Warp Zone

For some reason, I occasionally find myself reading editorials in the KMT's mouthpiece, the Central Daily News. Perhaps it's because the paper sometimes says what the Ma administration won't announce from the podium. Here is the article I read today.

The editorial mocks DPP positions on the ECFA; denigrates Lee Teng-hui's "two countries" and Chen Shui-bian's "one side, one country" formulations as "not only completely unworkable but bound to bring about disastrous consequences;" and finally notes that shooting for de jure independence is sure to bring economic ruin and war.

But what really caught my eye was the final paragraph, where the writer throws a curve ball:

Up to this point, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have had the wisdom to define their relations as a unique, non-international and non-domestic relationship. Thus agreements have been signed on the principles of equality and mutual respect by [Taiwan's] Straits Affairs Foundation [SEF] and [China's] Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits [ARATS]. The agreements have been mutually beneficial and won the praise of the international community, just as the ECFA has. Taiwan independence supporters, though, continue to blow hot air about dealing [with "the mainland"] on a nation-to-nation basis. The Taiwanese people have already experienced the tangible benefits of setting aside political differences, fostering warm economic relations, and reducing the danger of a military conflict. If the independence supporters keep mouthing the same old platitudes, they will not win any hearts or minds.

　兩岸如今都有智慧把雙方關係定位為非國際、亦非國內的特殊關係，故以海基、海協兩會來進行協商簽署，合乎對等、尊嚴原則，互蒙其利，亦獲國際社 會讚賞，ＥＣＦＡ也是一樣。獨派卻仍鼓吹以國與國來處理兩岸關係。台灣人民已體驗到了兩岸政治上擱置爭議、經濟上合作互惠、軍事上化解危機的實際利益，獨 派再唱其陳腔濫調，是不會有市場的。

It is obviously and pointedly false to suggest that China views relations with Taiwan as anything other than domestic, unless you ignore everything they say about the subject.

But far more baffling is when the CDN tries to suggest the KMT defines relations [with China] as a unique, non-international and non-domestic relationship.

When was that the definition? Certainly not in 2008 when Ma drew a firestorm of criticism for saying relations were "a non-international, special relationship." Certainly not today, when fantasies of China recognizing a "shared sovereignty" situation are the domain of deluded academics. In fact, there's not a peep about "non-domestic" anywhere.

To prove the point, go search for the Chinese phrase "non-domestic special relationship" (非國內的特殊關係). That search turns up only this CDN article. Even when broken up into two phrases,"non-domestic" and "special relationship," we see nothing else about this topic on the internet. This terminology is newly minted, not official policy, and certainly not the policy of both China and Taiwan.

Why would the official KMT mouthpiece make up one definition of a policy -- one where nuance in phrasing matters a lot -- when the KMT has a different official policy? Is the editor simply living in la-la land? Does he have access to insider information about progress in negotiations with China? Is he making an effort to fool the public in Taiwan (presumably because people don't actually have the stomach to accept relations with China as "domestic" yet)? Or what?

Vaguely Familiar

It seems the Legislature has figured out what we long knew. It's amazing how the timing works out -- this report about the ECFA comes out soon after the ECFA's signing, meaning the negative results would not be in the news to influence the legislative vote. But on to the meat of the post...

This week, a report out of the Legislative Yuan's think tank-like organization, called in Chinese the Lifayuan Fazhiju ji yusuan zhongxin (立院法制局及預算中心), said that China will strictly adhere to a "One China" policy (imagine that) and block Taiwan efforts to sign other FTAs.

The report ominously concludes that "in the future, it is possible that Taiwan's survival and development will require walking the road to integration with China."「將可能使台灣生存與發展僅先有一條與中國大陸結合之路」。

Back in Nov. 2008, I said:

"I also think [Ma's] policies will lead Taiwan not directly into unification, but to a point of no return, where economic and political relations are at a point where China will be have even such enormous leverage in both the cross-strait and international sphere that the CCP will be able to push for a unification time table of its own choosing and Taiwanese leaders will have few options but to comply and negotiate for minimal concessions."

Obviously, my prediction was somewhat more descriptive and uses KMT taboo words like "unification." But it is clear that the Ma administration's policy may well put Taiwan in a position where unification is the only peaceful option.

Some would say that the point of no return has already come. There are certainly plenty of people positioning themselves for that time, even if it is not here yet.

Argh

It is, in a way, big news that China's Gao Hucheng (高虎城), Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Commerce, said the ECFA was signed under the precondition of accepting "the '92 consensus of One China." While this has been the unvarying Chinese policy, it is not often said in one piece. Before the ECFA's signing, the Chinese favored simply "the '92 consensus" and tried to avoid talking about "One China". China certainly doesn't often reiterate their claim that the '92 consensus means "One China," not "one China, two interpretations."

Part of the reason Gao spoke so "boldly" is that his audience was the international community. Reinforcing the "One China" aspect of the deal is a way of trying to undercut and prevent pro-Taiwan ideas from entering the heads of the international community.

Pingtung DPP legislator Pan Meng-an (潘孟安), quoted in that article, seems to forget (or pretends to forget) that China did not leak a KMT secret. Rather, the Ma administration has a long-standing acceptance of "One China," a policy phrase they also utter as little as possible -- especially in connection to the ECFA. Just check out the MAC Vice-chair Liu Te-hsun's (劉德勳) limp, non-denying response to China's assertion. Liu simply musters the formula stating that the ECFA is apolitical because it is a strictly economic deal.

Apparently, Japan too has little interest in the subtleties of years-gone-by -- the Japanese ambassador to China recently reiterated the rarely spoken fact that Japan has never recognized Taiwan as part of China.

Keepin' it interesting, eh?

Special Feature

Despite its rhetorical flair, this article brings up some important issues. So I've decided to translate this Liberty Times opinion piece for you.

[Original text]

Hu pins ECFA with label of "anti-independence, one China;" Will Ma go along?

Reporter Zou Jingwen ╱ Special Feature

"The ECFA is purely an economic issue, unrelated to politics."This remark was made by President Ma Ying-jeou."The common political basis for the signing of the ECFA is opposition to Taiwan independence and the upholding of the '92 consensus. "So says Hu Jintao.

These two statements about the signing of the ECFA are contradictory; whose statement is correct? Does Ma Ying-jeou accept the ECFA's "common political basis?"The government's position has resulted in "one ECFA, two interpretations;" this rhetoric is deceptive, to both ourselves and others.

When Ma Ying-jeou says the ECFA is non-politicial, he is talking to the Taiwanese people. He does not say such things to China. So do these words reflect reality or do they not?

Make no mistake: Hu Jintao brought up this "political foundation" in the presence of Ma's special envoy, Wu Poh-hsiung. These words were uttered for all the world to hear. These words are most sincere.

Now that the ECFA is signed, Hu Jintao has opted to set the tone and thereby deny Ma negotiating cover cover, preparing to force future concessions that go further than "opposing Taiwanese independence and upholding 'One China.'" If these two policies are the ECFA's foundation, they become "reality;" Ma's calls for Hu to "face reality" are naive nonsense. Beijing does not intend to let Taiwan avoid further compromise for the next thousand years.

Hu may have hit this ball into Ma's court, but Ma must not sit idly by; 23 million pairs of eyes are watching him. China has "put this hat on your head" [pinned Ma with this label]. Will you wear it? If you will not, you must refuse it; silence will indicate consent, and those in Taiwan who oppose you will have another righteous reason for doing so.

Asking Ma to "wear the hat" of One China and anti-Taiwan independence, regardless of the color of the hat [A-Gu:that is, regardless of its political character], demonstrates Chinese anticipation that Ma would play innocent and agree, since these policy positions are in Ma's DNA.

The problem is, Ma's campaign promised the voters that "Taiwanese independence is a choice." Not only has that choice been removed, but Ma now wants to tie our hands. He has openly repudiated his own election pledge. Yet how can support for Taiwanese independence be made illegal? Is there an intention to set up a Fascist government?

Even more ridiculous is what "opposing Taiwan independence" entails. Basically, "Taiwan independence" has two meanings. One is that Taiwan is a sovereign independent country.The KMT has said that the ROC is on Taiwan, and that the ROC is a sovereign independent country. We should be able to reason by extension that here in Taiwan we have an independent and sovereign country. Does Ma Ying-jeou oppose this position?

If he does not, then let us consider the second meaning of "Taiwan independence." This is a sovereign independent country, and is also a democratic country, and in democracies all over the world, the people have the right to decide major policies which greatly affect national development. This includes the majority's right to change the national title, flag or anthem.

If one day the people of Taiwan decide that the label "ROC" creates international confusion and problems with our self-identity, and jointly decide to change the country's name to "Taiwan", on what grounds is the KMT so slandering this definition of "Taiwanese independence?"

Ma's parroting the Chinese "one China" position and his cooperation with the Communist Party in opposing Taiwan independence is undermining the basis for Ma's own prosperity. Are these efforts aimed at preparing for a denial of the sovereignty and independence of the "Republic of China?"

Hu has branded the ECFA, and topped it with a red cap. How can Ma Ying-jeou ignore this reality?Ma owes the people an explanation.

High Court corrupt?

I'm sickened by the possibility that four High Court judges and a prosecutor accepted bribes from a (former) KMT legislator. There may be several additional, undisclosed investigations into judicial corruption as well.

This sort of thing is a deathblow to confidence in an institution. If even the High Court can be corrupted, what verdict can escape suspicion?

Don't despair

Sometimes its hard to follow your own advice. But in this case, it's important. Despite the signing of the ECFA today, there's no need to lsoe hope. There's lots of variables and lots of exciting times ahead.

No matter how fast the CCP intends to force Taiwan into political capitulation, and no matter how fast the KMT is willing to move toward a "path of no return" on unification, the opposition has time and has the ability to freeze or reverse the direction.

It might not be the brightest day, but the sun will again shine.

Referendum Rejected!

Well, as Michael and David noted, the Referendum Review Committee struck down the TSU-initiated referendum drive on the ECFA. An RTI article explains the Chairman's rational, also noted in this Taipei Times article:

The TSU's application requested a referendum on the question: “Do you agree that the government should sign an ECFA with China?”

“The reason stated for the referendum proposal is to ask if the government has the right to sign an ECFA. However, the question asked in the proposal is about the contents of an ECFA, which is different from the stated reason,” Referendum Review Committee Chairman Chao Yung-mau (趙永茂) told a press conference after the five-hour meeting.

The committee had convened at 6pm.

Chao said a referendum proposal should be aimed at changing the status quo, but the government would not have to take any action to change its policy, even if the proposed referendum had passed, because of the wording — asking whether voters agree with the government’s plan to sign an ECFA.

“The referendum proposal, therefore, does not meet the qualification of ‘approving a government policy,’ as stated in the Referendum Act (公民投票法),” he said.

So the response outlines two reasons the referendum is rejected: first, because the "stated reason" for initiating the referendum differs from the content; and second, because even if passed, the referendum couldn't change government policy by the Committee's reasoning.

The TSU has naturally responded unfavorably to the Committee's reasoning:

The TSU yesterday said that the issue had already been settled in a previous meeting by the ­Central Election Committee (CEC), which it said had found that the TSU referendum question fulfilled the requirements under Article 14, Section 1.

In a letter sent to TSU Chairman Huang Kun-huei (黃昆輝) on May 5, the CEC wrote that the issue had been discussed in one of their meetings on May 4.

The letter, signed by CEC Chairman Lai Hau-min (賴浩敏), stated: “The 402nd meeting of [CEC] committee members finds that [the proposal] doesn’t invoke any circumstances of Article 14, Section 1 under the Referendum Act.”

And as you can imagine, the Committee chair responded to that:

In response, Referendum Review Committee Chairman Chao Yung-mau (趙永茂) said yesterday the committee was entitled to determine whether the TSU proposal complied with Article 14 of the Referendum Act even if the CEC had already reviewed it.

Determining that the TSU proposal was not in line with the article was just one of the reasons that the committee rejected the proposal, he added.

Just one of the two reasons, the other being highly debatable. I would argue that if the ECFA referendum passes and the ECFA is still signed by the administration, the legislature would be obliged to strike down the ECFA.

I think TSU appeals may have some chance of getting air time -- the committee's decision is hardly air tight. But I also agree with David that perhaps a new route is probably needed here, probably one to more thoroughly amend the referendum law rather than just abolishing the Referendum Review Committee.

Time constraints now make further ECFA referendum initiatives pretty useless -- everything is likely to be signed and law before a referendum could even reach the second threshold. Perhaps its time to move on to the larger issue of tackling of the "bird cage" referendum law.

Vacation

I'll be gone for the next 4 days, and when I get back, I'll be too late to provide any data on the Referendum Review Committee's impending decision. I'm not optimistic they'll approve the referendum, but I have my fingers crossed anyway.

The oddest piece...

A CNA article appears today quoting an unnamed official. The very weird part is the unnamed official is supposedly only reminding us of things we know....

The article opens as follows:

On June 3rd, the Referendum Review Committee will review the ECFA Referendum application. [An unnamed] source from [the ruling] party and government administration stated that the Mainland Affairs Council and Economic Ministry have already made the government's position clear: as the ECFA mainly involves land taxes and investment issues, it is not a topic that can be brought to referendum....

At the public hearing [held by the Referendum Review Committee on the 27th], the MAC and MOE argued that the ECFA had provisions related to land taxes and investment, and therefore could not be a topic for referendum [according to the Referendum Act]. Furthermore, once the ECFA is signed, it will be sent to the Legislature for review, and only after its review has been passed will it take effect. The Legislature has complete oversight over the process and there is no need for an additional referendum. The Referendum Review Committee ought to reject the application, they argued.

The source from the party and government administration said that the MAC and MOE had already made the government's attitude clear. As far as the final decision on the ECFA referendum petition went, the government would respect the Referendum Review Committee's decision.

6月3日公審會將審議ECFA公投案。黨政人士今天表示，陸委會與經濟部已表明政府態度，主張涉及租稅、投資為主要內容的ECFA，不得作為公投的提案。...

陸委會與經濟部代表在公聽會主張，ECFA包含「租稅」及「投資」事項，不得作為公投的提案；且兩岸簽署ECFA後須送立法院審議，審議通過後才生效，國 會完全監督，沒有再公投必要，認為公審會應駁回公投案。

黨政人士說，陸委會與經濟部已清楚說明政府的態度，對於ECFA公投最後的准駁結果，政府尊重公審會的決定。

Why would this source wish to remain unnamed unnamed? That's what puzzles me the most, if they are just discussing a matter of public record. I feel like something else is going on there but can't really pin-point a reason for this odd anonymity.

The government's position is not far-fetched, considering Article 2 of the referendum law states:

No proposal of referendum may be raised for any matters regarding budgeting, taxation, investment, salary and personnel affairs.
The matters subject to referendum shall be recognized by the Referendum Review Commission (hereinafter referred to as "the Review Commission").

If you reject the government's theory, you can't argue that the referendum only deals with the question of whether the government ought to sign an abstract economic agreement with China (regardless of content). If you make that argument, you'll get rejected on these grounds:

“Instead, it asks the public to vote on something that has not yet happened — since the ECFA is not a concrete policy yet. Hence, we decided that the petition did not meet the criteria for a referendum as stipulated in the Referendum Act (公民投票法),” committee chairman Chao Yung-mau (趙永茂) said....

But you can argue that in theory, any national referendum topic affecting government policy at all would affect the budget-- the KMT's 2008 referendum campaign for rejoining the UN would clearly have required budgeting UN dues if successful, since UN by-laws would require Taiwan to pay. But the intention of the Referendum Law is clearly not to bar all referendum topics; the degree of separation between a referendum topic and the budget/tax/investment details must exempt it from rejection on these grounds. In this case, the topic is on the signing of an ECFA rather than the ECFA's tax or investment related contents -- and therefore the referendum does not touch on the verboten topics.

I don't know if this argument would be taken into account by the committee, but I think 2008 sets enough of a precedent for at least an argument on these lines.

Whoops!

The KMT's domestic PR strategy to promote the ECFA is to say, "we need this or our country's economy will be devastated and marginalized."

However, that PR strategy puts the government in a very difficult negotiating position, as China can demand more favorable terms and postpone the signing, as seems to be happening now. The KMT is then left with the choice of caving in to Chinese demands that don't benefit Taiwan or contradicting their own insistence on the ECFA's necessity.

Whoopsie-doodle...

State of the party, revisited

Well, one year ago I wrote briefly on the DPP, and at that time I was most pessimistic about the state of the party. I think that many of those problems have been solved. The DPP seems to have moved past Chen Shui-bian, despite a handful of holdouts. The party has consolidated around Tsai Ing-wen's leadership, as well, and these two factors have helped to consolidate the party's message and messenger issues (disclaimer: I'm not watching the DPP Legislative Caucus' press conference clips).

Perhaps best yet, the DPP has re-remembered their strategy of yi difang baowei zhongyang (以地方包圍中央), or to siege the central government [KMT dominated] with local success. I like what I see!Of course, I'd like it even more if they were really going after offices at every level.

Obviously, it doesn't hurt that the party has won a few special elections and has high hopes for the municipalities.

Here's to hope!

6/3 baby!

I have to say I'm not paying a whole lot of attention to the political situation at the moment, as I'm waiting for the Referendum Committee to make its decision on the TSU/DPP's ECFA referendum initiative. That should be coming down on June 3rd. In the mean time, there's the ever exciting nominations for the upcoming mayoral elections, being well covered by those heroes of Taiwan blogging that work so hard every day.

You can bet I'll have something to say about the referendum committee's decision, though. I fully expect a rejection on one of the causes for rejection last time:

“Instead, it asks the public to vote on something that has not yet happened — since the ECFA is not a concrete policy yet. Hence, we decided that the petition did not meet the criteria for a referendum as stipulated in the Referendum Act (公民投票法),” committee chairman Chao Yung-mau (趙永茂) said....

Winner of the ECFA debate?

Polls are naturally divided on partisan lines, but I have to say I was most impressed with Ma's performance in the ECFA debate. I wasn't expecting him to come out swinging. But instead, he was aggressive and dripped sarcasm, and somehow it worked better than I would have imagined. He was a man on a mission out there.

On the other hand, Tsai Ying-wen had a set of four reasonable questions which she felt Ma refused to answer even after being asked four or five times. She kept bringing that up, and that was making Ma look evasive. She was also amply able to answer questions asked to her, and appeared very competent.

The debate was quite tense. Quite something to watch. Tsai and Ma both became noticeably impatient and annoyed at several points.

I think Ma had the more rhetorically swaying argument even as I tend to personally support Tsai's logic. Tsai asked a lot of questions of Ma in that debate, and a lot of rhetorical questions began, "Didn't you think about...?" That was setting Ma up for homeruns like, "We have thought about it, and here's our awesome conclusion..." I think Ma capitalized on a difference in rhetorical style, and worked it to his advantage.

It wasn't a blow out by any means; quite close really. but I think I would still give Ma the win.

A point of Blue thinking

I've been wanting to blog on this topic for months, and thankfully, Michael Turton's latest post gave me just the right opening to present my contention.

Michael's post displays some of the worst paragraphs of a China Post editorial, but the line that caught my attention is this:

It is ludicrous to argue that Ma is planning a sellout of Taiwan. Even if he dreamed of presenting Taiwan to the People's Republic on a silver platter, he couldn't make his dream come true.

This sentiment is quite prominent in blue and light-blue thinking. I've had lots of debates with light-blue, anti-unification voters where I don't even raise the idea of KMT intent to sell out the island. Instead, I try to remind them what the Chinese position on Taiwan's future is. These voters, however, simply dismiss arguments about China's intent, policy or rhetoric. "Of course the CCP is going to say and do those things," they'll argue, "but what difference does it make?"

There is a real lack of concern about the Chinese position, and I find that these light-blues are convinced China simply can't force Taiwan's hand. This is why I think they dismiss the China policy/intention part of the equation, and instead believe that Taiwan can engage economically or culturally with China under almost any set of conditions with no threat of being forced into political capitulation. They figure the Taiwanese electorate just wouldn't let unification happen, and China can't force it.

Meanwhile, I find that the deep blue voters -- those with deep ideological bonds to the KMT or institutions it has created -- equally dismiss Chinese intentions for Taiwan's future, but I think they do this for entirely different reasons. First, many of these voters once deeply believed anti-Communist rhetoric from the old days. They believed the KMT line about a constant threat of invasion facing Taiwan, which justified martial law and lack of political freedoms. When Taiwan democratized and these anti-Communist arguments disintegrated, I think these deep blues just came to believe China was never and will never be the threat the old KMT guard made it out to be. And given their receptiveness to some eventual (if distant and mutually agreeable) unification, they see the "closer economic ties" as a great thing as well. Further, I think they see the Chinese "good will" rhetoric as genuine, and they accept that only DPP style "Taiwanese independence" would cause China to try and force unification.

Over all, however, I've always felt that the KMT's success in promoting its China policy depends on not factoring in China's arguments and intentions for Taiwan's future. And that seems foolish and short-sighted, at best. What surprises me is how many blue voters of different stripes are willing to ignore China's role in this equation, as well.

But what do you think?

ECFA Referendum

The TSU has announced that volunteers collected 120,000 signatures in support of a referendum on the ECFA. As you may recall, the signatures and petition will soon go before the Executive Yuan's Referendum Evaluation Committe -- probably by the end of the month, according to the TSU. As the Taipei Times notes, only 86,000 valid sigs are needed to get past "stage one," so the list should be safe.

Yet that committee, made up entirely of Ma appointees, roundly rejected a similar petition last August. The previously rejected topic was:

「你是 否同意台灣與中國簽訂之經濟合作架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ），政府應交付台灣人民公民投票決定？」

Do you agree that the government ought to put an economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) signed between Taiwan and China to a referendum before the Taiwanese people?

This time, the question asks:

你是否同意政府與中國簽訂「兩岸經濟合作架構協議」 （簡稱「兩岸經濟協議」或ECFA）？

Do you agree that the government should sign a cross-Strait economic framework agreement with China (often called a cross-Strait economic agreement or an ECFA)?

The new wording gets around most of the Referendum Evaluation Committee's previous objections, but the committee could still have one excuse it used last time:

“Instead, it asks the public to vote on something that has not yet happened — since the ECFA is not a concrete policy yet. Hence, we decided that the petition did not meet the criteria for a referendum as stipulated in the Referendum Act (公民投票法),” committee chairman Chao Yung-mau (趙永茂) said....

We'll see what happens around early May...but don't expect the Committee to rule differently, even if the public is less likely to buy the sole excuse "the ECFA is not concrete policy" this time around.