Whoops!

The KMT's domestic PR strategy to promote the ECFA is to say, "we need this or our country's economy will be devastated and marginalized."

However, that PR strategy puts the government in a very difficult negotiating position, as China can demand more favorable terms and postpone the signing, as seems to be happening now. The KMT is then left with the choice of caving in to Chinese demands that don't benefit Taiwan or contradicting their own insistence on the ECFA's necessity.

Whoopsie-doodle...

State of the party, revisited

Well, one year ago I wrote briefly on the DPP, and at that time I was most pessimistic about the state of the party. I think that many of those problems have been solved. The DPP seems to have moved past Chen Shui-bian, despite a handful of holdouts. The party has consolidated around Tsai Ing-wen's leadership, as well, and these two factors have helped to consolidate the party's message and messenger issues (disclaimer: I'm not watching the DPP Legislative Caucus' press conference clips).

Perhaps best yet, the DPP has re-remembered their strategy of yi difang baowei zhongyang (以地方包圍中央), or to siege the central government [KMT dominated] with local success. I like what I see!Of course, I'd like it even more if they were really going after offices at every level.

Obviously, it doesn't hurt that the party has won a few special elections and has high hopes for the municipalities.

Here's to hope!

6/3 baby!

I have to say I'm not paying a whole lot of attention to the political situation at the moment, as I'm waiting for the Referendum Committee to make its decision on the TSU/DPP's ECFA referendum initiative. That should be coming down on June 3rd. In the mean time, there's the ever exciting nominations for the upcoming mayoral elections, being well covered by those heroes of Taiwan blogging that work so hard every day.

You can bet I'll have something to say about the referendum committee's decision, though. I fully expect a rejection on one of the causes for rejection last time:

“Instead, it asks the public to vote on something that has not yet happened — since the ECFA is not a concrete policy yet. Hence, we decided that the petition did not meet the criteria for a referendum as stipulated in the Referendum Act (公民投票法),” committee chairman Chao Yung-mau (趙永茂) said....

Winner of the ECFA debate?

Polls are naturally divided on partisan lines, but I have to say I was most impressed with Ma's performance in the ECFA debate. I wasn't expecting him to come out swinging. But instead, he was aggressive and dripped sarcasm, and somehow it worked better than I would have imagined. He was a man on a mission out there.

On the other hand, Tsai Ying-wen had a set of four reasonable questions which she felt Ma refused to answer even after being asked four or five times. She kept bringing that up, and that was making Ma look evasive. She was also amply able to answer questions asked to her, and appeared very competent.

The debate was quite tense. Quite something to watch. Tsai and Ma both became noticeably impatient and annoyed at several points.

I think Ma had the more rhetorically swaying argument even as I tend to personally support Tsai's logic. Tsai asked a lot of questions of Ma in that debate, and a lot of rhetorical questions began, "Didn't you think about...?" That was setting Ma up for homeruns like, "We have thought about it, and here's our awesome conclusion..." I think Ma capitalized on a difference in rhetorical style, and worked it to his advantage.

It wasn't a blow out by any means; quite close really. but I think I would still give Ma the win.

A point of Blue thinking

I've been wanting to blog on this topic for months, and thankfully, Michael Turton's latest post gave me just the right opening to present my contention.

Michael's post displays some of the worst paragraphs of a China Post editorial, but the line that caught my attention is this:

It is ludicrous to argue that Ma is planning a sellout of Taiwan. Even if he dreamed of presenting Taiwan to the People's Republic on a silver platter, he couldn't make his dream come true.

This sentiment is quite prominent in blue and light-blue thinking. I've had lots of debates with light-blue, anti-unification voters where I don't even raise the idea of KMT intent to sell out the island. Instead, I try to remind them what the Chinese position on Taiwan's future is. These voters, however, simply dismiss arguments about China's intent, policy or rhetoric. "Of course the CCP is going to say and do those things," they'll argue, "but what difference does it make?"

There is a real lack of concern about the Chinese position, and I find that these light-blues are convinced China simply can't force Taiwan's hand. This is why I think they dismiss the China policy/intention part of the equation, and instead believe that Taiwan can engage economically or culturally with China under almost any set of conditions with no threat of being forced into political capitulation. They figure the Taiwanese electorate just wouldn't let unification happen, and China can't force it.

Meanwhile, I find that the deep blue voters -- those with deep ideological bonds to the KMT or institutions it has created -- equally dismiss Chinese intentions for Taiwan's future, but I think they do this for entirely different reasons. First, many of these voters once deeply believed anti-Communist rhetoric from the old days. They believed the KMT line about a constant threat of invasion facing Taiwan, which justified martial law and lack of political freedoms. When Taiwan democratized and these anti-Communist arguments disintegrated, I think these deep blues just came to believe China was never and will never be the threat the old KMT guard made it out to be. And given their receptiveness to some eventual (if distant and mutually agreeable) unification, they see the "closer economic ties" as a great thing as well. Further, I think they see the Chinese "good will" rhetoric as genuine, and they accept that only DPP style "Taiwanese independence" would cause China to try and force unification.

Over all, however, I've always felt that the KMT's success in promoting its China policy depends on not factoring in China's arguments and intentions for Taiwan's future. And that seems foolish and short-sighted, at best. What surprises me is how many blue voters of different stripes are willing to ignore China's role in this equation, as well.

But what do you think?

ECFA Referendum

The TSU has announced that volunteers collected 120,000 signatures in support of a referendum on the ECFA. As you may recall, the signatures and petition will soon go before the Executive Yuan's Referendum Evaluation Committe -- probably by the end of the month, according to the TSU. As the Taipei Times notes, only 86,000 valid sigs are needed to get past "stage one," so the list should be safe.

Yet that committee, made up entirely of Ma appointees, roundly rejected a similar petition last August. The previously rejected topic was:

「你是 否同意台灣與中國簽訂之經濟合作架構協議（ＥＣＦＡ），政府應交付台灣人民公民投票決定？」

Do you agree that the government ought to put an economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) signed between Taiwan and China to a referendum before the Taiwanese people?

This time, the question asks:

你是否同意政府與中國簽訂「兩岸經濟合作架構協議」 （簡稱「兩岸經濟協議」或ECFA）？

Do you agree that the government should sign a cross-Strait economic framework agreement with China (often called a cross-Strait economic agreement or an ECFA)?

The new wording gets around most of the Referendum Evaluation Committee's previous objections, but the committee could still have one excuse it used last time:

“Instead, it asks the public to vote on something that has not yet happened — since the ECFA is not a concrete policy yet. Hence, we decided that the petition did not meet the criteria for a referendum as stipulated in the Referendum Act (公民投票法),” committee chairman Chao Yung-mau (趙永茂) said....

We'll see what happens around early May...but don't expect the Committee to rule differently, even if the public is less likely to buy the sole excuse "the ECFA is not concrete policy" this time around.

Oh yeah right

The DPP, in its preparation for the imminent debate between chairwoman Tsai Ying-wen and President Ma Ying-jeou about the ECFA, has asked for some information from the President's office: namely, a list of the "early harvest" products that China will likely be allowed to import, a working draft of the agreement, and information from government research agencies or think tanks about the expected impact of the ECFA on various industries.

The President's office has responded that, due to the ongoing negotiations, its not possible to provide these materials at this time. In other words, "you [the public] don't even need to have the slightest idea of what we're negotiating until we've signed it. The president's office asked Tsai to "stop evading," while other KMT legislators hinted Tsai is "scared of the exam [upcoming debate]."

Well, I don't think I need to bother actually refuting the Presidental Palace's and the KMT's absurd position on this. But I'll ask: how can it be that nobody of consequence outside the government has even seen a working draft? How can media and professionals be promoting an agreement they are being told is "too sensitive" to even know about? How can even the most basic points of an economic agreement -- not a political agreement, mind you -- need to be negotiated in secrecy? It seems to me the only reason to keep it secret if fear it will not be popular in Taiwan.

I think the DPP's push for a referendum on this subject will continue to gain momentum -- it the referendum idea already has a plurality of KMT voters' support, according to a recent TVBS poll (from 04/01's talking show) -- and likewise, we can be almost certain the referendum review committee will strike down the topic before it can even move to stage two of signature gathering.

One China, same interpretation

Please find here the translation of an article by Liu Shing-Ren (劉性仁), an NUU part-time lecturer and ROC constitutional scholar, which was featured on the President's website. I believe Professor Liu starts off presenting his views well, but degenerates into a bizarre, whiny patriotic rant.

The article and its translation are rather long, so I've just linked them above. But to sum up Professor Liu's argument:

1. "One China, same interpretation" is a great idea if each side could accept that the ROC + PRC = One Complete China [quote: "the unified, complete China is made up of a 'Mainland China' and a 'Taiwan China' separated by civil war."]
   


2. The Ma government's current position, though, is that One China = ROC.
   


3. If the Ma Government tried to adopt a "One China, same interpretation" position, those pesky Greens would accuse him of preparing to surrender to the Communists. So it's politically unwise.
   


4. When the election rolled around, the Blues would just fall back on China = ROC to avoid political heckling, and mainland China can't accept that, now can it?


5. That makes "One China, same interpretation" a great ideal for the future, but impractical for now.
   


6. Rather, the top priority right now is to arrive at a Blue + Green consensus -- not by compromising toward a middle ground, mind you, but by convincing the Greens to come on over to the Blue understanding.
   

Despite some sarcasm on my part, that's a pretty fair portrayal of the professor's argument.

Nevertheless, I find the idea of "One China, same interpretation" as defined above rather interesting, if impractical as the professor does. What do you think?

Pirate stations

The Liberty Times speculates that recent government efforts to shut down unlicensed radio stations is motivated by the government's annoyance at those pirate station's yelling down of the ECFA, and an attempt to reverse sliding public support for that agreement.

I think the Liberty Times overestimates effectiveness and audience of these underground stations. I am reasonably sure that I was one of about a half-dozen politically-oriented listeners in Kaohsiung and Pingtung, with the rest of the people listening in for the medical programs and medicine ads.

I make my estimate of these station's audience size based on three observations: first, you could hear the same two callers most every day calling in. No problem with clogged lines. Second, I never saw anyone tuning into a pirate station -- the only stations even Taipei taxis had on were Green Peace (綠色和平) or Voice of Taiwan （臺灣之聲). Third, there are just so few of these stations left, especially broadcasting with any frequency or regularity.

Plus, the KMT has been trying to pull the plug on these guys for a long time; ECFA is not the motive. They've just always hated the stations.

I, for one, love the pirate stations so much I would support liberalization of licensing requirements in the industry to keep bands reserved for these sorts of operations. I know some will defy government shutdown attempts. And that's great. And I wish the DPP had done more to help them become legit than just let them slide during their tenure. I just wish the stations would stop trying to sell expensive, ineffective medicine.

Translation: DPP needs idealistic platform

Below is an editorial published by the Liberty Times on March 21st about the DPP's ideal party platform. My own ideas have been laid out before. Honestly, I think the author's mistaken; the DPP will obviously keep a core independence vision, but this will not win new votes. Any new DPP platform must, as the DPP apparently plans to do, take a much more comprehensive look at Taiwan's political, economic, environmental and social situation.

Cao seems to seriously confuse Taiwanese support for continued de facto independence as an outright endorsement of plans such as a new constitution. This is simply not the case, and the DPP will never get elected on the TSU platform of yesteryear, which revolved around the theme of rectifying the country's name and writing a new constitution (正名制憲). I might like these ideas in theory, but they will not get you elected.

Frankly, should the leaks about the coming platform worry Cao Chang-ching be true, I'd consider it a very good step forward and a good sign of a DPP that's growing into a party again capable of governing, instead of being a party that's just good at shouting slogans about unnecessary and impossible goals that have no resonance with the wider electorate.

Either way, enjoy!

DPP needs idealistic platform

by Cao Chang-ching (曹長青)

The pan-greens are optimistic about their chances in the upcoming mayoral elections following their string of victories in legislative special elections. This has resulted in some intense jockeying within the party.

But whether we are discussing the upcoming five mayoral elections or the 2012 presidential elections, the most important thing for the pan-green movement is not to gain power, but to use power gained to promote the cause of making Taiwan a normal independent state. As the core of the pan-green movement, the DPP's upcoming party congress (to be held in August), will likely be the site of an to launch a "ten year platform," press reports say. The platform is expected to expound "a comprehensive plan for the country's future" and a "vision for the coming decade."

Since their loss last presidential election, DPP heavyweights have failed to spell out a clear plan for handling the problems related to Taiwan's future and status. In the current situation, the DPP's plan to bring forward a clear platform is a responsible move, in respect to both voters and country.

National Identity is Key

The key question is, what will be the contents of the political platform? What important rhetorical points and understanding will be applied regarding Taiwan's future? Although no one has yet seen a draft of the platform, certain points shown to the press by the DPP Policy Committee's deputy executive director are a bit worrying.

The reason they are worrying is that this platform does not make the status of Taiwan its central theme, but rather focuses on "changes in the world's situation; the interaction of Taiwan and China; globalization and economic trends & the evolution of economic and trade relations with Taiwan and China; technological development; energy prices and ideas for the reduction of carbon emissions ; water scarcity and food autonomy; climate changes' coming effects on Taiwan's fragile soil; the aging population and health care changes; and the government's financial discipline & the undermining of the social insurance system due to the possibility of bankruptcy."

Frankly speaking, a KMT political platform could include all of these same elements. It creates no clear contrast with the current Ma administration. The problems that Taiwan faces today do not just include globalization, unemployment, economic development and democratic politics, all of which are problems countries around the world face.

More unique to Taiwan is the question of its status and future as a country, a problem that revolves around three issues. The first is Taiwan's relationship with the Chinese Communist Party.On this we should be very clear: Taiwan has never been a part of the PRC, and Taiwan is a sovereign independent state. We should make all efforts to resist China's attempts to promote unification, or any attempt at annexing Taiwan.

The second issue is Taiwan's relationship with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). We must resolutely resist the KMT's "two sides of the strait, one China" policy or any other actions which aim to sell Taiwan.

The third issue is the relationship between Taiwan's future and its people. The DPP ought to make a clear promise that should the party return to power, they would be promoting the normalization of Taiwan as a country, including the efforts to write a new constitution (excluding archaic language related to territory, and clearly stating the limiting of that territory to Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen and Matsu); the adopting of a new national anthem (we must ditch references to the three people's principles and
loyalty to the KMT); and the adaptation of a better national referendum law. We must cast aside the "Republic of China" hat that the KMT forced on Taiwan through violent means, and recognize reality. We must apply to join the United Nations under the name of Taiwan. And so on.

The DPP must respect public opinion

Some people will ask: while the KMT remains so strong, can these goals be realized? Do these goals lack realism or practical value? Regardless of how these questions are answered, the starting point ought to be that platform ought to place highest priority on the will of the people, regardless of how idealistic it is, if the party hopes to make strides. These objectives are not castles in the sky, but concrete goals that increasing numbers of Taiwan people strongly desire. Whether under the Chen Shui-bian administration or the Ma Ying-jeou administration, a variety of polls reflect these trends:

A TVBS Poll conducted 30 days after President Ma Ying-jeou took office showed 65% of people support Taiwanese independence, while only 19% were in favor of unification. Sixty-eight precent considered themselves Taiwanese, and only 4% would call themselves Chinese people.

One year after Ma Ying-jeou took office, a Global Visons poll revealed 49% of people supported "eventual independence" while a mere 16% supported "eventual unification," and a solid 69% opposed eventual unification. In July last year, the same magazine's poll showed 82% support for each side of the Taiwan strait now being a separate, sovereign state.

Early last year, a poll by the monthly magazine "Wealth" showed two thirds of the Taiwan people are unwilling to make concessions on sovereignty to China for political or economic benefits; 59% of people worry that Taiwan's economy is too dependent on China, and 55% of people think China is Taiwans' largest enemy militarily.

These polls were not conducted by pan-green media, so their results may be taken to reflect reality and not a pro-DPP political point of view. Today, the question is not whether the DPP ought to present an idealistic platform before the people; rather, the question is whether the party will follow public opinion, subject itself to public opinion, and be in accordance with the wishes of the people on the way forward.

Why Chen Ming-wen won [omitted]

Ma: Politics w/ China is for my second next term

Which is what "Ma won't touch political topics in his first term" is code for.

By political topics, they mean a peace treaty and possibly military confidence building measures. Everything else, regardless of how it might affect political and security equations, doesn't count as political to them.

History curriculum

I was up in arms recently about planned changes to the high school history curriculum which would emphasize Chinese history over Taiwan's, and possibly subsume Taiwan history into Chinese history.

These are long standing issues where there is plenty of good faith disagreement, even among those who are for Taiwan's continued independence. Remember that for a long time, Taiwan has never really been taught history in a Taiwan-centric way. It's been either Japan-centric or China-centric, and only in the very last years of the DPP administration did things start to swing the other way.

I was originally alerted to the upcoming changes by Weichen's post here. Taipei Times covers the issue and some of the protests to it, and describes the two proposals being considered:

Chou, who is on the task force making changes to the high school curriculum, said NTU philosophy professor Wang Hsiao-po (王曉波) and some other task force members had proposed that students spend two semesters learning Chinese history and just one semester studying world history.

On Nov. 15, the task force voted in favor of a proposal by Chou and others to allot one-and-a-half semesters each to Chinese and world history, but task force convener Wu Wen-hsing (吳文星), a history professor at National Taiwan Normal University, resolved to put Wang’s amended proposal up for further deliberation after task force’s term expired on Dec. 31.

For sake of simplicity, here is a chart (translated from Weichen's table) to break down the two proposals in a bit more depth. Please note this is written somewhat from Chou's perspective, and some of the characterizations seem rough; you'd obviously want to see what textbooks came out of the guidelines before deciding how reasonable Chou's proposal is, even if Wang's proposal is wack. And I'm not sure exactly about the last two things in the table, as the descriptions are a bit vague and confusing to me.

	Wang's Proposal	Chou's Proposal
Taiwan:China:World History ratio	1: 2: 1	1: 1.5 : 1.5
Earliest included Taiwan-related historical records	Eastern Wu (~250 CE) and Sui Dyansties (~600 AD)	400 years ago
Japanese Occupation	Emphasizes Japan as colonizers, fact of second-class citizens.	Discuss both modernization and colonization issues
Taiwan in WW II	Place special emphasis on Taiwanese efforts to reunite with China and oppose Japan	No particular details especially emphasized
Post-WW II Taiwan	Describe international relations in such a way as to avoid picking apart the ROC sovereignty (over all of China) argument.	Describe international relations according to the historical record
Post-WW II Taiwan culture	Topics include: Re-Sinization, Taiwan's development of unique features and internationalization	Topics include: Sinization, localization and globalization
Chinese History	China-centric world view	Looks at China's neighbors and the world from the perspective of cultural exchange
Post-war Chinese history	The splitting of One China, discusses both Taiwan and Taiwan	Covers the People's Republic of China [and not Taiwan]
World History	Takes the nation-state and representative events [?] as the main units	Emphasizes a macro-view of schools of thought and frameworks

a

This time, a blast from the back to the future

Taipei Times:

President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) yesterday morning thanked the outgoing Solomon Islands ambassador at the Presidential Office, but referred to his administration as the “Chunghua government” (中華政府) or “Chinese government....”

Realizing his mistake, Ma immediately corrected himself and said he meant the “government of the Republic of China.”

I'm no native speaker, but I'd argue that the Chinese term used here seems really bizarre and forced. “Chunghua government” (中華政府) is not *quite* a coinage, as the phrase appears when searched for online, mostly in relation to some sort of Taiwan military surplus dealer which uses the phrase in their name (though I'd argue the deep structure is different for their title).

So although the phrase isn't entirely invented, it does not roll off the tongue. Frankly, "Chinese government (中國政府) would be not only smoother but probably preferable to this bizarre formation that is riding on the back of Zhunghua Minzu. And there's no reason the good old "Taiwan government" (臺灣政府) should have been avoided here.

However, I'll give Ma the benefit of the doubt and assume this was a misspeak leaving out two words (should have been 中華民國政府), not an attempt to start using new terminology.

Yea for Ron Paul!

Good job winning the CPAC straw poll . Too bad it means next to nothing. :(

So, if you run a plane into a building because nobody likes paying taxes, obviously, that's a sign of the frustration that gets Republicans elected to office.

But of course, if you run a plane into a building because you are a jihadist, well, time to strip *every* citizen of basic constitutional rights, and time to strip every non-citizen of basic human rights guaranteed by treaty and common decency.