Romance of the Three Kingdoms

You may be familiar with the opening line of the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, a famous novel from the late Yuan-early Ming period. As Wikipedia translates it,

The world under heaven, after a long period of division, will be united; after a long period of union, will be divided.  話說天下大勢，分久必合，合久必分。

A heavy sentence like that carries a lot of weight when applied to the Taiwan situation, especially as Taiwan and China are undeniably in dis-union, regardless of how one views sovereignty issues.

And as you also might imagine, the metaphor might come to seem prophetic if you switch up the opening phrase to "after a long period of unity, will be divided; after a long period of division, will be united." And that's exactly what President Ma Ying-jeou said June 28th when attending a ceremony conferring promotions of higher-level ROC military officers. Of all possible places.

The context of this remark is even more baffling to me:

他表示，中國歷史上分分合合，合久必分、分久必合，但不論那一次分？那一次合？都靠戰爭解決；這次是第一次用和平解決爭端，這是中華民族、炎黃子孫的創舉，大家應該要有這個勇氣，把這段歷史寫好。 [President Ma] said that Chinese history was full of both division and unity; after a long period of unity it must divide, and after a long period of division it must be united. But when to divide? When to unite? Both had always been decided by war. Yet this time is the first time that peaceful methods have been used, a pioneering effort of the Zhonghua Minzu and the decedents of the Yellow Emperor. Everyone should have courage and make sure this section of history is written well [A-gu: aka, a peaceful union comes to fruition].

I find this a remarkably strong statement of the KMT's aspirations to realize unification. That degree of directness is not at all typical: remember how the President did a 180 after his 'ultimate unification' (終極統一) remark back in 2007ish, and how the KMT constantly accused the Greens of "smearing" Ma when they trotted out his own words? Or how the KMT threatened to sue DPP politicians for harping on the "One China Market" (一中市場) philosophy of Vincent Siew?  So I was just stunned to see this remark at all, much less this close to the election, much less at a military ceremony at a time where Ma's administration  spends much media time defending their commitment to the country's defense.

But I was completely beside myself to find that while newspapers had picked it up, the remark wasn't making the sort of waves I would have expected. I mean, this is GOLDEN material for DPP election ads. What am I missing here?   

Mirror, mirror

The AP interviews President Ma...

Any political union, he said, would require Beijing to adopt democracy and respect for human rights, under special scrutiny following the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to jailed China democracy campaigner Liu Xiaobo. Because of such concerns, Ma did not cite any timetable for the process, saying it would be a "long historical" transition....

In between the poles of union and separation, Ma said his government is prepared to discuss political agreements, including security issues, as soon as the priority economic issues are dealt with. He suggested that those political talks could start as early as a second four-year term if he wins re-election in 2012.

"We are not intentionally delaying the talks on political issues. Certainly the economic ones are more important to people here. People also support the idea (of) economy first, politics later," said Ma. Asked if he would move to political talks in a second term once economic issues are dealt with, Ma said "it depends on how fast we move." Political issues, he said, "will come after all the major economic issues are resolved."

Among the crucial economic agreements that first need to be tackled, Ma said, are those on investment guarantees, ways to resolve disputes and tariff and other barriers to the two sides more than US$100 billion in trade.

There's nothing new or particularly surprising in this interview, yet the Ma administration came out to emphasize there is no time table for political talks, that they will not necessarily occur during his second term, and that economic issues come first.

Ma nearly accuses the AP of putting words in his mouth about the negotiations, because all the focus was on the prospect of political talks. Really, it's just that international news outlets chose the juicy bits about political talks for their edited versions of the AP article, and this created a sort of backlash after Taiwan media saw and yelled, "Look what Ma said to the AP!"

Warp Zone

For some reason, I occasionally find myself reading editorials in the KMT's mouthpiece, the Central Daily News. Perhaps it's because the paper sometimes says what the Ma administration won't announce from the podium. Here is the article I read today.

The editorial mocks DPP positions on the ECFA; denigrates Lee Teng-hui's "two countries" and Chen Shui-bian's "one side, one country" formulations as "not only completely unworkable but bound to bring about disastrous consequences;" and finally notes that shooting for de jure independence is sure to bring economic ruin and war.

But what really caught my eye was the final paragraph, where the writer throws a curve ball:

Up to this point, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have had the wisdom to define their relations as a unique, non-international and non-domestic relationship. Thus agreements have been signed on the principles of equality and mutual respect by [Taiwan's] Straits Affairs Foundation [SEF] and [China's] Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits [ARATS]. The agreements have been mutually beneficial and won the praise of the international community, just as the ECFA has. Taiwan independence supporters, though, continue to blow hot air about dealing [with "the mainland"] on a nation-to-nation basis. The Taiwanese people have already experienced the tangible benefits of setting aside political differences, fostering warm economic relations, and reducing the danger of a military conflict. If the independence supporters keep mouthing the same old platitudes, they will not win any hearts or minds.

　兩岸如今都有智慧把雙方關係定位為非國際、亦非國內的特殊關係，故以海基、海協兩會來進行協商簽署，合乎對等、尊嚴原則，互蒙其利，亦獲國際社 會讚賞，ＥＣＦＡ也是一樣。獨派卻仍鼓吹以國與國來處理兩岸關係。台灣人民已體驗到了兩岸政治上擱置爭議、經濟上合作互惠、軍事上化解危機的實際利益，獨 派再唱其陳腔濫調，是不會有市場的。

It is obviously and pointedly false to suggest that China views relations with Taiwan as anything other than domestic, unless you ignore everything they say about the subject.

But far more baffling is when the CDN tries to suggest the KMT defines relations [with China] as a unique, non-international and non-domestic relationship.

When was that the definition? Certainly not in 2008 when Ma drew a firestorm of criticism for saying relations were "a non-international, special relationship." Certainly not today, when fantasies of China recognizing a "shared sovereignty" situation are the domain of deluded academics. In fact, there's not a peep about "non-domestic" anywhere.

To prove the point, go search for the Chinese phrase "non-domestic special relationship" (非國內的特殊關係). That search turns up only this CDN article. Even when broken up into two phrases,"non-domestic" and "special relationship," we see nothing else about this topic on the internet. This terminology is newly minted, not official policy, and certainly not the policy of both China and Taiwan.

Why would the official KMT mouthpiece make up one definition of a policy -- one where nuance in phrasing matters a lot -- when the KMT has a different official policy? Is the editor simply living in la-la land? Does he have access to insider information about progress in negotiations with China? Is he making an effort to fool the public in Taiwan (presumably because people don't actually have the stomach to accept relations with China as "domestic" yet)? Or what?

This time, a blast from the back to the future

Taipei Times:

President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) yesterday morning thanked the outgoing Solomon Islands ambassador at the Presidential Office, but referred to his administration as the “Chunghua government” (中華政府) or “Chinese government....”

Realizing his mistake, Ma immediately corrected himself and said he meant the “government of the Republic of China.”

I'm no native speaker, but I'd argue that the Chinese term used here seems really bizarre and forced. “Chunghua government” (中華政府) is not *quite* a coinage, as the phrase appears when searched for online, mostly in relation to some sort of Taiwan military surplus dealer which uses the phrase in their name (though I'd argue the deep structure is different for their title).

So although the phrase isn't entirely invented, it does not roll off the tongue. Frankly, "Chinese government (中國政府) would be not only smoother but probably preferable to this bizarre formation that is riding on the back of Zhunghua Minzu. And there's no reason the good old "Taiwan government" (臺灣政府) should have been avoided here.

However, I'll give Ma the benefit of the doubt and assume this was a misspeak leaving out two words (should have been 中華民國政府), not an attempt to start using new terminology.

More peace agreement thoughts

Now I've thought a lot about the possibility of a China-Taiwan peace agreement and what it would mean for Taiwan's future.

My early ramblings focused on the challenges of getting anything of substance in the agreement, given the political realities between the two sides. However, The continued cooperation between the KMT and CCP on a number of ideological points reduces the chances a peace agreement would be devoid of substantial changes in the relationship.

Still, any peace agreement will be able to tackle only peripheral political issues -- military CBM, maybe exchange of press and private individuals, etc. Nothing in the peace agreement would be able to tackle the core sovereignty issue at this time, because this is still too difficult for Taiwan or China to handle in a mutually agreeable way.

Which led me to my first major shift in speculation, which was that any peace agreement would explicitly be an "interim agreement" with a time table and an understood final result of unification. Like a treaty with a doomsday clock attached.

As this "interim agreement" becomes central to international understanding, Japan and the US will lose interest in Taiwan's defense; the KMT will scale up promotion the Zhonghua Minzu identity instead of a Taiwan-centric identity, and the CCP will also bombard Taiwan with related propaganda; promotion of Taiwanese Independence or statements that Taiwan is already independent will become increasingly taboo again, if not outright illegal; and at the end of the time table laid out in the "interim agreement," Taiwan will have little choice but to be swallowed up.

Now, I've shifted opinion again. I've just finished reading a paper: Bridge over Troubled Water? Envisioning a China-Taiwan Peace Agreement by Phillip C. Saunders and Scott L. Kastner. The paper is very China-centric in its thinking, but it had at least one piece of info that was news to me:

In private conversations with Western academics, however, Chinese officials have indicated their opposition to an interim agreement with a specified duration. This opposition may be partially rooted in concerns that as an agreement neared its end, it might turn into a de facto timetable for unification that could place future Chinese leaders in a difficult position. PRC officials may also be reluctant to sign an agreement that, in essence, implies that unification is off the table for several decades.

I think this seems quite reasonable. China would not want to have its hand forced and does not want to give up on the unification issue either.

So now, I think the most likely result is a peace agreement that touches on those peripheral CBM/press/exchanges issues we've outlined above and officially ends the state of hostility between Taiwan and China; a KMT/CCP united front of propaganda about Taiwan's Chinese heritage; but, very importantly, no time table for unification or an end to the agreement.

That means the CCP will need to push for separate political negotiations for unification after the treaty comes into place, but that will be a completely separate set of issues and hard to get even the KMT moving on. It could also buy Taiwan the leverage and time it needs to wait out the CCP unification campaign and to more fully consolidate a Taiwanese identity (read: wait for the young people to grow up).

I remain skeptical of KMT-CCP intentions for the peace accord and post-accord development in relations. At the same time, I must reiterate that a peace treaty that reduces Chinese threats while indefinitely postponing any chances of unification/annexation talks might not be the worst possible result. In fact, depending on the details, it might be a pretty sweet deal.

Sugar-coated poison? Probably. But I increasingly suspect the pill would not be fatal. This weekend shows Taiwan is full of surprises.

Why does this feel like a sales pitch?

If it looks like a duck...

Deputy Minister Mainland Affairs Council The Executive Yuan Chien-min Chao (趙建民) spoke today in his role as a Professor of political science at a conference titled, The establishment of Chinese Communist rule and sixty years of separate administration across the Taiwan strait.

(Just so you know, he'll also be at this upcoming conference [pdf] on Grassroots Democracy and Local Governance in China in early November if you want to see him).

The professor argued that the old label of party-state system (黨國體制) is an inaccurate description of China, and was not even accurate under Mao, when it was more of a one-man authoritarian dictatorship. Chao also said while some scholars think "post-party-state system" (後黨國體制) is a good label, the label ignores the role of the social and political changes in China. Today, Chao argues, now that the market economy is the driving factor in political decision making, China is seeing many of the kind of incidents like Taiwan's "Formosa Incident" and an increase in social movements. Why then can't we label China as a country in the early stages of democratic development?

I'm going to put aside for the moment that Chao seems to be selling me something. I'll just address his arguments. I agree that China shows some of the same symptoms of a society crying out for greater democracy, but there are no signs that CCP leadership intends to ever allow a multi-party system or a truly democratic society, and the weak civil society in China means there are no signs that a collapsed CCP would be replaced with anything but the PLA;. In contrast, while the KMT leadership was reluctant to allow democratic changes, it was always committed to that transition in principle.

You may want to know how I reach this conclusion. First, as has been well-documented within The First Chinese Democracy: Political Life in the Republic of China on Taiwan (Chao and Myers), by the time of the Formosa Incident, the KMT was regularly losing elections at multiple levels to independents. To the KMT's credit, it had for years allowed somewhat free local elections -- plenty of vote buying on all sides, but ballot box stuffing was not as serious a problem, and local rivals were more likely to be co-opted than threatened -- and so although an organized opposition party was still completely out of the question for the KMT leadership, and although there was constant cracking down on political dissidents, the momentum for reform had been building for sometime (it took Lee Teng-hui's determination to drag the rest of the KMT elite into ending one party rule).

Similarly, as Chao and Myers document, while the KMT leadership was not willing to tolerate an opposition party at that time, it remained rhetorically committed to an eventual Western-style, multi-party democracy. Though the KMT claimed that Taiwan was not ready for such a transition yet, eventually, it would be. And as David blogged, the Wild Lily protest movement was able to push the country significantly in that directly in 1990.

That's a bit of an overview on Taiwan; what about China? While China has made some breakthroughs at creating real competition at the village chief level (He 2003 [PDF]), though these officials have little control beyond the village and the party remains strictly authoritarian at the national level. Unlike the Wild Lily movement, the Tiananmen Square protests ended in tragedy.

Further, the CCP has no rhetorical commitments to any multi-party system; instead, the party promotes "Intra-party democracy," basically a 'harmonious' consultative process that hopes to bring in innovative ideas and heed local demands, but without the risk of a transition of power. Chinese scholars remain committed to the one-party state. And the party continues to promote its one-party democracy on its own news sites.

If there is to be real hope that China will experience a democratic transition, a few pre-conditions must be met: a stronger civil society to help form the skeleton outline of a capable opposition, a relaxation on crushing censorship rules, perhaps greater autonomy in the autonomous zones (to relax tensions there and fears that democracy will lead to the break-up of the country), and most importantly of all, willingness at the CCP leadership center to accept the prospect of losing power.

So far, the CCP shows no signs of relaxing its control over China, nor in fact of wanting anything but greater power -- over Taiwan, the Spratly Islands, Aranchul Pradesh, the Senkaku Islands... and who knows what would be next.

Deputy Minister Chao, I wish you were right. I hope I'm delusional and you're right. But I think we both know better. China shows no signs of heading toward a Taiwan-inspired path to a democratic transition.

Wu's trip to Hong Kong

New premier Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) may have have bitten off a bit more than he can chew today, as today's lead in the Taipei Times points out.

Wu made a public trip to Hong Kong recently, apparently to research how to combat mudslides. So the trip wasn't the news.

The part that leaked Sunday night wasn't so much of the trip, but of the only by the Hong Kong pol and likely future Special Administrative Region head, Leung Chun-ying (梁振英). That ignited speculation that Wu was going there for an interview or discussion with Beijing before his taking up the post. Some read this as an atempt by Ma to "get permission" for Wu's appointment.

Wu’s trip to Hong Kong on Sept. 5 was first reported on Wednesday, with Wu saying he had gone to learn from Hong Kong’s experience dealing with mudslides.

A report in the Liberty Times (the Taipei Times’ sister newspaper), cited Wu’s secretary as saying that Wu had visited Hong Kong with his wife, newly wedded son and daughter-in-law for a “family gathering.”

His secretary said Wu had also taken the opportunity to learn about measures Hong Kong had taken to combat mudslides.

Paul Lin (林保華), a commentator on Chinese Communist Party (CCP) history, told the Taipei Times yesterday that Leung is an “underground member” of the CCP and well-trusted by Beijing.

So you can see the main problem here: the Executive Yuan clearly kept the most important factor of Wu's trip off the iternerary, put up a rather shady excuse (Wu visited the Civil Engineering and Development Department on a Saturday in Hong Kong to get mudslide information? Really?). Then Wu got busted, still hasn't released a complete itenerary, and would now like to blow off the trip as no big deal.

Leung might not be a CCP heavyweight, but his very close relationship with the party is well described further in the article. This was not an innocent mudslide adventure.

I smell a rat. And Wu may be in for more scrutiny than he can stand up to.

Surprise, surprise.

KMT proposes ‘decriminalizing’ fund

The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) caucus yesterday again proposed “decriminalizing” the use of the special allowance fund by government chiefs.

The KMT caucus first suggested an amendment to the Audit Law (審計法) in April 2007 that would decriminalize government chiefs’ personal use of special allowance funds....

“Now that Chen has been found guilty in the first trial, we can now discuss [decriminalization] of [how the government chiefs use their] special allowance fund,” [KMT caucus secretary-general ] Lu [Hsueh-chang (呂學樟)] said, referring to the verdict handed out by the Taipei District Court on Friday sentencing Chen and his wife Wu Shu-jen (吳淑珍) to life in prison in the first trial of Chen’s state affairs fund case.

Lu told reporters that it was necessary for the legislature to pass the legislation given that some 200 government chiefs are still being investigated for how they spent their special affairs funds.

I am speechless, though the term "shameless" (袂見笑) comes to mind.

Ma feeds the fire at his feet

The pro-KMT China Times has a biting news piece on Ma's painful press conference yesterday. Translated below:

President Ma Ying-jeou's press conference, designed to dampen criticism aimed at his typhoon response, was instead full of surprising language. Examples include statements that the damage done by this typhoon has "taught a lesson" to many people [victims unable or unwilling to evacuate], and that in the future they would cooperate better. Vice Premier Chiu Cheng-hsiung (邱正雄), responding to questions of how victims could find information regarding compensation, said "The Executive Yuan website already has that information [as if victims have easy internet access]." The string of gaffs managed not to sooth public anger, but rather to inflame it once again.

At yesterday's press conference, President Ma Ying-jeou affirmed local government efforts to evacuate areas prone to heavy damage, such as Hsin-shan Village in Nantou County's Shui-li Township (南投縣水里鄉新山村), where Village Chief Lin Mei-ling (林美玲) successfully evacuated 50 villagers. "I asked her, 'How is it that you are so amazing and foresaw the mudslides?' She said she followed her training from the Water Conservation Bureau." Ma approved of the effectiveness of WCB training, which explain to everyone the extreme dangers of mudslides, and noted that Chief Lin had saved the lives of her villagers by following her training [AG: As last night's Talking Show covered, many destroyed villages were following disaster evacuation plans but it made no difference as emergency convergence areas were destroyed as well].

Afterward, Ma emphasized that he hopes to quickly establish an effective [evacuation] system; "This typhoon has taught many people a lesson, and they will cooperate more fully in the future. Human effort is the decisive factor, and effort can be made."

Responding to questions that the military had not activated enough units, Defense Minister Chen Chao-min (陳肇敏) cautiously started by saying such things as "I am Taiwanese, and Taiwan is my home." [A-Gu: This is a given for most of the public, who are probably just bewildered by and suspicious of this kind of introduction, because it seems to show Chen fears he'll be called a non-Taiwanese in a time where such accusations are not really flying around.]

When asked by the media about how citizens could get details on how to ask for compensation from the disaster, Vice Premier Chiu arrangements for shelter allowed each person to get NT$5,000 of compensation, which would be provided by the red cross over a period of three days. Those households who had suffered damage from flooding by water over 50cm high would receive NT$20,000 in compensation, which would be distributed by local governments. Should their funds be inadequate, the central government would foot the bill. "This plan was decided Monday by the Executive Yuan and announced on the website."

Vice Premier Chiu further explained that compensation for rent for those forced to move would be 30,000-50,000 per household and could be obtained immediately. "Those with any questions can contact the relevant government departments; relevant phone numbers are on the Executive Yuan website." As soon as Chiu made these remarks, media were dumbstruck, and had no choice but to ask him in response, "How are flood victims who have been stripped of all their possessions and have a flooded house going to get online to find these phone numbers?"

For the record, the last two days of Talking Show have been excellent, fact-filled shows about the government's response and its inability to present a plausible reason for its paralysis. Start watching them here (Monday) and here (Tuesday).

And for the record ...

Global Views Monthly has a new survey out showing a whopping 82.8 percent of respondents agree Taiwan and China are two separate countries (full results here [pdf]).

So make no mistake: more than ever before (and we have covered this before), the public is overwhelmingly in support of the DPP's most sacred core principle, and in direct opposition the the KMT and Ma administration's rarely trumpeted but clearly stated view that Taiwan and China belong to the same country.

But we also see that over 80% of the respondants consider themselves members of the Zhonghua Minchu, that modern invention which Ma has used so well as a blanket to cover his "One China" policies.

Further, the voters are overwhelmingly in favor of using cross-strait negotiations to accomplish the following goals, in this order of popularity: reduce China's opposition to Taiwan's participation in international affairs, remove the missles pointed at Taiwan, signing a peace treaty and "increasing freedom and democracy in China." That last goal is newly added to the survey and is something we all wish for in an ideal world, but which I see as a KMT talking point that isn't going to happen.

The only thing to make of this result is issues other than cross-strait terminology are more important to the voters, including "reducing hostilities." If the DPP wants to sell people on the idea that peace treaty = capitulation, they've got a lot of work to do and it could well backfire.

The people of Taiwan are not voting for the KMT because of the One China principle, and the DPP will not repulse voters by saying "one side, one country." The public wants nothing to do with unification but doesn't mind being called what is probably best translated as "ethnically Chinese."

And this is not just a matter of blue-media brianwashing, though people are undoubtedly poorly informed about the DPP, CCP and KMT's position on these issues by blue-leaning media.

If the DPP wants to win, they must get out of the echo chamber and give the public what it wants, as I have been trying to emphasize. That doesn't mean they become KMT Lite; it means coming out swinging with a constructive policy, capable spokesmen and not sounding so paranoid -- even if there is good reason to be paranoid.

The public will not buy it. The island is not going to suddenly "wake up" to the CCP's ongoing threat as long as the CCP stays quiet. Like it or not, believe it or not, the public agrees with the KMT on one major point, which is that there are ways forward in cross-strait issues that don't involve unification or declarations of de jure independence. The DPP must present their version of that middle way to achieve domestic policy goals and constructive relations with China, even if Beijing threatens to boycott it.

Let's rename PTS to KMTS.

Seriously, while their programing is still excellent and not partisan, (they are putting out this week what is probably the first show every broadcast in Taiwan with Holo Taiwanese subtitles), news like this is scary.

Yes, no, maybe so.

Last Wed., Ma "clarified" (muddled, really) part of his Three Nos pledge: no unification, no independence, and no war.

"No unification," Ma said, "does not mean we rule out the option of unification." The topic has already been covered at Taiwan Matters, among other blogs.

That article remains the hottest topic on Yam's news site today, and one of the more astute commentators asked how this applies to his other pledges.

No independence does not mean we rule out the option of independence?
No use of force does not mean we rule out the option of the use of force?

What sort of pledge is it, really then?

I think that there is some possibility that Ma's comment come sin light of Chinese pressure, but it's impossible to say for sure.

Hu makes no secret of agenda

Following the meeting between KMT chairman Wu Po-hsiung and CCP chairman Hu Jintao, Chinese media has made a large deal of two particular formulations: first is Hu's new 'six ideas' and second is a five point consensus reached during the meeting, a consensus Liberty Times said the KMT really had no idea existed until reports on it surfaced.

What is the five point consensus?

第一，双方都表示要继续推动落实“两岸和平发展共同愿景”，不断促进两岸关系和平发展； 第二，都认为要维护反对“台独”、坚持“九二共识”的共同政治基础，不断增强和深化互信；第三，都强调要加强两岸经济合作，尽快商谈两岸经济合作协议，以 利建立两岸经济合作机制；第四，都赞同要积极促进两岸文化教育交流，举办以文教交流为主题的两岸经贸文化论坛，开始探讨协商两岸文化教育交流协议；第五， 都主张两岸在涉外事务中避免不必要的内耗，增进中华民族整体利益。

First, both sides expressed their intent to continue to implement their common wish for peaceful cross-strait development and would constantly work to improve peaceful cross-strait relations. Second, both sides will guard against "Taiwanese independence" while strongly upholding the common political foundation of the '92 concensus, in order to constantly improve and deepen mutual trust. Third, both sides emphasized their intent to strengthen cross-strait economic cooperation, to quickly sign a cross strait economic cooperation agreement, and to establish mechanisms for cross-strait economic cooperation. Fourth, both sides agreed to actively promote cross-strait cultural and educational exchanges, to hold economic and cultural forums that focus on those exchanges, and to discuss how to come to an agreement on cross-striat cultural and economic exchanges. Fifth, both sides support avoiding 'bad news' when it comes to foreign matters in order to promote the interests of the Zhonghua Minzu [A-gu: probably a reference to Ma's détente with China in seeking allies].

Well, not a lot of new information there. What about the six ideas?

　第一，关于增进两岸政治互信。去年５月以来，两岸双方在反对“台独”、坚持“九二共识 ”的基础上建立了互信，从而推动解决了两岸关系中一系列复杂问题。考虑到今后两岸关系的发展前景，包括需要逐步破解一些政治难题，巩固和增进双方的政治互 信尤为重要。坚持大陆和台湾同属一个中国是关键所在。

The first deals with strengthening cross-strait political trust. .. [opposing TI, supporting the 92 consensus, etc]... Strongly supporting the idea that Taiwan and China both belong to one China is vital.

　　第二，关于两岸经济合作。今后一个时期仍然要把全面加强两岸经济合作作为重点， 当前最突出的任务是共同应对国际金融危机冲击。考虑到两岸同胞是一家人，我们采取了一些实际措施同你们共克时艰。今后，如果形势需要，我们还会继续这样 做。签定两岸经济合作协议，关键是协议内容要有利于两岸经济共同发展、两岸同胞福祉增进，有利于建立具有两岸特色的经济合作机制。双方应该共同推进商签协 议准备工作，争取今年下半年谈起来。

The second deals with economic cooperation... [Cooperation good, dealing with current financial crisis]... Keeping in mind that comrades on both sides of the strait belong to the same family, we are choosing a practical method to get through these hard times together. Afterwards, if circumstances require, we will continue to help... [Economic agreement good for both sides, get ECFA done by end of year].

　　第三，关于加强两岸文化教育交流。新形势下，开展两岸文化教育交流，既有巨大需求和潜力，也显得更为重要。我们要比以往更加努力地开展两岸文化教育交流，共同传承和弘扬中华文化，增强中华文化认同、中华民族认同。

The third deals with economic and cultural exchanges. [Important, helps heal wounds....] Both sides should promote Chinese culture together, strengthen identity with Chinese culture and with the Zhonghua Minzu.

　 　第四，关于涉外事务。几天前，中华台北卫生署应邀派出人员作为观察员参加了今年的世界卫生大会。这表明，两岸中国人有能力、有智慧妥善解决台湾参与国际 组织活动问题，也表明我们促进两岸关系和平发展的诚意。我们希望，这有利于增进台湾同胞对大陆的了解，有利于两岸关系和平发展。

The fourth deals with foreign affairs... [WHA observer status breakthrough great, demonstrates Chinese good will]... We hope that this helps the Taiwanese compatriots better understand the mainland and contributes to peaceful cross-strait development.

　　第 五，关于结束两岸敌对状态、达成和平协议。促进正式结束两岸敌对状态、达成和平协议，是“两岸和平发展共同愿景”提出的目标，已经成为两岸双方的重要主 张。我们提出，两岸可以就国家尚未统一的特殊情况下的政治关系问题、建立两岸军事安全互信机制问题进行务实探讨，表明了我们解决问题的积极思考。两岸协商 总体上还是要先易后难、先经后政、把握节奏、循序渐进，但双方要为解决这些问题进行准备、创造条件。双方可以先由初级形式开始接触，积累经验，以逐步破解 难题。

The fifth deals with the cross-strait tension and seeking a peace agreement. Putting a formal end to hostilities and reaching a peace agreement is the common aspiration for peaceful cross-strait development and has already become an important principle of both sides. We would point out that both sides can discuss how political relations should be handled in this special circumstance preceding national unification, can debate how to establish a confidence building on military affairs, and express our thoughts on how to solve these problems. We still need to deal with cross-strait agreements by dealing with the easy ones first. First economics, then politics...

　　第六，关于国共两党交流对话。国共两党交流对话特别是高层交往对保持两岸关系发展势头具有不可替代的重要作用。国共论坛是一个 成功的论坛，应该继续办下去，而且要越办越好。同时，两岸关系发展需要两岸广大同胞特别是基层民众参与。两岸各界举办的海峡论坛，突出了两岸民众的参与和 互动。

The sixth deals with KMT-CCP dialogue and exchanges... [It's been important so far, we should continue, and improve communication. Need to bring in common people to participate. Need more exchanges between people on both sides.]

There you have it! Now time to get back to work. Remember, try to ignore all these things coming out of the CCP's mouth if you want to pretend they're not going to push for unification.

I make special note of the wording "this special circumstance preceding national unification," because you can bet your bottom dollar that the CCP will want that sentence in the peace agreement, even if exactly when and how the unification is to be achieved is not specified.

I speculate Ma will re-activate the National Unification Council sometime before that. Before the signing of the peace agreement, expect a further emphasis that the Council's guidelines will still be used to determine when unification is possible (namely, once China has democratized and gotten as rich as Taiwan). And finally, I imagine the CCP will ask for revisions to those guidelines a few years later.

More confusing still

At the El Salvador presidential inauguration ceremony which President Ma Ying-jeou was attending, he ran into Sec. of State Hillary Clinton and introduced himself as "President of Taiwan." This seemed almost like an intentional contrast to Wu Po-hsiung's mention of daonei while in China.

But, Ma clarified his introduction during a tea session with reporters, whenever he says "President of Taiwan," he means "President of the Republic of China," certainly not "President of the Republic of Taiwan."

Well, fair enough if you think, like A-bian did, that Taiwan = the ROC, a position Ma may or may not have endorsed at some point, depending on how you interpret that famous pre-election statement, 台灣就是中華民國.

So to wrap up what we've learned by carefully watching KMT statements before and after the election last year, the KMT position is:

1. Taiwan and the Chinese mainland are both parts of the Republic of China, a fact that the constitution mandates -- neither independence or unification are possible without constitutional amendments. So Taiwan is not a country.
2. Still, thanks to doublethink, "Nobody thinks Taiwan isn't a country."
3. Taiwan's sovereignty belongs to the ROC, and the ROC's sovereignty belongs to all of the ROC citizens. Therefore Taiwan's sovereignty belongs to the people on both sides of the Taiwan strait.
4. However, the future of cross-strait relations should be decided "on the Taiwan side" by the Taiwanese people through referendum, but not until a generation from now.
5. But first, Taiwan and China should sign a peace agreement in Ma's first term. Scratch that, make it the theoretical second term.
   

What to make of the shifts which one commenter on this blog accurately called a "merry-go-round" of policy statements? I doubt Ma is confused about his position on this -- he's merely trying to pander to both the CCP and the Taiwan electorate, who hold incompatible positions, because he needs both of their support to have a chance at re-election or legacy.

And -- if Taiwan's military becomes an otherwise worthless paycheck factory, if the economy becomes fully dependent on China, if countries like Japan and the US write off Taiwan, all while Beijing refuses to renounce the use of force and openly maintains the goal of unifying under the one country, two systems formula sooner rather than later-- does it matter what the Taiwan government's position is? Would China stop short of simply demanding compliance with their preferred terms for unification? All signs suggest making such a demand wouldn't bother them a bit.

Ma endorses sovereignty referendum theory

President Ma Ying-jeou's latest comments to Taiwanese media in Belize constitute a fundamental shift on Ma's position regarding whether Taiwan's future status be determined through the referendum process. Using that process is a key demand and central plank of the DPP platform.

Only issues of greater importance, such as those involving Taiwan’s sovereignty,
need to be put to a referendum, he said.

“There won’t be any political items, such as ‘one nation, two systems,’ in the ECFA,” he said.

Stressing that the proposed ECFA was an economic agreement, Ma said holding referendums is time-consuming and expensive, and it would be difficult for the government to operate if it had to hold a referendum on every major policy issue. “It would be meaningless if referendums were held too often and on less important issues,” the president said.

While "the ECFA won't address sovereignty issues, so it doesn't need a referendum" is a frequent refrain from the Ma administration, before now they've carefully avoided vocalizing the implied point, which is that sovereignty issues do require a referendum. This appears to mark a reversal in that strategic ambiguity.

The quote in Chinese is reported by the Liberty Times as follows: 「我一向都主張台灣的前途必須由二千三百萬台灣人民來決定，涉及主權議題才需要公投」"I have always held that Taiwan's future is to be determined by Taiwan's 23,000,000 people; only topics related to with sovereignty need a referendum."

It could be that Ma's using the opportunity to improve his opening hand before going into peace talks with Beijing. Or maybe feeling some sort of heat from some unknown source. Or perhaps neither -- maybe he really hadn't noticed he and his spokesmen were avoiding putting the word sovereignty and referendum in the same sentence, and he truly does want to endorse the referendum process.

In any case I welcome this development.

What is up with this guy?

No points for answering that question correctly.

Ma can't get his story straight.

I was surprised and confused on the 19^th when Ma said "Taiwan is the Republic of China," which seemed like a policy shift to me, but the Presidential Office spokesman cleared that up quickly by correcting Ma's statement to "Taiwan is the Republic of China's." Ma reinforced that on May 20^th by saying "Taiwan is a part of the Republic of China." (As the DPP asked that day, what's the other part?)

Well, yesterday, the 21^st, when answering a question about 'Chinese Taipei's participation in the WHO, Ma noted that while it is difficult for Taiwan/the ROC to get formal recognition in the WHA and other international organizations, "nobody thinks Taiwan's not a country." (Except of course Ma himself.)

A few days ago I wrote that Ma's contradictory statements force one to conclude he is either lying to the electorate or the CCP about his intentions, since they have very different ideas of where he is leading the island. Considering the sequence of his dissembling -- where pro-unification sentiment or statements are repudiated and replaced with the kind of statements you'd expect from pro-TI die hard Chen Shui-bian -- I think it's rather obvious whose eyes he's pulling the wool over.

Footnote: I rarely participate in the comments section of this site, except to post brief "thanks for reading" notes, and that's mostly because I don't want to dominate every aspect of this blog. :)

But I do want to make particular note that while I try to sprinkle my posts with healthy doses of realism and skepticism, I have no doubt that political subservience to China is an outcome that Taiwanese public opinion will roundly reject for the foreseeable future. All evidence says so.

More dissaembling Ma's dissembling

Ma made one other statement at his international press conference that struck me as, well, false:

外籍媒體也詢問馬總統對大陸領導人的看法，馬總統說，儘管對岸在台灣議題的立場上沒太大改變，但策略已經有所不同，過去10年對岸堅持「一國兩制、和平統一」，最近則開始重視預防台灣走向獨立，而非一味宣揚要達到統一的目的，已展現更大彈性。

When asked by a foreign reporter about his view on the mainland leadership, President Ma said that although there had not been a major change in the mainland's Taiwan policy, there had been a shift in their strategy; the last ten years of emphasizing "one country, two systems" and peaceful unification has already switched to a focus of preventing Taiwan from going toward independence. This shift away from advocating unification is a demonstration of [the mainland's] greater flexibility.

Certainly the tone of China's rhetoric has shifted dramatically, and this is because Ma has already accepted the one China principle and that Taiwan's sovereignty belongs to all Chinese people on both sides of the strait.

My objection is his characterization of the Chinese position. Hu mentioned one country, two systems and peaceful unification in a major speech just as recently as March 18. Realizing the peaceful unification of the motherland through 'one country, two systems' was a topic on this year's political section of the Chinese Gaokao. And the Chinese leadership even refuses to admit that the '92 consensus' can be fairly stated as "one China, two interpretations."

What is accurate to say is that the CCP and KMT have never been closer on either their ultimate goals, which include unification and preventing formal Taiwanese independence. They are also in agreement on the means (just study Hu Jintao's Six Point proposal). Both parties avoid saying "unification" now because talking about the elephant in the room would ruin the plan -- less because those two parties are in disagreement and more because talking about unification would alert the Taiwanese people to the final stop on this ride. Or so I like to think.

Ma: Let the next generation decide the future of cross-strait relations

At today's international press conference, Ma called for Taiwan's future to be decided by Taiwanese.

Ma stated, "The future of cross strait relations out to be decided on the Taiwan side by the Taiwanese people, and even by the next generation. I believe the present is not a good time to make any decision."

He also promised no unification in his maximum potential 8 years of office but added that the cross-strait relationship could be different 30 years from now.

==============

I like the sound of these statements more than his claim yesterday that Taiwan's sovereignty belongs to all Chinese (blogged on earlier this morning), though you'll see that reading between the lines, here he's saying the future of cross-strait relations is a decision for Chinese on both sides of the strait -- probably an inescapable reality even if a repulsive thought.

Now I really wish I could find this more reassuring. Most importantly, Ma still won't say that Taiwanese can decide their future by referendum (though he hasn't ruled it out. And several statements from both him and his staff about the ECFA economic agreement not requiring a referendum "because it doesn't deal with sovereignty issues" seem to hint that sovereignty issues do require a referendum; hopefully he is subtly endorsing that referendum right, but I think he is probably trying to placate the center by parroting the core of the DPP stance while leaving out that pesky referendum bit which most people forget anyway).

I would like to be in the camp that says, "Chen Shui-bian tried A for 8 years, that didn't really get us anywhere with China, maybe Ma's plan B will work while leaving Taiwan stronger and still de facto independent." I hope that is true, but don't think so.

At the end of the day it really comes down to this: do you believe that Ma is an advocate for the Taiwanese right to self-determination, cloaking his plans with words that are music to the ears of the CCP? Or do you believe Ma seeks to play a part in unifying Taiwan with/annexing Taiwan to China, and masks his intent with lip-service to the Taiwanese right to self-determination? I think the later is more likely.

I suppose there is a third option. You could say, "Black cat or white cat, just make me rich." In which case you probably find questions of sovereignty boring anyway.

Excuse me?

President Ma can't keep his sovereignty position straight. Just look at yesterday's press conference:

President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) challenged the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) yesterday to produce concrete evidence that he has jeopardized Taiwan’s sovereignty and urged them to be practical and flexible....

Ma said his cross-strait policy has gained local and international recognition and he didn’t think he had made any mistakes.

“If sovereignty was lost, I can get it back,” he said. “But nobody can tell me exactly what was lost.”

Ma said the Republic of China (ROC) Constitution is a “one China” Constitution, and before both sides of the Taiwan Strait could talk about unification or independence, he would suggest “mutual non-denial” of each other’s existence.

Although critics complained that school textbooks are vague about Taiwan’s sovereignty, Ma said it should be made clear to the public that the sovereignty of the ROC belongs to the people.

“Taiwan is the ROC,” [in Chinese: 應該清楚告訴下一代，「中華民國主權是屬於國民全體，台灣是中華民國」，這點非常清楚。]he said. “We should clear this up from a historical and constitutional viewpoint. The public must not be confused into thinking Taiwan’s sovereignty is undefined. We should never let anyone distort history for political reasons.”

Ma said the nine agreements and a joint statement his administration signed with Beijing are conductive to Taiwan’s development and none have hurt Taiwan or echoed China’s political overtures.

His administration’s definition of cross-strait relations was not new, he said, because former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) introduced the idea that Taiwan and China are two regions under the framework of the ROC Constitution and former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) did not alter that stance.

If "Taiwan is the ROC," than the Chinese mainland is not ROC territory, a position in clear contradiction with the "one China" principle. To be sure, saying "Taiwan is the ROC" is awfully similar to saying "one side, one country" or "two Chinas."

Or is this a case of 「台灣是中華民國」 being technically interpretable as "Taiwan is [a part of] the Republic of China?"

Either way, Ma is misleading either himself or the public.

Though I agree the DPP policy direction is feeling especially unclear in contrast with Ma's clarity.

We've got an update: Presidential spokesman has clarified that Ma meant "Taiwan belongs to the Republic of China." 「台灣是中華民國的。」

Which means that Ma is saying, "congratulations Taiwan, your sovereignty is in the hands of the people of all of China!"

That, my friends, is not empty rhetoric. That is the warning bell.

Another update: Ma apparently made the comments in the context of criticizing the "unclear" position of current textbooks. But that's pretty much BS, as this article points out.

CCP-WHO MOU MIA? IDTS

Since Ma claims the Beijing-WHO memorandum of understanding doesn't exist, I think he'd better take a look at the evidence (as it so often does, hat tip goes to Maddog for finding the memos).

I will note that the memo appears to have information redacted, including the actual signatories and some header info, which could have been a condition for leaking it in the first place (to give the WHO signers plausible deniability). But naturally, this makes it harder to fully verify the existence of the memo.