT and CCP while discussion of the '92 consensus or other political topics: and that is because a full 60% of people believe both sides of the strait are governments established by Zhonghua Minzu, including 45% of greens. Not too far off from saying 60% of people consider themselves to be part of the Zhonghua Minzu. Notice how that differs from the identification results if you use more phrases that are considered more political in Taiwan, like Zhongguoren and Taiwanren in your questions. Of course, as far as the Chinese are concerned Zhonghua Minzu = Zhongguoren.

So Zhonghua Minzu is the non-political tether that can hold Taiwan to China, the thing both sides can make claim to and that has majority support in Taiwan. Which is badly needed, especially since the last MAC opionion poll for how to decide Taiwan's future looked like this:

Maintain the 'status quo' forever: 27% (record high)
Maintain the ‘status quo’ and decide later: 35%
Maintain the ‘status quo’ and then become independent: 15.1%
Maintain the ‘status quo’ and then unify [with China]: 7.6%
Declare independence as soon as possible: 6.7%
Immediate unification with China: 1.2%
(No response: 7.4%)

And 82% percent of people oppose China's "one country, two systems" model.

Last quote from Wu:

提到兩岸，他指出，一年來兩岸關係發展非常關鍵，得來不易，但「想通了就通了」，有智慧就知道該怎麼走。他認為，兩岸有些問題短期內無法解決，可用智慧先擱置爭議，從異中求同，「兩岸共同基礎就是血緣、同屬炎黃子孫的民族情感，另外就是文化」。

Regarding cross-strait relations, Wu pointed out that the next last year of developing those relations was crucial and fraught with difficulty, but "As long as we want to work through it we can," and by applying wisdom both sides would know where to go.

Although there are a great many problems in the cross-strait relationship that cannot be fixed in the short term, those disputes can wisely be set aside, the two sides could find common interests despite their difficulties. "Both sides have the common affection of a people whose foundations are build on blood and common descent from the Yellow Emperor, not to mention a common culture."

I won't argue much on the cultural front (even though Wu's phrasing is just meant to fit into a political narrative), but the purely racist language used here is neither entirely accurate nor acceptable.

Just great

In the 24-hour news cycle world, a new Biggest Story Ever gets marched out on at least a daily basis. One of those big stories yesterday was related to the Hu-Wu meeting.

Emphasizing that Taiwan and China belonged to “one China,” Hu said the two had agreed to promote peace, oppose Taiwanese independence, stand by the so-called “1992 consensus” and strengthen mutual trust.

Hu said that the two sides should engage in “pragmatic discussions” of political relations ­before carrying out unification and establish a military confidence-building mechanism. It is the goal of both sides to put a formal end to hostility by signing a peace agreement, he said.

Hu said Taiwan and China should forge ahead with preparations for an ECFA and aim for negotiations on the agreement in the latter part of the year.

An ECFA would be beneficial to economic development and public welfare on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, Hu said.

Wu did not mention President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) or Taiwan’s sovereignty during the meeting. He repeatedly used the phrase daonei (島內, “within the island”) when referring to Taiwan.

Last week, Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu (陳菊) earned plaudits from lawmakers across party lines when she referred to Ma by his title during a meeting with Beijing’s mayor.

Taiwan is, of course, an island. But Green politicians were upset Wu did not use the phrase guonei (國內, "within the country").

Now it will come as no surprise to readers of this blog that Wu does not consider Taiwan a country; indeed, the current KMT position is basically a reversion to the Chiang Ching-kuo policy, where unification, democratizing the mainland and upholding the Three People's Principles are interlocking goals.

But you wouldn't know that by watching blue media yesterday. Oh no. You see, Wu was merely avoiding saying guonei because using the phrase might cause friction with China. Likewise, saying "the Republic of China" might result in Hu Jintao retorting with "the People's Republic of China." The Chinese media would probably block it anyway, depriving the Chinese people of a chance to hear from Taiwan's political leaders. And even if the Chinese aired it, the masses wouldn't understand that guonei was acutally a reference to Taiwan; they'd take it as a reference to all of China. All of that is best avoided, you see.

Ultimately this is a relatively trivial matter, but honestly, the way the blue media covers for the KMT, you'd think the blues had a "two China" policy.

What is up with this guy?

No points for answering that question correctly.

Ma can't get his story straight.

I was surprised and confused on the 19^th when Ma said "Taiwan is the Republic of China," which seemed like a policy shift to me, but the Presidential Office spokesman cleared that up quickly by correcting Ma's statement to "Taiwan is the Republic of China's." Ma reinforced that on May 20^th by saying "Taiwan is a part of the Republic of China." (As the DPP asked that day, what's the other part?)

Well, yesterday, the 21^st, when answering a question about 'Chinese Taipei's participation in the WHO, Ma noted that while it is difficult for Taiwan/the ROC to get formal recognition in the WHA and other international organizations, "nobody thinks Taiwan's not a country." (Except of course Ma himself.)

A few days ago I wrote that Ma's contradictory statements force one to conclude he is either lying to the electorate or the CCP about his intentions, since they have very different ideas of where he is leading the island. Considering the sequence of his dissembling -- where pro-unification sentiment or statements are repudiated and replaced with the kind of statements you'd expect from pro-TI die hard Chen Shui-bian -- I think it's rather obvious whose eyes he's pulling the wool over.

Footnote: I rarely participate in the comments section of this site, except to post brief "thanks for reading" notes, and that's mostly because I don't want to dominate every aspect of this blog. :)

But I do want to make particular note that while I try to sprinkle my posts with healthy doses of realism and skepticism, I have no doubt that political subservience to China is an outcome that Taiwanese public opinion will roundly reject for the foreseeable future. All evidence says so.

More dissaembling Ma's dissembling

Ma made one other statement at his international press conference that struck me as, well, false:

外籍媒體也詢問馬總統對大陸領導人的看法，馬總統說，儘管對岸在台灣議題的立場上沒太大改變，但策略已經有所不同，過去10年對岸堅持「一國兩制、和平統一」，最近則開始重視預防台灣走向獨立，而非一味宣揚要達到統一的目的，已展現更大彈性。

When asked by a foreign reporter about his view on the mainland leadership, President Ma said that although there had not been a major change in the mainland's Taiwan policy, there had been a shift in their strategy; the last ten years of emphasizing "one country, two systems" and peaceful unification has already switched to a focus of preventing Taiwan from going toward independence. This shift away from advocating unification is a demonstration of [the mainland's] greater flexibility.

Certainly the tone of China's rhetoric has shifted dramatically, and this is because Ma has already accepted the one China principle and that Taiwan's sovereignty belongs to all Chinese people on both sides of the strait.

My objection is his characterization of the Chinese position. Hu mentioned one country, two systems and peaceful unification in a major speech just as recently as March 18. Realizing the peaceful unification of the motherland through 'one country, two systems' was a topic on this year's political section of the Chinese Gaokao. And the Chinese leadership even refuses to admit that the '92 consensus' can be fairly stated as "one China, two interpretations."

What is accurate to say is that the CCP and KMT have never been closer on either their ultimate goals, which include unification and preventing formal Taiwanese independence. They are also in agreement on the means (just study Hu Jintao's Six Point proposal). Both parties avoid saying "unification" now because talking about the elephant in the room would ruin the plan -- less because those two parties are in disagreement and more because talking about unification would alert the Taiwanese people to the final stop on this ride. Or so I like to think.

Ma: Let the next generation decide the future of cross-strait relations

At today's international press conference, Ma called for Taiwan's future to be decided by Taiwanese.

Ma stated, "The future of cross strait relations out to be decided on the Taiwan side by the Taiwanese people, and even by the next generation. I believe the present is not a good time to make any decision."

He also promised no unification in his maximum potential 8 years of office but added that the cross-strait relationship could be different 30 years from now.

==============

I like the sound of these statements more than his claim yesterday that Taiwan's sovereignty belongs to all Chinese (blogged on earlier this morning), though you'll see that reading between the lines, here he's saying the future of cross-strait relations is a decision for Chinese on both sides of the strait -- probably an inescapable reality even if a repulsive thought.

Now I really wish I could find this more reassuring. Most importantly, Ma still won't say that Taiwanese can decide their future by referendum (though he hasn't ruled it out. And several statements from both him and his staff about the ECFA economic agreement not requiring a referendum "because it doesn't deal with sovereignty issues" seem to hint that sovereignty issues do require a referendum; hopefully he is subtly endorsing that referendum right, but I think he is probably trying to placate the center by parroting the core of the DPP stance while leaving out that pesky referendum bit which most people forget anyway).

I would like to be in the camp that says, "Chen Shui-bian tried A for 8 years, that didn't really get us anywhere with China, maybe Ma's plan B will work while leaving Taiwan stronger and still de facto independent." I hope that is true, but don't think so.

At the end of the day it really comes down to this: do you believe that Ma is an advocate for the Taiwanese right to self-determination, cloaking his plans with words that are music to the ears of the CCP? Or do you believe Ma seeks to play a part in unifying Taiwan with/annexing Taiwan to China, and masks his intent with lip-service to the Taiwanese right to self-determination? I think the later is more likely.

I suppose there is a third option. You could say, "Black cat or white cat, just make me rich." In which case you probably find questions of sovereignty boring anyway.

Excuse me?

President Ma can't keep his sovereignty position straight. Just look at yesterday's press conference:

President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) challenged the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) yesterday to produce concrete evidence that he has jeopardized Taiwan’s sovereignty and urged them to be practical and flexible....

Ma said his cross-strait policy has gained local and international recognition and he didn’t think he had made any mistakes.

“If sovereignty was lost, I can get it back,” he said. “But nobody can tell me exactly what was lost.”

Ma said the Republic of China (ROC) Constitution is a “one China” Constitution, and before both sides of the Taiwan Strait could talk about unification or independence, he would suggest “mutual non-denial” of each other’s existence.

Although critics complained that school textbooks are vague about Taiwan’s sovereignty, Ma said it should be made clear to the public that the sovereignty of the ROC belongs to the people.

“Taiwan is the ROC,” [in Chinese: 應該清楚告訴下一代，「中華民國主權是屬於國民全體，台灣是中華民國」，這點非常清楚。]he said. “We should clear this up from a historical and constitutional viewpoint. The public must not be confused into thinking Taiwan’s sovereignty is undefined. We should never let anyone distort history for political reasons.”

Ma said the nine agreements and a joint statement his administration signed with Beijing are conductive to Taiwan’s development and none have hurt Taiwan or echoed China’s political overtures.

His administration’s definition of cross-strait relations was not new, he said, because former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) introduced the idea that Taiwan and China are two regions under the framework of the ROC Constitution and former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) did not alter that stance.

If "Taiwan is the ROC," than the Chinese mainland is not ROC territory, a position in clear contradiction with the "one China" principle. To be sure, saying "Taiwan is the ROC" is awfully similar to saying "one side, one country" or "two Chinas."

Or is this a case of 「台灣是中華民國」 being technically interpretable as "Taiwan is [a part of] the Republic of China?"

Either way, Ma is misleading either himself or the public.

Though I agree the DPP policy direction is feeling especially unclear in contrast with Ma's clarity.

We've got an update: Presidential spokesman has clarified that Ma meant "Taiwan belongs to the Republic of China." 「台灣是中華民國的。」

Which means that Ma is saying, "congratulations Taiwan, your sovereignty is in the hands of the people of all of China!"

That, my friends, is not empty rhetoric. That is the warning bell.

Another update: Ma apparently made the comments in the context of criticizing the "unclear" position of current textbooks. But that's pretty much BS, as this article points out.

Straits Forum

The rally wasn't the only thing happening this weekend. Also check out the program from this year's Straits Forum. My favorite part has to be an article about a performance put on during the evening of the 16th titled Chinese Spirit, Straits Fate (中华情·海峡缘).

The performance included a song called One Hundred Surnames 《百家姓》which included lyrics like:

百家姓里你姓李我姓张，骨血里淌着都是黄河长江；百家姓里你姓赵他姓王，心脏里装的都是龙族的荣光…

You're name is Li and my name is Zhang, but our bones and are blood all flow with the waters of the Yellow and Yangzi Rivers; You're name is Zhao and my name is Wang, but our guts and hearts are filled with the glory of the Dragon People...

The chair of the event had a little cute poem to read that included the following:

“离我们不远的地方，就是欢腾的海峡。”“每一阵海风，都是亲人的消息。”“我们是知己，不分我和你，咱若有代志（闽南话，指事情），互相来扶持，因为你是我的兄弟。” Not far from me is the great [Taiwan] Strait. Every time the wind blows in from the sea, it brings news of relatives. We are intimate friends, and we do not distingish ourselves from each other. Whatever the situation, we can count on each other, because we are brothers."

Best of all have to be lyrics from a Beijing opera titled I am Chinese 《我是中国人》. This reads like it's jumped out of a time warp in the Cultural Revolution where even all the Beijing Opera was political:

“中国人，同是华夏好子孙；中国人，海角天涯一条根。你和我逢盛世担大任，做一个坦坦荡荡、磊磊落落、堂堂正正中国人……”

Chinese people are all decedents of the Yellow Emperor. Chinese people even in far off regions still have the same roots. You and I have a great mission in this world, to be honest, proud and true Chinese ...

If that closing line doesn't ring a bell, may I direct your attention to Taiwanese elementary school textbooks from not that long ago (more images here):

Ma: Delay that peace treaty

Ma gave an interview yesterday morning to Taiwan's China Television (CTV, 中視) which covered quite a lot of ground and touched on everything from peace talks with Beijing to the Assembly and Parade Law to the WHO and Beijing's MOU with them.

I'm going to start with the peace talks article, which was the lead today in the Taipei Times. Let's get right to the text:

President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) yesterday said he would not negotiate unification with China during his presidency, but would consider launching talks on a peace agreement if re-elected in 2012....

This is clearly a retreat off of earlier Ma statements about wanting to have a peace agreement signed during his first term. That could mean either Beijing and Taipei plan to break up the agreement into two parts, one less controversial and one more, and sign those before the election (to give Ma a boost) and the second one after. Or, perhaps Beijing or Taipei simply fear backlash if such steps are taken within such a short four year period. It could also mean that the gaps between Beijing and Taipei on the key sovereignty question is simply too big to imagine the agreement being signed in the first four years.

... He said that he had promised in his inauguration address, under the framework of the Republic of China Constitution [A-gu: emphasis mine], not to discuss unification with Beijing during his presidency, not to pursue or support de jure independence and not to use military force to resolve the matter of Taiwan’s status.

“I will not engage in talks on unification with mainland China during my presidency, regardless of whether it lasts four years or eight,” he said.

Does this imply that according to Ma's reading of the ROC Constitution, he can no more discuss the prospect of unification than he can try to declare independence? I hate to say it, but that would be a very useful wedge indeed that would help keep Beijing at bay. In fact, such a reading could serve as a basis for internal political consensus on cross-strait relations (as if either party would want that).

Also note that Ma does assures voters that they can vote for him twice without fear of bieng fully sold out.

Nor would political negotiations necessarily have to start in 2012, he said, adding that it would depend on developments and whether more pressing issues such as the economy had been addressed.

This statement seems to just be a way of denying a 'unification time table,' a charge that was thrown at Ma right after the interviews Friday with Singapore media.

Ma said he was aware of China’s efforts to achieve unification, but that his administration was focusing on more urgent, less controversial matters, including the economy.

Although these negotiations inevitably touch on some political matters, both sides have sought to avoid sensitive topics, he said.

Ma said the political agenda behind Beijing’s economic engagement with Taiwan was no secret, yet “some administrations handle it well, some not so well.”

“I think my administration handles it rather well,” he said, adding that Beijing does not seek political gains in all its dealings with Taiwan and that a win-win situation for both sides of the Strait is possible.

Besides the swipe at the Chen administration, Ma also reinforces that he really does see the economic and political issues as separate ones, and to be honest I hope he's right (but doubt it). He also may be implying that even though the CCP sees the economic and political issues as going hand in hand, the Ma administration is just not going to let them use one to leverage the other. Again, sounds great, but awfully difficult to put into practice.

Ma said Beijing was hesitant to sign an economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA), possibly because of differences between Taiwan’s ruling and opposition parties. However, Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) and Premier Wen Jiabao (溫家寶) have both expressed interest in an ECFA....

Beijing might also be hesitant to sign because they are holding out for further KMT concessions.

...Ma said the economic pact would likely be one topic at the next round of cross-strait talks, scheduled for the second half of the year.

The president said he did not have any immediate plans to visit China, adding that high-level visits were complicated by issues of security and national sovereignty and dignity.

“My approach has always been to deal with a problem if we cannot solve it,” he said. “You’ll achieve nothing by fixating on sovereignty. Cross-strait relations have developed since we came to power because both sides set aside their differences and focused on more pressing and solvable matters.” [A-gu: emphasis mine]

In principle I could agree, except I don't see China setting aside the sovereignty issue (despite CCP propaganda events meant to imply otherwise). That doesn't seem like truly setting aside differences. It seems to me that it's more like the KMT just closing its eyes to Beijing's oft-repeated position.

Further, the KMT for its part is fixating on sovereignty, not in its daily rhetoric but in its claim to own an ROC that includes all of mainland China. It was the DPP that proposed begininng negotiations without any "One China" or even "One China, One Taiwan" preconditions, and Beijing that refused that point.

In response, DPP spokesman Cheng Wen-tsang (鄭文燦) said Ma should not lie to the public about unification with China.

Cheng said the DPP viewed Ma’s policies as geared at achieving unification. Ma’s strategy for dealing with criticism is to lie to the public, Cheng said.

The DPP urged Ma to put an end to policies that move toward unification.

Here's a classic case of the DPP speaking with such a lack of refinement or substance that even if their ultimate conclusion is correct, nobody will listen to them.

Take that!

If you've seen Michael Turton's last post about Japan's de facto ambassador to Taiwan stating plainly that Japan considers Taiwan's status to be unresolved, you won't be surprised to know that President Ma Ying-jeou has responded in kind already, again insisting while talking to a visiting Japanese delegation of legislators that the Treaty of Taipei transfered sovereignty of Taiwan to the Republic of China.

This reinforces again that Ma is basically telling Japan to $^#@ off and insisting that the Taiwan question is an internal Chinese matter to be resolved among Chinese.

But a whimper?

In the portion of my brain devoted to Taiwanese politics (usually carefully cordoned so as to keep me sane), I am at some emotional state between panic and despair (which also seems like a pretty good definition of 'feeling impending doom').

I have to say that all the recent developments in the Taiwan-China discussions about opening Taiwan to Chinese investment, along with the clear ideological alignment of the KMT and their determination to sign a peace treaty which I now am convinced surely must resolve the sovereignty question, and also along with the feebleness of the DPP "opposition," have combined into a perfect emotional storm in my head.

I am worried for the first time in my 12 years of involvement that we are going to lose this battle to maintain Taiwan's independence from China, and worse yet I feel the final nail (well, perhaps the next to final nail) in the coffin may be hammered in within two, at most three years. This is also the first time I've ever felt like I am on the ultimately losing side of a political cause, and that surely does not help.

While not quite debilitating, this is a deflating feeling, and I can't decide if the appropriate course of action is to start distributing revolutionary propaganda, flee the country, or protest like hell for the remaining two years before the Final Sellout occurs.

Thinking of all this also reminds me of a what a friend of mine in Taipei, who had been taken in his youth by his father to protests-turned-riots, demanding democracy, told me while he was up all night at the Chen Yunlin protests: "It feels like the democracy movement in the 80s all over again." But today I wonder if the difference is that this time, we are on the side about to be crushed.

The Taiwanese political portion of my brain has never been feeling at such a loss. Is this irrational, or has the last decade of hard work been for naught?

Not with a bang

See Michael Turton's critical, perhaps pivotal, post on Connecting the Dots. In light of other recent moves of the KMT along with recent revival of the Treaty of Taipei I made a comment there amounting to this: I now believe the upcoming peace treaty will declare a formal end to hostilities of the Chinese civil war (not far fetched at all), will make some sort of statement about the place of Taiwan, autonomous region of China, will authorize conditional de facto self-administration by the ROC government on Taiwan, and will postpone ultimate discussions on joint administration/unification/annexation for a set period of time.

Before he made the post we were chatting online about the same topic, and I realized why I hadn't been able to visualize what a peace agreement will look like. In my mind, the sovereignty question was still untouchable and unresolvable, because the KMT would be forcibly constrained by public opinion in Taiwan, and because practical benefits of de facto independence would outweigh any ideological tendency to resolve the Taiwan question in a way that would be so decisive.

Now I believe they will sign an agreement which effectively resolves the Taiwan question, pass it off as Chinese recognition of the "status quo," get China to do a lot of investing and perhaps job creation as the election approaches, and pretend like nothing really happened on the sovereignty issue at all.

The KMT could well manage to do what I had believed to be unthinkable, formally wrap this all up in one term.

The DPP had better put together a real platform fast and begin collecting signatures for a referendum topic that might be able to head off the end game (no point waiting around now) -- perhaps something like "Do you agree that any change to Taiwan's current 'de facto' independence from the People's Republic of China' or agreements signed with that polity require approval by the people through referenda?"

Back when Cheney was shooting people in the face...

.. then-Presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou was getting into hot water over constantly shifting and radically different tones of his ideal China policy. This was back when Ma made his now famous statement on "ultimate unification," and also marked about the last time the KMT was honest with the Taiwanese people about its plans for them.

Reading through all this, I can't help but wonder if I've correctly imagined the "interim solution" which is planned before ultimate unification with a prosperous, democratic China (keep dreaming).

Could it be that the peace agreement would immediately usher in a Jiang Zemin's Eight-point Proposal-like "one country, two systems" reality, where Taiwan formally agrees with the CCP that Taiwan is Chinese, but gets to keep its government organs and under-funded military -- that is, until the international community has lost interest and withdrawn all promises to Taiwan, at which point the CCP gets impatient and starts to ask for increasing degrees of "consultation" and then control over Taiwan's political & policy process, slowly abolishing this shining light of democracy one issue at a time?

After all, the CCP has always held it will not let Taiwan put off unification talks forever. And when would you ratchet up the pressure -- while Taiwan still has some real options, or after the issue is more or less decided?

Ma's biggest slip up (stating things plainly) came in Dec 2005 interview with Newsweek ...

What is your time frame, then, for unification?

For our party, the eventual goal is reunification, but we don't have a timetable. At the moment, we don't believe that either side is prepared to have unification... The conditions are really not ripe yet.

Do you see unification happening in your lifetime?

If you had asked me the question 10 years ago, I would have said no. But things are changing rapidly on the Chinese mainland, and we don't know how far they will go with democratization. Ten years ago, I wouldn't have thought that they were ready to have local elections. But they are doing it now. Of course, the nature of communism is to [hold] power for as long as possible. So it would be very naive to think that they will become as democratic as Taiwan in the near future... I think we may not be able to solve the sovereignty issue in our lifetimes—whether it's one China or two, or whatever.

Can you imagine a future in which Taiwan and China exist side by side as fully independent states, recognized as such by the world?

It would be very unlikely. Some of us here would like to see that happen. But for the mainland, they have similar problems with Xinjiang, with Tibet. So they feel that if they loosen up for Taiwan, they might encounter difficulties elsewhere. On the other hand, Taiwan is very different from the provinces in mainland China that have independence or autonomy [aspirations] because our situation is very much linked with the rest of the world. Any military move against Taiwan would certainly involve the United States.

Let's follow the timeline from there...

Feb 08, 2006 Ma pushes `status quo' in article

"The KMT believes that neither unification nor independence is likely for Taiwan in the foreseeable future and that therefore the status quo should be maintained. The island's [sic] future should be determined by its people, rather than the government," [Ma] wrote.

Ma criticized President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) recent Lunar New Year's Day message, in which Chen advocated abolishing the unification guidelines and pushing for another round of constitutional amendments. Ma said that Taiwan should not "rock the boat in regional waters."

"We should instead seek to advance the security and stability of the area," he said. "Taiwan, while it seeks to defuse tensions across the Taiwan Strait, should also demonstrate its determination to protect itself by maintaining adequate defensive capabilities."

Feb 10, 2006 Ma talks of `peace and prosperity' on arrival in Geneva

KMT Legislator Lai Shyh-bao (賴士葆) said yesterday in Taipei that Ma had raised the unification theory in order to explain the "one China" spirit as stipulated in the ROC Constitution. What Ma is focused on, he said, is maintaining Taiwan's current status quo.

The "eventual unification" that Ma referred to must be based on preconditions of peace and equitable prosperity on both sides of the Strait and with the consent of Taiwan's people, Lai said, [A-gu: notice how here there's no requirement for China to become a democracy for Taiwan to accept annexation; that would be too pesky.] adding that what Ma talked about did not exceed the framework of the National Unification Council or its guidelines.

KMT Legislator Wu Yu-sheng (吳育昇) accused the president of playing hardball by saying that he had unfairly interpreted Ma's remarks to the foreign media as a way of shifting the general public's attention from the poor performance of the government.

Feb 11, 2006 Ma touts unification with `free' China

Ma dismissed DPP criticisms that the KMT supports unification with China, saying that while the KMT does consider "ultimate cross-strait unification" an option in its cross-strait policy, unification can only be achieved after China has evolved into a country of freedom, democracy and prosperity, and on condition that the majority of Taiwanese voters consent to it. [A-gu: If one were generous, this would be read as a well-formed attempt to stall political annexation by China, because the CCP will never transition to a democracy. But that interpretation flies in the face of everything else we know about Ma's position.]

He added that none of these conditions for the implementation of cross-strait unification had been met, and that the KMT had no timetable in this regard.

Feb 13, 2006 Ma tells China to dismantle missles

Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) has said that China must agree to discuss dismantling its missiles pointed at Taiwan before the country would agree to hold talks.

"No one likes to live under the threat of guns, knives or warheads of missiles," Ma said in comments aired on Saturday by ETTV. "This should be included in the agenda if we hold talks in the future."

Feb 14, 2006 Hubbub over Ma's remarks escalates

Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) said in London yesterday during an interview with Taiwanese and British reporters that engaging in negotiations with China to seek a breakthrough in relations remains the only way for Taiwan to solve thorny cross-strait issues peacefully.

Even in the face of more than 700 missiles targeting Taiwan, the country's leadership should seek to negotiate with China and solve the differences between the two sides to achieve permanent peace across the Taiwan Strait, Ma said.

Ma's comments contrasted with remarks he made on Saturday, as well as with the comments of other KMT officials on Sunday, when he agreed with a student at Cambridge University, who asked whether China must remove its missiles before the Taiwanese people could countenance negotiations.

Feb 15, 2006 Ma under fire over London party

He gave a speech on cross-strait relations during the reception on Sunday. The reception was organized by the KMT's UK branch, the Sun Yat-sen Association and the Republic of China Women's Association in the UK.

In addition to dozens of overseas Taiwanese residents in London, the attendees included overseas Chinese and Hong Kong residents.

Also present was a former official of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (OCAC), Rao Gang (饒剛), who has been charged by the Taipei District Court with corruption but who has failed to return home to stand trial.

Taiwanese Association in the UK director Lee Yi-te (李奕德), who teaches at a British university, told the Taipei Times in a telephone interview yesterday that the reception organizers had received a ?1,000 (US$1,744) donation from Chan Sheng (單聲), a British Taiwanese businessman and a staunch supporter of the Anti-Secession Law. [<-- an earlier paragraph, placed here for convenience]

Feb 15, 2006 KMT ad defends unification plan

The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) yesterday sought to defend itself in the face of criticism that its goal of "eventually" unifying with China had little support among most Taiwanese.

The party published a print ad in a pro-independence newspaper explaining its cross-strait stance, as set out by Chairman Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) recently when he said that maintaining the status quo is the most pragmatic path for Taiwan.

In an ad titled "Taiwan's Pragmatic Path" that appeared in the Liberty Times (the Taipei Times' sister newspaper), the KMT stressed the importance of maintaining the status quo as a practical choice for the country, and that Taiwan's future should be determined by its people, rather than the government. [A-gu: but not by referendum?]

Feb 16, 2008 Sparks fly over KMT's controversial ad

"The KMT firmly believes that, in keeping with the spirit of democracy, there are many options for Taiwan's future, be it reunification, independence or the status quo. It is necessary that the choice be made by the people," the ad said.

KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), who arrived in Dublin early yesterday, defended the print ad, and said it was merely the result of "misreading or misinterpretation" to consider the KMT pro-independence because of an advertisement.

"Unification, independence and maintaining the status quo are all options for Taiwan's future. As citizens of a democratic country, the people of Taiwan are free to choose which option to pursue, [A-gu: except by referendum] so long as the choices are constitutional and do not violate any of the laws of the country," he said yesterday morning in Dublin.

While respecting the choices of the Taiwanese people [A-gu: see that back away from supporting eventual unification?], the KMT advocates maintaining the status quo at present, Ma added.