Sounds about right to me

中廣新聞網╱戴瑞芬 2010-10-06 10:04

調整字級：

(戴瑞芬報導)

... 根據主計處「薪資與生產力統計年報」調查，台灣員工「平均週工時」僅次於新加坡與香港。在台灣，「上班打卡制、下班責任制」的工作形式，儼然成為現代的職場文化。

根據1111人力銀行進行職場「責任加班」調查，高達7成8的上班族被要求「責任制」需要無償加班，且平均每月的責任加班有32.92小時。

...According to the results of a statistical survey, the "Annual Statistics on Salary and Production Strength," Taiwan workers spend more time on the job than people in any other country in the world excepting Singapore and Hongkong....

According to the survey's, commissioned by the 1111 employment services website, Over 78% of people reported working overtime in a salaried position, and thus ineligible for over time pay. The monthly hours of unpaid overtime at work averaged 32.92 hours per week.

Tsai Ing-wen's Apple Daily interview

There's much less buzz about it in the bloglosphere than I expected! First, an article about the interview and later related remarks:

On Friday last week, she suggested in an interview with the Chinese-language Apple Daily that the DPP would most likely continue Ma’s cross-strait policies and that any changes would have to be supported by public consensus and legislative approval.

In a previous meeting with the international press in May, she also insisted the DPP had learned from its eight years in office and would work on a more predictable China policy. She has said that stable cross-strait relations would form a key component of the DPP’s 10-year policy guidelines....

While she acknowledged that, compared with the Ma administration, there was a general expectation the DPP needed to be firmer on sovereignty and national security-related issues in the face of growing Chinese pressure, she said the issues could be overcome through greater cross-strait interaction.

However, she maintained increasing cross-strait exchanges would not be conducted at the expense of Taiwan’s ties with the rest of the world.

“This is distinct from the KMT government approach, which embraces China as a [corridor] to the world,” she said.

The Presidential Office has responded by saying DPP cross-strait policy is opportunistic, inconsistent and disingenuous; after all, they say, if the DPP intends to keep the ECFA and other policies in place, why are they attacking the KMT policy? China's Taiwan Affairs Office has shrugged, claiming they don't know if this is simply election language or a sincere change of course.

I have to agree with the criticism of Tsai's remarks, although I sense she's responding to the tendency of the ever-important moderate voter; I also note she wasn't terribly specific. But if the only difference she wants to highlight between DPP and KMT policy is that last paragraph in the quote above, I have to say that's not much of a distinction. Mostly rhetorical.

My question for Tsai would be: would the DPP continue to negotiate with China under the "one China" framework currently in place?

If the answer is yes, isn't the battle for Taiwan's independence essentially over? If the answer is no, will the DPP stand a chance at the polls in 2012?

GG Caijing

For a clearly pro-China but reasonably well measured analysis of the Senkaku dispute, see this Caijing article. Its ultimate conclusion is that neither China nor Japan have much room to back down on the dispute, but this makes negotiations and cool heads all the more critical, especially now that setting aside the dispute is becoming a less realistic option.

There you go

Some time ago, I advised the DPP to head Howard Dean's example (the 50 states strategy). It seems the GOP has beat them to the punch.

Hmm...

I'm going to ask you to take an absolutely wild fucking guess here. http://n.yam.com/tlt/politics/201009/20100906001101.html

Do you think the Executive Yuan's Referendum Committee, with a set of appointees all chosen by Taiwan's current president, will reject or allow the TSU-backed referendum which aims to "eliminate the Referendum Committee?"

Typical

This article [ZH], a China Times editorial, shows just how completely out of touch the China Times is -- and why they're clearly going for the role of official Chinese propaganda machine ($$$$$. They can't get it from sales).

It's a short one, so I've decided to give it to you nearly in full and without further comment.

On the day memorializing the sixty-fifth anniversary of the war against Japan [WWII], The Chinese Communist Party's organ, the People's Daily, carried an editorial talking about the victory over the Japanese, saying "the Communist party lead and pushed" [the fight]. Our Presidential Office and Defense Ministry responded strongly, saying these statements were "not in accordance with reality." It appears that even as cross-strait relations are warming up, the government has no choice but to struggle to clarify historical truths.

In reality, although KMT policies such as martial law and the lack of implementation of democracy created controversy, historical researches within the country [in Taiwan] conclude that in the eight years of struggle before victory over the Japanese, the main fighting force was the ROC army under the lead of President Chiang Kai-shek. Even on the sixtieth anniversary of that struggle, the Chinese Communist leader Hu Jin-tao acknowledged the KMT's contribution to the war against the Japanese....

The funny thing is, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has never agreed to recognize the Republic of China, and as a result has not accepted this part of history. But the green [DPP] legislators are still eager to take advantage of Ma Ying-jeou, mocking the Presidential Office for an inadequate response [to Chinese claims]. The Presidential office responded by saying the DPP is simply opposed to anything that China does. In reality, they are opposed to anything that Ma does. The DPP does not care a lick about this part of history; it is simply using the opportunity to attack Ma Ying-jeou.

The problem is, although the KMT and CCP have been opposed to each other for so long, they must still make peace in the end, and therefore they must resolve questions of how history is to be explained; in contrast, despite the DPP having been in power and having participated in the electoral system, [that party] still refuse to acknowledge the ROC. The DPP's rejection of the history of the Battle Against Japan causes them to be unable to reconcile their historical memory with the masses'.

Due to the influence of politics, it is always difficult to make an accurate reading of history. But this is not simply a KMT problem. It is a problem also for the largest opposition party, the DPP, which must face the ROC's history.

China: not nearly as capitalist as you think.

Special Political Zone, with vague details

From the "press release" version of the political reform announcement

不仅要推进经济体制改革，还要推进政治体制改革。没有政治体制改革的保障，经济体制改革的成果就会得而复失，现代化建设的目标就不可能实现。要保障人民的民主权利和合法权益；要最广泛地动员和组织人民依法管理国家事务和经济、社会、文化事务；要从制度上解决权力过分集中又得不到制约的问题，创造条件让人民批评和监督政府，坚决惩治贪污腐败；要建设一个公平正义的社会，特别是要保障司法公正，重视保护和帮助弱势群体，使人们在生活中有安全感，对国家的发展有信心。

Not only must we continue reforming the economic system, we must also engage in reform of the political system. Without the security brought about by political reforms, the fruits of the economic reforms [of the last three decades] will slip through our hands and the goal of achieving modernization will be impossible to reach.

We must protect the people's right to democracy and their legal rights & interests; we must, on the largest scale, mobilize and organize the people to manage the country's affairs and economic, social and cultural development, in accordance with the law; we must solve the systematic problem of overly-concentrated, unrestricted power; we must create [a space] for people to, with certain restrictions, criticize and oversee the government, in order to resolutely punish & control corruption; we must build a fair and just society, and must especially protect the impartiality of the justice system; we must place importance on protecting and helping the disadvantaged; We must provide the people with a sense of safety in their lives, and they will have confidence in the country's development.

I also learned that these reforms will include elections for candidates in senior political positions, but the nominating process will of course be dominated by the Party, and the actually voting will be done by the municipal party committee after nominees have been vetted by the powerful organization department (also a wing of the party, not the government).

Special Political Zone

Word has it that Beijing intends to celebrate the 30th anniversary of Shenzhen's "Special Economic Zone" status by turning it into a "Special Political Zone" (Reuters article here).

What does that entail? Most articles I found were short on specifics, but "like Singapore, like Hong Kong" is a common refrain. It seems the idea is to figure out how to get a more effective and less corrupt administration rolling.

The article above takes as an example a 2003 Shenzhen policy of dividing responsibilities for formulating policy, executing it and maintaining oversight among three different groups [update: that plan was abandoned because the press "misunderstood" it as a checks and balances system]. The reforms seem likely to focus on this "practical" end of improving policy execution without too greatly increasing public oversight or elections.

This seems to be part of an overall pattern of stepping up "intra-party democracy" and "Chinese style democracy" slogans.

We'll see what, if anything, actually happens. But I would like to speak to the general wisdom of undergoing political reforms from a position of strength. I hope for the best.

Rumors abound

I won't go into the rumors circulating within the local and Chinese media about the odds of an unexpectedly early "withdrawal" of Chinese missiles aimed at Taiwan. Someone else can cover that.

I'll even leave the fascinating possibility of unification of Chinese character education in Taiwan and China to someone else.

What I really want to focus on today is Vice Chair of ARATS, Zhang Mingqing (張銘清), who is apparently in Taiwan again with much less fan fair than his first visit (video below).

In any case, on this visit to Taiwan, Zhang was a speaker at the 15th Conference on Chinese Scientific Modernization (中國現代化學術研討會). The conference is hosted by the very pro-"Greater China" Academic Foundation for Advancing Chinese Modernization (促進中國現代化學術研究基金會).

Zhang spoke words he meant to show brotherly affection but which, in my mind, mask a threat. As he put it, the two sides of the Strait have in the past two years already forged a common destiny based on blood ties. The ECFA, he said, is aimed at promoting the common interest of the Zhonghua Minzu, and the next and most urgent step is to establish a feeling of recognition about Taiwan and China's common destiny.

==============

Probably three or four years ago a business savvy, light-blue voter I knew (with a family business in China) sat through a less-than-sober rant of mine about the importance of preventing Taiwan from becoming overly economically intertwined with China. Otherwise, I railed, Taiwan would have great trouble maintaining its de facto political independence.

She listened politely and responded quietly and much more soberly. "It is probably already too late to do anything about that," she said, and those words shook me then, because they forced me to consider a possibility I had always preferred to ignore or dismiss.

Zhang's words shake me now.

Warp Zone

For some reason, I occasionally find myself reading editorials in the KMT's mouthpiece, the Central Daily News. Perhaps it's because the paper sometimes says what the Ma administration won't announce from the podium. Here is the article I read today.

The editorial mocks DPP positions on the ECFA; denigrates Lee Teng-hui's "two countries" and Chen Shui-bian's "one side, one country" formulations as "not only completely unworkable but bound to bring about disastrous consequences;" and finally notes that shooting for de jure independence is sure to bring economic ruin and war.

But what really caught my eye was the final paragraph, where the writer throws a curve ball:

Up to this point, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have had the wisdom to define their relations as a unique, non-international and non-domestic relationship. Thus agreements have been signed on the principles of equality and mutual respect by [Taiwan's] Straits Affairs Foundation [SEF] and [China's] Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits [ARATS]. The agreements have been mutually beneficial and won the praise of the international community, just as the ECFA has. Taiwan independence supporters, though, continue to blow hot air about dealing [with "the mainland"] on a nation-to-nation basis. The Taiwanese people have already experienced the tangible benefits of setting aside political differences, fostering warm economic relations, and reducing the danger of a military conflict. If the independence supporters keep mouthing the same old platitudes, they will not win any hearts or minds.

　兩岸如今都有智慧把雙方關係定位為非國際、亦非國內的特殊關係，故以海基、海協兩會來進行協商簽署，合乎對等、尊嚴原則，互蒙其利，亦獲國際社 會讚賞，ＥＣＦＡ也是一樣。獨派卻仍鼓吹以國與國來處理兩岸關係。台灣人民已體驗到了兩岸政治上擱置爭議、經濟上合作互惠、軍事上化解危機的實際利益，獨 派再唱其陳腔濫調，是不會有市場的。

It is obviously and pointedly false to suggest that China views relations with Taiwan as anything other than domestic, unless you ignore everything they say about the subject.

But far more baffling is when the CDN tries to suggest the KMT defines relations [with China] as a unique, non-international and non-domestic relationship.

When was that the definition? Certainly not in 2008 when Ma drew a firestorm of criticism for saying relations were "a non-international, special relationship." Certainly not today, when fantasies of China recognizing a "shared sovereignty" situation are the domain of deluded academics. In fact, there's not a peep about "non-domestic" anywhere.

To prove the point, go search for the Chinese phrase "non-domestic special relationship" (非國內的特殊關係). That search turns up only this CDN article. Even when broken up into two phrases,"non-domestic" and "special relationship," we see nothing else about this topic on the internet. This terminology is newly minted, not official policy, and certainly not the policy of both China and Taiwan.

Why would the official KMT mouthpiece make up one definition of a policy -- one where nuance in phrasing matters a lot -- when the KMT has a different official policy? Is the editor simply living in la-la land? Does he have access to insider information about progress in negotiations with China? Is he making an effort to fool the public in Taiwan (presumably because people don't actually have the stomach to accept relations with China as "domestic" yet)? Or what?

Vaguely Familiar

It seems the Legislature has figured out what we long knew. It's amazing how the timing works out -- this report about the ECFA comes out soon after the ECFA's signing, meaning the negative results would not be in the news to influence the legislative vote. But on to the meat of the post...

This week, a report out of the Legislative Yuan's think tank-like organization, called in Chinese the Lifayuan Fazhiju ji yusuan zhongxin (立院法制局及預算中心), said that China will strictly adhere to a "One China" policy (imagine that) and block Taiwan efforts to sign other FTAs.

The report ominously concludes that "in the future, it is possible that Taiwan's survival and development will require walking the road to integration with China."「將可能使台灣生存與發展僅先有一條與中國大陸結合之路」。

Back in Nov. 2008, I said:

"I also think [Ma's] policies will lead Taiwan not directly into unification, but to a point of no return, where economic and political relations are at a point where China will be have even such enormous leverage in both the cross-strait and international sphere that the CCP will be able to push for a unification time table of its own choosing and Taiwanese leaders will have few options but to comply and negotiate for minimal concessions."

Obviously, my prediction was somewhat more descriptive and uses KMT taboo words like "unification." But it is clear that the Ma administration's policy may well put Taiwan in a position where unification is the only peaceful option.

Some would say that the point of no return has already come. There are certainly plenty of people positioning themselves for that time, even if it is not here yet.

Argh

It is, in a way, big news that China's Gao Hucheng (高虎城), Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Commerce, said the ECFA was signed under the precondition of accepting "the '92 consensus of One China." While this has been the unvarying Chinese policy, it is not often said in one piece. Before the ECFA's signing, the Chinese favored simply "the '92 consensus" and tried to avoid talking about "One China". China certainly doesn't often reiterate their claim that the '92 consensus means "One China," not "one China, two interpretations."

Part of the reason Gao spoke so "boldly" is that his audience was the international community. Reinforcing the "One China" aspect of the deal is a way of trying to undercut and prevent pro-Taiwan ideas from entering the heads of the international community.

Pingtung DPP legislator Pan Meng-an (潘孟安), quoted in that article, seems to forget (or pretends to forget) that China did not leak a KMT secret. Rather, the Ma administration has a long-standing acceptance of "One China," a policy phrase they also utter as little as possible -- especially in connection to the ECFA. Just check out the MAC Vice-chair Liu Te-hsun's (劉德勳) limp, non-denying response to China's assertion. Liu simply musters the formula stating that the ECFA is apolitical because it is a strictly economic deal.

Apparently, Japan too has little interest in the subtleties of years-gone-by -- the Japanese ambassador to China recently reiterated the rarely spoken fact that Japan has never recognized Taiwan as part of China.

Keepin' it interesting, eh?

Special Feature

Despite its rhetorical flair, this article brings up some important issues. So I've decided to translate this Liberty Times opinion piece for you.

[Original text]

Hu pins ECFA with label of "anti-independence, one China;" Will Ma go along?

Reporter Zou Jingwen ╱ Special Feature

"The ECFA is purely an economic issue, unrelated to politics."This remark was made by President Ma Ying-jeou."The common political basis for the signing of the ECFA is opposition to Taiwan independence and the upholding of the '92 consensus. "So says Hu Jintao.

These two statements about the signing of the ECFA are contradictory; whose statement is correct? Does Ma Ying-jeou accept the ECFA's "common political basis?"The government's position has resulted in "one ECFA, two interpretations;" this rhetoric is deceptive, to both ourselves and others.

When Ma Ying-jeou says the ECFA is non-politicial, he is talking to the Taiwanese people. He does not say such things to China. So do these words reflect reality or do they not?

Make no mistake: Hu Jintao brought up this "political foundation" in the presence of Ma's special envoy, Wu Poh-hsiung. These words were uttered for all the world to hear. These words are most sincere.

Now that the ECFA is signed, Hu Jintao has opted to set the tone and thereby deny Ma negotiating cover cover, preparing to force future concessions that go further than "opposing Taiwanese independence and upholding 'One China.'" If these two policies are the ECFA's foundation, they become "reality;" Ma's calls for Hu to "face reality" are naive nonsense. Beijing does not intend to let Taiwan avoid further compromise for the next thousand years.

Hu may have hit this ball into Ma's court, but Ma must not sit idly by; 23 million pairs of eyes are watching him. China has "put this hat on your head" [pinned Ma with this label]. Will you wear it? If you will not, you must refuse it; silence will indicate consent, and those in Taiwan who oppose you will have another righteous reason for doing so.

Asking Ma to "wear the hat" of One China and anti-Taiwan independence, regardless of the color of the hat [A-Gu:that is, regardless of its political character], demonstrates Chinese anticipation that Ma would play innocent and agree, since these policy positions are in Ma's DNA.

The problem is, Ma's campaign promised the voters that "Taiwanese independence is a choice." Not only has that choice been removed, but Ma now wants to tie our hands. He has openly repudiated his own election pledge. Yet how can support for Taiwanese independence be made illegal? Is there an intention to set up a Fascist government?

Even more ridiculous is what "opposing Taiwan independence" entails. Basically, "Taiwan independence" has two meanings. One is that Taiwan is a sovereign independent country.The KMT has said that the ROC is on Taiwan, and that the ROC is a sovereign independent country. We should be able to reason by extension that here in Taiwan we have an independent and sovereign country. Does Ma Ying-jeou oppose this position?

If he does not, then let us consider the second meaning of "Taiwan independence." This is a sovereign independent country, and is also a democratic country, and in democracies all over the world, the people have the right to decide major policies which greatly affect national development. This includes the majority's right to change the national title, flag or anthem.

If one day the people of Taiwan decide that the label "ROC" creates international confusion and problems with our self-identity, and jointly decide to change the country's name to "Taiwan", on what grounds is the KMT so slandering this definition of "Taiwanese independence?"

Ma's parroting the Chinese "one China" position and his cooperation with the Communist Party in opposing Taiwan independence is undermining the basis for Ma's own prosperity. Are these efforts aimed at preparing for a denial of the sovereignty and independence of the "Republic of China?"

Hu has branded the ECFA, and topped it with a red cap. How can Ma Ying-jeou ignore this reality?Ma owes the people an explanation.

High Court corrupt?

I'm sickened by the possibility that four High Court judges and a prosecutor accepted bribes from a (former) KMT legislator. There may be several additional, undisclosed investigations into judicial corruption as well.

This sort of thing is a deathblow to confidence in an institution. If even the High Court can be corrupted, what verdict can escape suspicion?