Ma and 228

Historian Hwang Chang-chien (黃彰健) passed away not too many months ago. You can view his Who's who page at Taiwan News here.

In the later part of his career, Hwang turned his attention to the 228 incident in Taiwan. The results of his research were not exactly pretty nor what I would call reasonable. His research culminated in the publishing of A Draft of Textual Research into the Truth of the 228 Incident (二二八事件真相考證稿). Hwang's research concluded that only 673 people were killed and that foreigners such as George Kerr incited the incident.

President Ma Ying-jeou praised Hwang's research recently. Weichen's most recent post on this topic points out just how twisted Ma Ying-jeou's understanding of 228 must be if he thinks Hwang's research is definitive.

On the level

Last night, Taiwan's MAC Deputy Minister Liu Te-shun (劉德勳) argued that China would not be able to tolerate an ECFA with Taiwan when any pro-Taiwan independence party was in power. In Liu's own words, "The ECFA is a political and economic asset that the KMT has fought to give the Taiwan people. How could we let a pro-Taiwanese Independence party plunder or ruin it?"

The DPP has long complained that the ECFA agreement is meant to bind Taiwan to "One China" both politically and economically. The CCP, likewise, made it obvious that political unification was the ultimate objective.

But only recently a KMT official acknowledge the "logic" of the CCP argument and demonstrate how the ECFA exacts a political cost designed to keep the DPP either out of power or in line with CCP unification demands.

Expect "clarifications" and denials of political pre-requisites for the ECFA agreement.

UOCN 中国泛蓝联盟

You'll be interested to know that the Union of Chinese Nationalists (中国泛蓝联盟), which is a pro-KMT outfit in China which promotes Sun Yat-sen's doctrines and hopes to use the KMT as a sort of basis for Chinese democratization, has a functional website and active forum.

A number of members of this group have been harassed and arrested over the years such as Zhang Zilin (张子霖).

The KMT makes no effort to support or even acknowledge the group. The DPP has in their past send their best wishes to the group.

Taiwan Disaster

Yuan Hongbing (袁紅冰), and exiled Chinese law professor, released his new book Taiwan Disaster last November. I learned about the book at the Taiwanese Heritage Society of Houston yesterday, which displayed an ad for the book. I decided to do a little research into the book, which posits that the Chinese Communist Party plans to complete a loose unification by 2012, including full economic integration, and to form its own proxy party in Taiwan for the 2016 elections.

One of the first things I discovered is that Yuan Hongbing is apparently as crazy as the Falun Gong's Epoch Times, since he apparently believes the Chinese intend on enslaving the entire human race, starting with Taiwan. That does not exactly inspire confidence in his other findings. But let's move on.

The second thing is that Yuan Hongbing claims to be quoting a few very primary sources. The Epoch Times reports the most important as being Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao's June 2008 speech at the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP. The document was apparently highly classified, and the leaking source was risking their life. The other three sources, listed in a Liberty Times article, are from that same meeting, and are three particular plans Yuan says the Central Committee passed: specifically, the Political Strategy for Resolving the Taiwan Problem, Plans for Potential Clashes with the Taiwanese Military, and Plans for Dealing with Taiwan Political Laws Post-Unification.

As Yuan outlines the plan, we see a relatively tight schedule that requires China do the following:

1. Fully integrate Taiwan's economy into China's, turning China into the major export market of Taiwan (snatching 90% plus of exports, including agricultural ones). Given Taiwan's dependence on exports and importation of natural resources, China feels this will finish the goal of economic unification. [A-Gu: It's well-known that China is using the economic crisis and general trends to get Taiwan to agree to economic integration terms they'd otherwise deplore; the Economic Minister just admitted Taiwan will eventually have to remove all Chinese factory products from the current import ban list, and that Taiwan's just trying to get a more favorable time table for those openings. Further, China's not giving in on Taiwan's plans to block Chinese produce and labor for the ECFA.]


2. China intends to be able to fully manipulate the Taiwan stock market through a number of well-paid Taiwan proxies, an expensive goal but one which would give the CCP huge leverage. [A-Gu: I would think so. I thought this would be an ideal investment for the CCP years ago, and I would certainly imagine they would pursue it. Why beat into submission what you can just buy?]


3. Get KMT and DPP heaveyweights alike to profit from investments in China, starting with the KMT; threaten economic ruin for those that don't cooperate; weaken the DPP's social standing and turn the KMT into a partner of unification by 2012. [A-Gu: I think these are also rather obvious, long running strategies, but really still beyond Chinese control.]
   


4. Perhaps most unbelievably, Yuan says the CPP has plans to create its own puppet "Democratic Socialist Party" in Taiwan after 2012. They intend for it to win the presidential election in 2016, and have lined up a number of high profile individuals from the media, religion, political circles, and business to back it. [A-Gu: I don't really see that happening. Too many things could go wrong to bother with this plan for it even to be seriously considered.]

It seems to me that Yuan's book reveals very little new information that is believable. We already knew China seeks economic unification as a basis for further political unification; that it openly seeks to make life easy for politically-connected investors; and that it tries to manipulate Taiwan's domestic politics when it can, but that it's given up using the ham-fist.

But forming a puppet party seems too difficult to be realistic to me, and I think the CCP would conclude the same thing. Likewise, a 2012 time table seems to be more optimistic than even most PLA hawks would hope for. I just don't believe Yuan can have authentic documents on these points, but if I'm wrong we'll know in just a few very short years.

On the other hand, I'd really like to read the book (Eslite is selling it, the LT article indicates). Has anyone read it, or do you have a more interesting review of the book handy?

Silly TVBS

When KMT-friendly media runs a story about how similar Ma Ying-jeou and VP Vincent Siew look to certain gods, you know the longstanding complaints about blue media's "deification" of Ma are not nonsense.

100th anniversary of the ROC

The coming 100th anniversary of the founding of the R.O.C. is sure to be a tremendous propaganda fest. As others have pointed out, it will be an effort to roll back the Taiwan-centric conscious that we've built up over the last couple of decades in favor of portraying Taiwan within the context of Chinese political and cultural history. The Zhonghua Minzu will feature prominently, as will early Republic (ROC) history.

I have a feeling the whole thing will just go over most people's heads. Don't expect any major transformations in opinion to accompany the festivities.

It remains to be seen if the KMT plans to sign something with China, beyond the ECFA, before the anniversary. While the peace agreement in the works probably cannot happen by that date, it seems likely that they will push for something new to wrap up in October.

Like Michael Turton, I found this essay to be particularly comprehensive, outlining KMT plans to keep local officials in charge after the county mergers (largely KMT or KMT-friendly independents). The KMT claims there is precedent for this move and so it is certainly constitutional and legal.

Well, the KMT already passed the bill this afternoon, though the DPP put up a fight.

So if the DPP intends to press this bill's constitutionality or legality, they'd better get the case before a judge in a hurry. Time is a-wastin'!

Wait a second, what?

China claims a missle intercept test went well:

China says it has successfully carried out a test of military technology to shoot down missiles in mid-air. The news comes in the wake of tensions between Beijing and Washington because of American missile sales to Taiwan, an island China considers part of its territory.

Jiang says Monday's test of "ground-based, mid-course missile intercepting technology" had what she describes as "the expected result."

There have been few details about the test....

She emphasizes that the anti-missile test is in line with what she calls China's path of peaceful development and is not targeted at any country.

Wait until everyone gets their hands on that.

My guess? The test didn't go very well. And I believe Taiwan media will go crazy about the report, with the pro-unification media emphasizing that any test like this was aimed at the US, not Taiwan.

Election results

While I'm as happy as the next guy about the DPP's sweeping win in the legislative by-elections, I want to say I'm disappointed at the media's concentration on the DPP's ability to raise a motion to impeach Ma.

For one thing, Taiwan is not a parliamentary system, and impeachment is not a vote of no confidence that results in snap elections; so even if the motion were to succeed, it would not create a better political atmosphere or give the DPP a chance to make any more immediate gains.

For another, the KMT's previous unending attempts to impeach Chen Shui-bian just led to a bunch of political theater and didn't accomplish anything, even if it might have hurt Chen *somewhat* politically; but I'm not even sure there's evidence for that. So I don't see an advantage to this strategy.

Most importantly, what the DPP should be doing with their new threshold is bringing up *bills* -- sunshine bill legislation, KMT party property stuff, etc. Yes, all of this will be blocked int he procedural committee, but it's important for the DPP to focus on and promote an image of capable governance, rather than stirring up further discontent against the KMT alone.

"International space"

One reason the KMT has been placing such emphasis on getting Taiwan "international space," is because it is this space which will be the post-unification international space, and which if Ma is able to obtain, would make the sell for unification all that much easier. If that sounds crazy or hyped, please re-read these two posts on the long-standing PRC definitions and ideas of unification.

I got so riled up about the KMT party property sell-off just now, I thought I'd give you this link again: KMT party property, re-visited.

I was especially upset when reading 2007 KMT property holdings.

Ma's New Year message

Sometimes I wonder if I should repeat myself as often as I do on this blog, especially on those handful of topics that most excite me. But considering I am not yet hearing the DPP caucus responding to me in chorus, I think I'll just take a deep breath and try again ...

Ma Ying-jeou's New Year's message, aimed largely at a domestic audience but with the understanding that China would glance over it, inadvertently emphasizes the difference between the KMT's actual policy -- hidden between the lines -- and the policy they want you to think they're pushing.

As I start getting into the speech details, I'll mention the most annoying and dangerous of KMT refrains, oft repeated, is that none of the documents being signed with China mention a "One China" or the so-called 92 consensus which Taiwan pretends to define as "one China, two interpretations." Therefore, the KMT argues, the agreements are not political and do not touch on "core" issues that might attract the people's willingness to push through a referendum.

Ma makes that case here:

During the fourth round of talks held 10 days ago between Chiang Pin-kung, head of Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation, and Chen Yunlin, head of mainland China's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait, the two sides signed three agreements. Along with the nine agreements signed previously, altogether 12 agreements have been signed over the past 19 months. These agreements have yielded considerable results, for they cover regular direct cross-strait flights; direct postal services; allowing mainland Chinese tourists to visit Taiwan; financial cooperation; food safety; cooperation on fishing crew affairs; product testing and certification; inspection and quarantine of agricultural products; and joint crime-fighting and judicial cooperation. Each agreement enhances and safeguards the rights and interests of Taiwan's people and has nothing to do with sovereignty.

In reality, each agreement is being signed on the understanding that Taiwan is adhering to the "One China" policy/fantasy. We all know the DPP supported most of the measures mentioned above and in some cases, even did the groundwork negotiating behind the scenes. But the DPP roundly rejected the notion that either Taiwan or the Republic of China were part of the same country as the People's Republic of China. So China didn't agree to anything. The new KMT administration reversed that position, claiming that Taiwan and China belong to the same country. So now the agreements can be signed faster than you can say "Pat-a-cake." Each agreement is premised on the falsehood that Taiwan is part of China and not a sovereign, independent entity.

And, despite a number of prominent examples of Chinese interests eclipsing Taiwanese ones (such as shipping), each agreement is loaded with carrots to please Taiwanese interests; these same carrots will make very handy sticks when China grows tired of waiting for Taiwanese to accept political demands. I'm no tactician, but arming the enemy is generally not the way to go.

Now I'll cut back to the beginning of Ma's "cross-strait" section of the speech:

My fellow citizens, the people of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are all of Chinese ethnicity. We share a common heritage, language, history and culture. But the two sides have been separately governed for 60 years now. In that time, each side has operated under different political, economic and social systems. As our ways of life and experiences are vastly different, we require a certain period of time in which to connect and gain a better understanding of each other. At present, making political choices hastily, whether they be for immediate unification or immediate independence, would cause serious confrontation and tumult. No one would be the better-off, and neighboring nations would all be affected.

Two things to note here. First, the reference to the Chinese ethnicity, or the Zhonghua Minzu. That topic has been covered rather extensively on this blog. The Zhonghua Minzu as Taiwanese understand it (and they understand it to essentially mean Han people) is not quite nonsense, but it is not exactly a good reason to pretend to be running another country.

Second, check out the last sentence I've highlighted. It's essentially true; there is no obvious way to solve the Taiwan-China issue in a peaceful way within the foreseeable future. This is, of course, because China threatens to pummel Taiwan into dust should the Taiwanese get the crazy idea to openly declare their home an independent country, as it obviously is. Taiwan does not threaten war, only common sense.

There is more meat in Ma's next claim:

And so, for cross-strait relations, I have always called for adherence to the principle of "no unification, no independence and no use of force" under the framework of the ROC Constitution, and have sought to promote cross-strait interaction and cooperation within the parameters of the 1992 Consensus. This is not passively maintaining the status quo, but rather an active attempt to gain enough time in which to allow for the peaceful development of the cross-strait relationship. This will help the people of Taiwan and mainland China better understand one another and eliminate prejudices through greater communication and cooperation in the areas of trade and culture. With Chinese culture as the foundation, we can seek pragmatic and feasible solutions to cross-strait disputes.

If Ma is saying his appropriation of Chinese terminology about "One China" is simply a stalling ploy, a "kick the can" maneuver, then he's merely repeating the KMT policy line, which has been officially aimed at stalling a "unification/independence" choice for a couple of generations ever since about 2003, when Lien Chan was running.

But remember China has given no indication that a 30-50 year time line is acceptable to them. You must also remember that the KMT aims to do stall not on the chance that China will consider the merits of Taiwanese Independence, but to intertwine Taiwan and China to the point that unification is the only feasible option.

(By chance, the best pro-KMT argument I ever heard was that Taiwan and China were already at that point, so edging in the direction of unification, as slowly as possible to ensure the most favorable terms, was the only reasonable policy).

And note the "common culture" claim that wraps up the paragraph, which is aimed domestically to re-define the Taiwan/China relationship on claims of common linguistic, cultural and ancestral heritage instead of the fact that they're two different countries. (That is why Holo Taiwanese/Southern Min will be nearly dead in Taiwan fifty years from now, even as we now promote shoddy mother language education.)

The true travesty is yet to come:

My fellow citizens, since I took office in 2008, the government has resumed cross-strait talks, insisting all the while on parity and dignity. The ROC is a sovereign, independent nation, and Taiwan long ago became a democracy in which sovereignty lies in the hands of the people. We should have full confidence that Taiwan's future is, as a matter of course, in the hands of its 23 million people. Precisely because the Republic of China is a democratic country, cross-strait policy must be subject to both supervision by the Legislature and to public opinion. As to cross-strait agreements that concern the people's welfare, the government must be responsive to public opinion and increase communication with opposition parties and the people to seek out consensus and gain support.

Ma is first saying that the ROC -- including the "mainland" and Taiwan -- is one sovereign nation. Then, he factually notes that Taiwan is a democracy. These two sentences are juxtaposed to make the Taiwanese voter think the administration is equating Taiwan to the Republic of China, which he is decidedly not. Finally, Ma claims that democracy will ensure the Taiwanese people's right to freely decide their own future.

Back here in real life, the ROC does not control or enjoy sovereignty over China. Taiwan is obviously a democracy, but we cannot ignore the KMT's anti-democratic determination to prevent any referendum related to Taiwan's future to ever occur, even in a theoretical scenario where unification and/or independence are being considered.

Finally, of course, the cross-strait agreements have not been properly supervised by the KMT-run legislature, for honestly baffling reasons. Most branches of government jump at the opportunity to expand their power.

The rest of the speech is much more boring.

KMT wants to become an election machine

Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Secretary-General King Pu-tsung (金溥聰) discussed the party's plans to sell of its remaining assets & investments and switch itself, "like a Transformer," into an "election machine" (his words, not mine).

What I love about this "strategy," besides the Transformers reference and the fact that it will doubtlessly enrich some KMT friends while avoiding responsibility for ill-gotten assets and gains, is that the KMT suffers from such long-running local factional splits exactly because it already is an "election machine" -- one that local elites use to gain greater power, and which can normally accommodate multiple moneyed interest groups at the same time -- but local factional leaders will abandon the party at the drop of a hat to run as independents. One would think the KMT would rather have more loyal politicians than ramp up the "election machine" message.

(Moreover, voters may read King's message as an endorsement of the "eternal election" model which leaves actual governing by the way-side -- and that does not play well with voters.)

The KMT plans to live on "donations" for political campaigns in the future. And we all know how transparent the financial laws are for political donations (hint: you need only report what you spend, not what you take in). Perhaps this is all really just a shell plan to create more flexible slush funds.

Back in 2000 and 2004, one of the great hopes of green guys like me was that the KMT was about to collapse. As financial interests -- not ideology -- holds the party together, we hoped that the moneyed interests would say, "these guys aren't winning again," and go their separate ways.

That didn't happen. But it stands a better chance of happening the other way around, with a newly poor KMT being gutted of its previous moneyed interest support, who may go run their own show.

Either that, or the party may become corporate property for a new set of sponsors.

KMT head fake

The KMT's solution (well, President/Chairman Ma's anyway) to its property problem is to sell its property -- valued at NT$20billion by its own estimates, and suspected by DPP estimates to be even more -- but this does nothing to correct or account for the unjust methods by which that property was obtained and the practices that were involved in increasing its value.

Two for the show...

I bought yesterday's World Journal, an American Chinese-language newspaper published by the United Daily News Group, the pro-blue Taiwan media group.

The newspaper included a monthly insert this particular Sunday, and you can see the titles of all the articles here. I took objection to Chen Shiyao's article titled "What will the two sides of the [Taiwan] Strait do for the next several decades?"

Chen's argument can be summarized, I think fairly, as below: Ma Ying-jeou has continually ricochet between endorsing ultimate unification with the "mainland" in a distant future and promises to maintain Taiwan's de facto independence. Ma is walking this tight rope because he desires to keep Beijing in a favor-giving mood, even as the Taiwanese voting public has no interest in unification. In other words, Ma is trying to please all, and trying to garner the votes of both the light-greens and KMT loyalists, as Lee Teng-hui managed to do before.

This "greening" of the KMT's position already threatens to shatter the silent agreement between Beijing and the KMT that unification is the eventual goal of negotiations. And at any time, Beijing could reverse its position on a number of policies that are net-favorable to Taiwan, and oculd seriously threaten Taiwan's relationship with its remaining allies and hurt Taiwan's economy through a retraction of the current set of carrots. Both Ma's reelection and Taiwan's livelihoods would then be under threat.

To maintain good relations between Taiwan and the "mainland" over the next several decades, the KMT must avoid the siren call of de facto independence and give time for the political atmosphere in Taiwan to accommodate the pro-gradual unification crowd's voice; they can then establish a political foothold. At the same time, the mainland must give Taiwan more carrots and hide the sticks behind their backs a little better, or they will lose the chance to win the hearts of the Taiwanese.

Chen makes special note that a recent Global Views Monthly poll shows that while only 57% of Taiwanese insist that negotiations with the "mainland" be conducted on a fully equal footing, a stronger 64% believe that important cross-strait agreements should go through a referendum for public approval. Chen labels the referendum a Pandora's box that must not be opened, as it may trigger an attack from China, and so the KMT must remain resolute on not allowing the referendum process to infringe on cross-strait affairs.

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I don't believe Chen is very right about Ma's pro-de facto independence credentials. Here's the WSJ quote from Ma's interview that Chen opens with to make his case:

"Whether there will be reunification as expected by the mainland side depends very much on what is going to unfold in the next decades. This is a question no one can answer at this stage. But as the president of this country, I believe that the 23 million people of Taiwan want to secure one or two generations of peace and prosperity so that people on either side of the Taiwan Strait can have sufficient time and freedom to understand, to appreciate, and to decide what to do."

Several days later, Chen notes,

In a private meeting with professor Winston L. Y. Yang from Seton Hall University of the United States, Ma also clearly said that "there is little support in Taiwan for unification with China." ([UDN,] Dec. 16, 2009)

The KMT reports on that meeting in more depth:

Yang said that, during their conversation, he had asked President Ma whether “the maintenance of the status quo meant to maintain Taiwan’s status quo of de facto independence,” and the President had not denied it. Furthermore, President stated that the majority of the people on Taiwan expressed support for the maintenance of status quo in various public polls and surveys when given the choice of unification, independence, or the status quo.

Yang went on to ask President Ma if Mainland China became more democratic, would conditions of unification improve for the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. To that the President replied, “It will depend on the mainstream opinion among the people of Taiwan.”

So you see, Ma didn't actually say that he considers the status quo to be de facto independence; in fact, Ma himself and the KMT leadership has repeatedly stated that the status quo is a Republic of China, one which by constitution and legal right claims the territory of all of China. And nothing they say implies the contrary.

I believe Ma's silence is motivated by the fact that younger, lighter blue voters (that I have met) have always implicitly believed Ma maintains a pro-de facto independence position. Ma needs this sort of "rumor" to be floating around to maintain their support. But he will never endorse a truly pro-de facto independence position, and what he actually believes in will probably never be clear.

Chen identifies the major problem with the current path of negotiations with Beijing -- namely, that Beijing expects compliance from Taiwan on political as well as economic matters, and that Beijing has increasingly large leverage to hurt Taiwan with little effort if it feels Taiwan drifting from the Chinese political line. Yet his proposed solution to the problem is for Taiwan to let Beijing make her even more vulnerable to Chinese sabotage, in hopes that a non-existent "pro-gradual unification" voter block will emerge and take things happily in that direction.

Chen fails to see that in reality, Beijing has no intention of giving out carrots forever with no return in sight. They are demanding minimal compliance now (that the KMT endorse the one China principle in some form) but will demand more soon -- not after several decades of agreements favorable to only Taiwan. At the same time, the Taiwanese voting public has no intention of allowing gradual unification to happen; neither do they want politicians to take the choice out of their referendum ballot-holding hands. Chen's proposed solution of eternal Chinese favors in return for only minimal Taiwanese political compliance is not going to fly in either Beijing or Taipei.

Chen's most realpolitik position is on the subject of the referendum, which is indeed both anathema to Beijing and a core demand of an increasing percentage of Taiwanese voters. Hence the true bottleneck in future cross-strait development will indeed be at the point China's demand for a political resolution meets Taiwan's demand for a refrendum. The KMT hopes to postpone that point forever, but Beijing has no intention of doing so.

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Beijing knows no referendum could pass in the next several decades which would be favorable to its political objectives -- de facto independence as the status quo is indeed the common political language of young greens and young blues alike. The DPP knows this too, which is why they count the referendum as their sacred right and best defense. The KMT knows this too, which is why they avoid the issue entirely, neither ruling out a political referendum on this subject but neither daring to imply that a referendum could or should be held ("The ECFA is an economic, not political, agreement, and so a referendum is not required...").

So we are faced with a future where Taiwan will have little leverage, China will make increasingly painful demands for political concessions from Taiwan, and the Taiwanese public will be demanding their right to self-determination. China's military will respond belligerently; the USA is unlikely to maintain much interest in the Taiwan Strait at that point. Japan will probably fall back. And we will be at a point where China has to decide if invasion is really worth the potential gain, and Taiwanese will have to decide if their liberties are worth defending. And it's very hard to tell what may happen at that time.

I don't see the basic causes of tension going anywhere any time soon, unless the KMT manages a quick sell out. I increasingly think they won't be able to get away with one. So don't expect tensions to really relax across the Taiwan Strait any time soon.