Bam

Latest DPP survey out of the DPP English blog supports a basic contention most of the pro-green camp has been making for a long time -- that Taiwanese do not support the underlying principles of the '92 consensus; and  they believe the ROC is the same as Taiwan, not merely one of its provinces.

The survey closes with what I consider to be more leading questions about approval of Tsai's latest policy proposals, but overall I feel those first several questions probably present a very representative view of Taiwan public opinion. 

Link

I really enjoyed this article by Will Wilkinson. 

台灣人能接受「台灣中國同屬於同一個國家」嗎？

「台灣共識」又是一碟空心菜 | 社論 | 意見評論 | 聯合新聞網

只有在「中華*民國就是台灣，台灣就是中華民國」的前提下，台灣人才能接受中華民國及中華民國憲法為「台灣共識」。主要的矛盾是，聯合報這個社論指的中華民國憲法則是包含整個中華人民共和國的一個不存在的「中華民國」。硬要人家接受台灣只是全中國的一個省是行不通的政策。因此，社論的作者只好故意不提馬政府針對中華民國及中華民國憲法的定義。所有的民調都很清楚，台灣人絕對不會認同說台灣現行的憲法是個「台灣中國同屬於同*一個國家」的憲法，假如人民有馬政府跟聯合報的這種理解的話，大多數人馬上就一定會開始支持正名制憲的運動。

再來，社論讚美的「一中各表」、「不統／不獨／不武」，「主權互不承認／治權互不否認」通通尚未得中國的承認，反而一直被中國認定為「兩國論」的原則。雖然中國了解說國民黨因為民意給的壓力也不得不喊這種帶著個「獨派味」的口號，但是最近的維基解密也證明說中國一樣認定馬政府接受的「九二共識」就是「一中原則」，中國也到現在認為未來台灣有一個選項而已，那就是必須以一國兩制來進行和平統一。

台灣真的要如馬政府一樣先接受「台灣中國同屬於同*一個國家」的前提嗎？這種立場可以叫做台灣最大公約數嗎？ 

*Thanks anon.

Thoughts on Taiwan Wikileaks

One of the more interesting revelations that came out of the Wikileaks news was the split within Chinese leadership about how to react to Ma Ying-jeou's stances. Obviously, they have chosen to move ahead, but I think it's worth noting the significant reservations within China circles about Ma's policies -- ie, fears Ma's a "two China's" kind of guy, and distrust of the "no unification" marker in Ma's "three no's" policy.

Obviously, this is the best the PRC can hope for though, and they've recognized that and moved forward with negotiations. But it sheds a light on the difficulty the PRC will have internally reacting to a DPP victory.  It seems they're already at their "edge" of acceptance with Ma.

Should Tsai win, will ignoring her be adequate? Will they  cancel existing agreements? Before, I was leaning on the "they'll just whine" side, but this is a little more food for thought.

Tsai in Washington

Listening in live to Tsai's speech at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). As you would imagine, not a lot of surprises. Some notes I'm taking:

"The overarching goal with managing relations with China is to maintain a peaceful and stable environment so that the Taiwanese people can have the opportunity to develop a prosperous economy ... Ultimately, we want to ensure that the right to determine Taiwan's future rests in the hands of the people of Taiwan, and any change to the status quo must be approved by the people of Taiwan through democratic means. "

She defines the status quo as basically meaning independence, and argues that dogmatic positions are "insufficient" for dealing with China, justifying the DPP being vague on exactly how dialogue with China will continue.

"We will refrain from extreme or radical approaches," she says. We acknowledge that Beijing insists on the One China principle, "But Beijing must understand the reality that the Taiwanese people ... are opposed to a one party system and committed to upholding the independence of their sovereignty. "

"The intensity of economic ties is a reality, and China has already become Taiwan's largest investment destination and trading partner. Economic relations have evolved to an extent that interaction cannot be stopped by either side... "

"The DPP's return to government is inevitable, and hopefully it will happen sooner rather than later."

Question: When you meet with US officials how are you going to assure them that you will continue to promote peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait in the absence of the '92 consensus?

"I essentially told you them what I said today to you in this speech. There are some political preconditions that might be too fragile for the future relationship. By now people generally agree that this ['92 consensus] is a fiction... and it's not going to be a solid foundation for both parties to build a long term and broad coverage relationship. So that is why we propose the Taiwanese people need to get together and get a Taiwan consensus before we go to China and negotiate.... the best way to give a consensus a political life without being disruptive by change of government in Taiwan is through legislation. So if we have a Taiwan consensus of some sort, then we would make that a piece of legislation of Taiwan so that it will govern future governments and administrations. And then, externally, we're talking about a legal basis now, we're talking about agreements of some sort with China... this is not something unusual when you are handling an external relationship."

Re: Mutual non-denial?

"It has a risk element in it, when you're not particularly emphasizing or insisting on your sovereignty,then the international community will think that you're legally non-existent, which is a situation becoming worse and worse now with the Ma administration taking that position, Taiwan's international position is weakening. So while of course people want to have a peaceful and stable relationship across the Taiwan Strait, I want to say that we should at the same time be careful about our position international, especially our legal position since you're a lawyer."

One thing that's got to work in Tsai's favor...

She doesn't retreat, she pushes back. That's gotta help. 

Did the DPP miss the boat?

Examining today's news articles about the DPP's cross-strait platform -- that the '92 consensus doesn't exist, that they want to stick with the "Taiwan consensus," that they just want to get along under an unspecified formula -- and examining the scathing criticism from the KMT, I'm getting the impression that the KMT is going to win this propaganda war and therefore the election.

(Just before what I sense is this swing, I'd say the DPP probably had damn near a 50% chance of winning. A year ago, I would have put it only at 30%, so there has been strong improvement. But at the moment I'd project a safe 54% vote percentage for Ma).

Long ago, I started to believe that even the phrase "'92 concensus" was devastating to DPP arguments. The vagueness of the phrase and China's willingness to "accept" it plays directly in to pro-unification hands, because it ignores that China's really only agreed to accept that Taiwan is a part of the PRC, which has only one legitimate government, them.

Rather, the DPP should have always been framing the KMT position in terms of "One China = same country."
"One China" is not some abstract cultural notion; the KMT position is that Taiwan and China are still the same country, politically, just temporarily and most unfortunately divided by civil war. Now that's the real KMT position, and it's the position that's politically untenable in Taiwan. The truth is, even "One China, two interpretations" leaves enough wiggle room in the voter's imaginations they don't realize they've played into the "unification" end game.

That's not to say people don't realize the KMT is ultimately pro-unification. Rather, most voters believe the "no unification, no independence, no use of force" position of Ma's administration is a tenable long-term strategy and the essence of the KMT stance -- because that "status quo" feeling is exactly what the voters want. Of course, the problem for Taiwan's future democracy is that "no unification, no independence, no use of force" is merely cover for a completely and obviously unsustainable "One China, same country, but no unification."

I think the DPP's in trouble. Maybe I should spend less time speculating on how the Chinese might react to a Tsai victory, and more time trying to ascertain what lies in store for Taiwan during a second Ma term.

Fire away

Tang Fei is not a fan of Tsai Ing-wen's cross-strait policy as he understands it, claiming that without recognition of the '92 consensus, there is no way to get along. Expect more of this from the blue side as the election approaches.

But I was much more interested in the Ma campaign spokesman Yin Wei (殷瑋) claiming that "according to media" (unnamed, of course), on June 29th 2000, Tsai said "the new government can accept that 'One China, two interpretations' is a consensus reached between ARATS and the SEF, that this is a clearer phrasing [of the DPP government's position]." But now Tsai denies the consensus. What gives, woman? they seem to be saying.

So I had to figure out what was really going on here.

The article can be found in this KMT think tank National Policy Foundation report [pdf]. It's taken from the China Times (the report is strongly self-filtered for pro-blue media). Actually the whole pdf is worth a read, especially the section this comes from, which is a chronological history of related newspaper articles. The sentiment Tsai really expressed that day, in full:

陳水扁總統廿七日提到新政府願意接受兩岸兩會對「一個中國、各自表述」的會談共識，這是對九二年共識「更明確、更進一步的說法」，但所謂「一個中國、各自表述」，只是我方描述會談過程的用語，這是新政府可以接受的描述方式，並不代 表 我 方 已 接 受 北 京 的 「 一 個 中 國 原 則」。 

一九九二年十月，兩岸所派代表在香港舉行會談時，雙方曾針對如何解決「一個中國」問題進行具體討論，但無法獲致任何結論，因此我方建議以「口頭上各自表述」的方式，暫時擱置此一爭議，中共稍後也致電我方，表示「尊重並接受我方的建議」。這就是對於「一個中國」問題的爭議，兩岸願意以口頭「各自表述」來處理，各說各話最終成為兩岸共識的實際過程。所謂的「一個中國、各自表述」就是我方描述此一過程的用 語 。

And I think the first paragraph is a more complete and compressed version of the whole piece, which appears to be an editorial of Tsai Ing-wen's own writing in the paper.

It says that on the 27th of June, President Chen expressed that the new government can accept that "One China, two interpretations" is a consensus reached between ARATS and the SEF, that this is a clearer phrasing [of the DPP government's position]. But "one China, two interpretations" was how [the Taiwan] side described the language used during the discussion; this is a position that the new government can accept. But it does not mean the Taiwan side accepts Beijing's "One China Principle."

I think that's actually a pretty fair summary of the DPP position. In fact, the DPP should spin this hard in Tsai's favor by having her read the whole article in a TV ad. Perhaps you can start with text that the Ma office's released portion on the screen first, maybe with the Ma campaign's spokesman ranting in false disbelief in the background. Then Tsai could read the whole paragraph out loud, and say a future DPP government would still feel this way -- plainly, that if accepting "one China, two interpretations" doesn't explicitly mean the Taiwan government agrees to Beijing's "One China Principle" [aka, Taiwan is part of the PRC], as long as we don't mean that, the DPP can accept it.

It's genius, if I do say so myself! I'd like to see what would happen then.

==========

Let's take a quick trip through history as relayed by that NPF report. The SEF responded to Chen's comment promptly, as that NPF paper demonstrates, saying:

恢復兩會接觸對話的關鍵，是台灣方面明確承諾不搞「兩國論」、承諾兩會一九九二年達成的各自以口頭方式表述「海峽兩岸均堅持一個中國」的共識，這樣兩會的事情就好辦，接觸對話就可馬上開啟 

The key to resuming dialogue was that the Taiwan side must clearly promise to not meddle with "two countries theory," must recognize the 1992 consensus reached by both sides that "both sides of the strait strongly uphold the One China," and that as soon as these actions were taken, then resumption of dialogue could start immediately.

This is fun, let's keep going with this.

Ma Ying-jiou, 17 September, 2000, China Times:

馬英九說：「目前大陸和台灣都在否定九二共識，大陸只承認一個中國，台灣只承認各自表述，但此刻大家唯有回到一中的原點，才可能讓中斷了的談判恢復起來。」

Ma Ying-jeou said that at the present time, Taiwan and China are both denying the '92 consensus. The mainland only recognizes "One China," and Taiwan only recognizes the "two interpretations." But at this moment, if everyone would just go back to the "One China" starting point, then talks should be able to resume.

Well, that's some consistency for you.

Lots of interesting things in that report, maybe we'll revisit them someday.

South Texas Lager

South Texas Lager

I just wrote about the difficult the DPP is having formulating their cross strait policy amist greater pressure for details from both the KMT and CCP. I concluded:

So the DPP plan is apparently to first remain clear about red lines (i.e. rejection of an explicit  'One China' framework). Next, express willingness to maintain all the agreements signed so far, and finally throw vague pleasantries out there in the hopes that someone will take the bait if Tsai is the winner come 2012.   

I would say the CCP-KMT effort to force the DPP into a very precise policy formulation is pretty smart politics, and likely to work. I expect the DPP will be forced to forge an internal consensus on exactly what language they're willing to embrace for the sake of talks, and on exactly what they cannot accept. And I don't see how the additional clarity will actually benefit the Green camp.

Unfortunately, since Beijing has their own veto on what formulation will work, and a precisely articulated DPP policy is unlikely to allay fears of Taiwanese Independence forces in Beijing, it'll be up to the relatively dovish faction in China to find a way to continue relations in the event of a DPP victory.

And it appears the DPP's chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen is pushing back calls for too many specifics, as the government funded Central News Agency reports:

有關媒體問及有人指民進黨兩岸政策太抽象，她則說，兩岸經貿政策牽涉很多專業層次問題，處理的政策都是依大方向來做說明，或許有人覺得處理不夠細部，但現階段還是要依大方向政策來做說明比較恰當。

蔡英文說，很多事情是要執政才能處理，很多事會在不同的階段、不同的場合，提出相關的說明；她也強調，對於兩岸政策，黨內的看法大致上是一致的。

Responding to media questions about the DPP cross strait policy being too abstract, Tsai said that because cross-strait economic policy deals with a number of specialized topics, explaining the policy is best done by explaining a general direction for how things will be dealt with; perhaps some people feel that this is not dealing with the issues in enough detail, but at this point outlining a general direction is still the most suitable way to explain the policy. 

Tsai Ing-wen said that many issues could only be dealt with after the DPP was administrating, that many issues need will be explained in different stages and in different settings. She also emphasized that in regards to cross-strait policy, the DPP has a general consensus.

Tsai's analysis strikes me as quite accurate, and also as the only way the DPP can keep Beijing from playing the veto card before the election. That obviously didn't stop Ma's office from blasting Tsai's "irresponsible" and "confusing" position.

As a bonus comment, I'll throw in that I particularly like Joseph Wu's (吳釗燮) statement today:

民主化後的台灣，民意一方面不願與中國統一，卻也願意與中國和平相處，這樣的形勢，是中國與國際社會必須接受的客觀事實。

Since Taiwan's democratization, public opinion rejects unification with China, but seeks peaceful coexistence with China. This situation is an objective fact that China and the international community need to accept.

Posturing

A series of articles that give insight into the posturing about cross-strait policy as the election approaches.

吳敦義暗批蔡：光喊台獨不敢推 是詐欺 中國時報 2011-07-29 03:00
綠：藍黨綱求統 馬真要跟中國統一？中國時報 2011-07-29 03:00
馬辦：蔡英文願不願宣示不獨 中央社 2011-07-29 13:42
遭吳批立場反覆 蔡英文：態度一向清楚 中央廣播電台 2011-07-29 07:56
蔡英文：兩岸立場一致 馬辦：一致閃躲 yam蕃薯藤新聞 2011-08-01 15:00

In chronological order, we see:

• KMT VP candidate and current Premier Wu Dun-yi accusing Tsai Ing-wen of being a vocal Taiwanese Independence supporter who won't actually promote the goal, making her a liar.
• The DPP spokesman Chen Chi-mai responds by calling out the KMT charter for promoting unification, so that means Ma and Co. are a bunch of liars, or that the KMT is institutionally a liar.
• Ma Ying-jeou's campaign office accusing Tsai Ing-wen of avoiding a clear statement ruling out Taiwanese independence, throwing a few glancing blows at the DPP charter as well.
• Tsai Ying-wen saying that her policy view has been steady and clear.
• Ma's campaign office pointing out DPP policy flip flops.

I think it's funny that the incumbent president and his running mate can accuse Tsai Ing-wen of opposite charges initially, and it goes to show how the KMT can attack the DPP's delicate position from both the center and the Deep Green.

The Blue camp intends to stir up fear on the Deep Green side of a DPP sell out -- which they hope can mean lower or split green turnout. Certainly lower turnout would be a real possibility, but I don't have any fear of a DPP vote split; they're neither prone to that problem historically nor is there someone with charisma willing to oppose Tsai.

At the same time, the KMT is exploiting and trying to perpetuate public confusion about DPP cross-strait policy, which is admittedly rather vague. But the DPP has to be vague; because the greens rejects the '92 consensus, the DPP really has no option but to remain tight-lipped on how they'll manage to negotiate with China. Speak too soon and the CCP pounces to denounce your formula as unworkable, and should you then win the election, it's harder to find a face-saving way to continue talks or the current framework. 

And formulating yourself clearly carries only this risk, but no benefits, because certainly China would not be willing to let a non-'92 consensus framework get a public green light from CCP authorities before the election. That would virtually eliminate the largest anxiety people have about electing the DPP, and such a change doesn't benefit Beijing's goal of unification.   


Still, the skill in the KMT strategy is that while ambiguity is a very useful negotiating tool, it's not a very good election strategy. Just makes it easier for opponents to accuse you of standing for nothing, being a sell out, being incompetent, etc etc.

So the DPP plan is apparently to first remain clear about red lines (i.e. rejection of an explicit  'One China' framework). Next, express willingness to maintain all the agreements signed so far, and finally throw vague pleasantries out there in the hopes that someone will take the bait if Tsai is the winner come 2012.   

I would say the CCP-KMT effort to force the DPP into a very precise policy formulation is pretty smart politics, and likely to work. I expect the DPP will be forced to forge an internal consensus on exactly what language they're willing to embrace for the sake of talks, and on exactly what they cannot accept. And I don't see how the additional clarity will actually benefit the Green camp.

Unfortunately, since Beijing has their own veto on what formulation will work, and a precisely articulated DPP policy is unlikely to allay fears of Taiwanese Independence forces in Beijing, it'll be up to the relatively dovish faction in China to find a way to continue relations in the event of a DPP victory.

Romance of the Three Kingdoms

You may be familiar with the opening line of the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, a famous novel from the late Yuan-early Ming period. As Wikipedia translates it,

The world under heaven, after a long period of division, will be united; after a long period of union, will be divided.  話說天下大勢，分久必合，合久必分。

A heavy sentence like that carries a lot of weight when applied to the Taiwan situation, especially as Taiwan and China are undeniably in dis-union, regardless of how one views sovereignty issues.

And as you also might imagine, the metaphor might come to seem prophetic if you switch up the opening phrase to "after a long period of unity, will be divided; after a long period of division, will be united." And that's exactly what President Ma Ying-jeou said June 28th when attending a ceremony conferring promotions of higher-level ROC military officers. Of all possible places.

The context of this remark is even more baffling to me:

他表示，中國歷史上分分合合，合久必分、分久必合，但不論那一次分？那一次合？都靠戰爭解決；這次是第一次用和平解決爭端，這是中華民族、炎黃子孫的創舉，大家應該要有這個勇氣，把這段歷史寫好。 [President Ma] said that Chinese history was full of both division and unity; after a long period of unity it must divide, and after a long period of division it must be united. But when to divide? When to unite? Both had always been decided by war. Yet this time is the first time that peaceful methods have been used, a pioneering effort of the Zhonghua Minzu and the decedents of the Yellow Emperor. Everyone should have courage and make sure this section of history is written well [A-gu: aka, a peaceful union comes to fruition].

I find this a remarkably strong statement of the KMT's aspirations to realize unification. That degree of directness is not at all typical: remember how the President did a 180 after his 'ultimate unification' (終極統一) remark back in 2007ish, and how the KMT constantly accused the Greens of "smearing" Ma when they trotted out his own words? Or how the KMT threatened to sue DPP politicians for harping on the "One China Market" (一中市場) philosophy of Vincent Siew?  So I was just stunned to see this remark at all, much less this close to the election, much less at a military ceremony at a time where Ma's administration  spends much media time defending their commitment to the country's defense.

But I was completely beside myself to find that while newspapers had picked it up, the remark wasn't making the sort of waves I would have expected. I mean, this is GOLDEN material for DPP election ads. What am I missing here?   

One country, two governments

You'll remember that Chinese scholar Chu Shulong just floated the concept of "one country, two governments."  This is not a new idea and has been floated ever since the Shanghai Communique. But scholarly channels are commonly used by the Chinese government to float trial balloons, and governments in both Taiwan and China frequently pass questions through scholars. So this proposal should be considered significant in the sense that China might be feeling out Taiwan anew on a policy the CCP once roundly rejected.

And President Ma has made a surprisingly fast and vocal response: "We can discuss 'one country, two governments.'"  I'm surprised at the speed of his response in part because KMT legislators were downplaying the significance or usefulness of Chu's proposal just yesterday. Now they're defending discussion over the idea.

It seems to me that the KMT is ideologically constrained to one of two positions in negotiations with China: either a position very much like 'one country, two governments' or a demand that China fully democratize before unification can be realized. That second position is probably a little worn out within the party and would not get any favors from Beijing.

The 'one country, two governments' model is what "greater China" advocates in Taiwan have dreamed of for years -- they envision a world where the ROC government survives intact and gains recognition from China and the world. Basically, pro-unification advocates in Taiwan envision this as a symbolic unification with practical independence maintained.

I think if there were any formulation for "unification" that will not send the Taiwanese people running to the DPP, it's this one. Truth be told, even I would be interested in hearing more about the idea, and would not reject it out of hand. The major concern, of course, is that the CCP uses this model as a lure to 'solve' the unification problem, then puts increasing pressure on Taiwan to gradually gain control over the island.

I believe Ma's response carries high political risk in Taiwan and makes him an easy target for DPP criticism ("which article of the constitution," the Greens are saying, "allows recognition of two governments?").  Ma's comment is directed at Beijing, and I imagine he hopes to signal to the CCP that only this kind of framework can win support at home.  When else has the KMT has so boldly stated support for a particular formula? 

I think this is a tell

The People's Daily reports:

人民网北京6月15日电（记者刘洁妍 李叶） 蔡英文日前表示，民进党将会以更加积极的态度与大陆对话，但是不会接受“一个中国”原则。对此，在今天上午举行的国台办新闻发布会上，发言人杨毅表示，两岸关系和平发展迄今的进展和成果都是在认同体现一中原则的“九二共识”的基础上实现的。没有了这一基础，否认“一中框架”，继续顽固坚持“一边一国”的分裂主张、分裂立场，很难想象两岸关系如何维持与发展。 

Tsai Ing-wen yesterday said that the DPP would engage in dialogue with China with a more energetic attitude, but would not accept the One China principle. In response, at the press conference today held by the Taiwan Affairs Office, Spokesperson Yang Yi expressed that cross straight relations and peaceful development, to date, had  advanced and produced results because they were being realized on the foundation of the common recognition of the One China principle of the '92 consensus.  Without this foundation, and by denying the One China framework & continuing to stubbornly uphold the One Side, One Country 
splittist position, it is difficult to imagine how cross strait relations could maintain or develop.  [emphasis mine]

I think Tsai was clever here, setting herself in opposition not to the ever-undefined and undefinable '92 consensus, but instead to China's "One China" interpretation of it. That means the ball is in China's court to respond, not the KMT's court; and because the KMT wishes to downplay the Chinese interpretation anyway, you won't hear them talking about it. Certainly, a Chinese official could easily create backlash in Taiwan should they repeatedly remind everyone that all agreements signed since 2008 are signed on their understanding that the Taiwan government now recognizes Taiwan and China are part of the same country.

And even worse for pro-"reconciliation" propaganda is the place where Yang Yi explicitly refutes the average Taiwanese's understanding that the "status quo" means One Side, One Country.

And yet I'm struck by the way the statement closes: it's merely difficult to imagine, not impossible, for relations to remain intact with a DPP that denies "One China." That seems to hint to me that the Chinese leadership is at least still debating this question, though unlikely already resolved to maintain current agreements like the ECFA (however, uncertainty on this question would surely assist the KMT come  2012); and the Chinese leadership is doubtlessly eager to see just how "energetic" of an attitude the DPP will display during this time where the Chinese government need concede nothing.

Maybe I'm reading too much into it, but I think this article suggests that all bodes well for the Greens. First, Tsai picking her fight with the CCP position instead of the KMT's version of '92 could and should be the start of a brilliant campaign strategy. Second, repeated and explicit Chinese rejection of the One Side, One Country formula is exactly the sort of thing that would help bolster explicit support in Taiwan for that same formula (so don't expect to see much about it in the blue press).  And finally, maybe there's already hope that a Tsai win and rejection of One China wouldn't mean the end of finding a way to conduct dialogue.

What if...

What if China is encouraging extreme overproduction in housing, cars and infrastructure for the purpose of moving quickly into the socialist phase of development?