I just wrote about the difficult the DPP is having formulating their cross strait policy amist greater pressure for details from both the KMT and CCP. I concluded:

So the DPP plan is apparently to first remain clear about red lines (i.e. rejection of an explicit  'One China' framework). Next, express willingness to maintain all the agreements signed so far, and finally throw vague pleasantries out there in the hopes that someone will take the bait if Tsai is the winner come 2012.   

I would say the CCP-KMT effort to force the DPP into a very precise policy formulation is pretty smart politics, and likely to work. I expect the DPP will be forced to forge an internal consensus on exactly what language they're willing to embrace for the sake of talks, and on exactly what they cannot accept. And I don't see how the additional clarity will actually benefit the Green camp.

Unfortunately, since Beijing has their own veto on what formulation will work, and a precisely articulated DPP policy is unlikely to allay fears of Taiwanese Independence forces in Beijing, it'll be up to the relatively dovish faction in China to find a way to continue relations in the event of a DPP victory.

And it appears the DPP's chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen is pushing back calls for too many specifics, as the government funded Central News Agency reports:

有關媒體問及有人指民進黨兩岸政策太抽象，她則說，兩岸經貿政策牽涉很多專業層次問題，處理的政策都是依大方向來做說明，或許有人覺得處理不夠細部，但現階段還是要依大方向政策來做說明比較恰當。

蔡英文說，很多事情是要執政才能處理，很多事會在不同的階段、不同的場合，提出相關的說明；她也強調，對於兩岸政策，黨內的看法大致上是一致的。

Responding to media questions about the DPP cross strait policy being too abstract, Tsai said that because cross-strait economic policy deals with a number of specialized topics, explaining the policy is best done by explaining a general direction for how things will be dealt with; perhaps some people feel that this is not dealing with the issues in enough detail, but at this point outlining a general direction is still the most suitable way to explain the policy. 

Tsai Ing-wen said that many issues could only be dealt with after the DPP was administrating, that many issues need will be explained in different stages and in different settings. She also emphasized that in regards to cross-strait policy, the DPP has a general consensus.

Tsai's analysis strikes me as quite accurate, and also as the only way the DPP can keep Beijing from playing the veto card before the election. That obviously didn't stop Ma's office from blasting Tsai's "irresponsible" and "confusing" position.

As a bonus comment, I'll throw in that I particularly like Joseph Wu's (吳釗燮) statement today:

民主化後的台灣，民意一方面不願與中國統一，卻也願意與中國和平相處，這樣的形勢，是中國與國際社會必須接受的客觀事實。

Since Taiwan's democratization, public opinion rejects unification with China, but seeks peaceful coexistence with China. This situation is an objective fact that China and the international community need to accept.

Posturing

A series of articles that give insight into the posturing about cross-strait policy as the election approaches.

吳敦義暗批蔡：光喊台獨不敢推 是詐欺 中國時報 2011-07-29 03:00
綠：藍黨綱求統 馬真要跟中國統一？中國時報 2011-07-29 03:00
馬辦：蔡英文願不願宣示不獨 中央社 2011-07-29 13:42
遭吳批立場反覆 蔡英文：態度一向清楚 中央廣播電台 2011-07-29 07:56
蔡英文：兩岸立場一致 馬辦：一致閃躲 yam蕃薯藤新聞 2011-08-01 15:00

In chronological order, we see:

• KMT VP candidate and current Premier Wu Dun-yi accusing Tsai Ing-wen of being a vocal Taiwanese Independence supporter who won't actually promote the goal, making her a liar.
• The DPP spokesman Chen Chi-mai responds by calling out the KMT charter for promoting unification, so that means Ma and Co. are a bunch of liars, or that the KMT is institutionally a liar.
• Ma Ying-jeou's campaign office accusing Tsai Ing-wen of avoiding a clear statement ruling out Taiwanese independence, throwing a few glancing blows at the DPP charter as well.
• Tsai Ying-wen saying that her policy view has been steady and clear.
• Ma's campaign office pointing out DPP policy flip flops.

I think it's funny that the incumbent president and his running mate can accuse Tsai Ing-wen of opposite charges initially, and it goes to show how the KMT can attack the DPP's delicate position from both the center and the Deep Green.

The Blue camp intends to stir up fear on the Deep Green side of a DPP sell out -- which they hope can mean lower or split green turnout. Certainly lower turnout would be a real possibility, but I don't have any fear of a DPP vote split; they're neither prone to that problem historically nor is there someone with charisma willing to oppose Tsai.

At the same time, the KMT is exploiting and trying to perpetuate public confusion about DPP cross-strait policy, which is admittedly rather vague. But the DPP has to be vague; because the greens rejects the '92 consensus, the DPP really has no option but to remain tight-lipped on how they'll manage to negotiate with China. Speak too soon and the CCP pounces to denounce your formula as unworkable, and should you then win the election, it's harder to find a face-saving way to continue talks or the current framework. 

And formulating yourself clearly carries only this risk, but no benefits, because certainly China would not be willing to let a non-'92 consensus framework get a public green light from CCP authorities before the election. That would virtually eliminate the largest anxiety people have about electing the DPP, and such a change doesn't benefit Beijing's goal of unification.   


Still, the skill in the KMT strategy is that while ambiguity is a very useful negotiating tool, it's not a very good election strategy. Just makes it easier for opponents to accuse you of standing for nothing, being a sell out, being incompetent, etc etc.

So the DPP plan is apparently to first remain clear about red lines (i.e. rejection of an explicit  'One China' framework). Next, express willingness to maintain all the agreements signed so far, and finally throw vague pleasantries out there in the hopes that someone will take the bait if Tsai is the winner come 2012.   

I would say the CCP-KMT effort to force the DPP into a very precise policy formulation is pretty smart politics, and likely to work. I expect the DPP will be forced to forge an internal consensus on exactly what language they're willing to embrace for the sake of talks, and on exactly what they cannot accept. And I don't see how the additional clarity will actually benefit the Green camp.

Unfortunately, since Beijing has their own veto on what formulation will work, and a precisely articulated DPP policy is unlikely to allay fears of Taiwanese Independence forces in Beijing, it'll be up to the relatively dovish faction in China to find a way to continue relations in the event of a DPP victory.

Romance of the Three Kingdoms

You may be familiar with the opening line of the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, a famous novel from the late Yuan-early Ming period. As Wikipedia translates it,

The world under heaven, after a long period of division, will be united; after a long period of union, will be divided.  話說天下大勢，分久必合，合久必分。

A heavy sentence like that carries a lot of weight when applied to the Taiwan situation, especially as Taiwan and China are undeniably in dis-union, regardless of how one views sovereignty issues.

And as you also might imagine, the metaphor might come to seem prophetic if you switch up the opening phrase to "after a long period of unity, will be divided; after a long period of division, will be united." And that's exactly what President Ma Ying-jeou said June 28th when attending a ceremony conferring promotions of higher-level ROC military officers. Of all possible places.

The context of this remark is even more baffling to me:

他表示，中國歷史上分分合合，合久必分、分久必合，但不論那一次分？那一次合？都靠戰爭解決；這次是第一次用和平解決爭端，這是中華民族、炎黃子孫的創舉，大家應該要有這個勇氣，把這段歷史寫好。 [President Ma] said that Chinese history was full of both division and unity; after a long period of unity it must divide, and after a long period of division it must be united. But when to divide? When to unite? Both had always been decided by war. Yet this time is the first time that peaceful methods have been used, a pioneering effort of the Zhonghua Minzu and the decedents of the Yellow Emperor. Everyone should have courage and make sure this section of history is written well [A-gu: aka, a peaceful union comes to fruition].

I find this a remarkably strong statement of the KMT's aspirations to realize unification. That degree of directness is not at all typical: remember how the President did a 180 after his 'ultimate unification' (終極統一) remark back in 2007ish, and how the KMT constantly accused the Greens of "smearing" Ma when they trotted out his own words? Or how the KMT threatened to sue DPP politicians for harping on the "One China Market" (一中市場) philosophy of Vincent Siew?  So I was just stunned to see this remark at all, much less this close to the election, much less at a military ceremony at a time where Ma's administration  spends much media time defending their commitment to the country's defense.

But I was completely beside myself to find that while newspapers had picked it up, the remark wasn't making the sort of waves I would have expected. I mean, this is GOLDEN material for DPP election ads. What am I missing here?   

One country, two governments

You'll remember that Chinese scholar Chu Shulong just floated the concept of "one country, two governments."  This is not a new idea and has been floated ever since the Shanghai Communique. But scholarly channels are commonly used by the Chinese government to float trial balloons, and governments in both Taiwan and China frequently pass questions through scholars. So this proposal should be considered significant in the sense that China might be feeling out Taiwan anew on a policy the CCP once roundly rejected.

And President Ma has made a surprisingly fast and vocal response: "We can discuss 'one country, two governments.'"  I'm surprised at the speed of his response in part because KMT legislators were downplaying the significance or usefulness of Chu's proposal just yesterday. Now they're defending discussion over the idea.

It seems to me that the KMT is ideologically constrained to one of two positions in negotiations with China: either a position very much like 'one country, two governments' or a demand that China fully democratize before unification can be realized. That second position is probably a little worn out within the party and would not get any favors from Beijing.

The 'one country, two governments' model is what "greater China" advocates in Taiwan have dreamed of for years -- they envision a world where the ROC government survives intact and gains recognition from China and the world. Basically, pro-unification advocates in Taiwan envision this as a symbolic unification with practical independence maintained.

I think if there were any formulation for "unification" that will not send the Taiwanese people running to the DPP, it's this one. Truth be told, even I would be interested in hearing more about the idea, and would not reject it out of hand. The major concern, of course, is that the CCP uses this model as a lure to 'solve' the unification problem, then puts increasing pressure on Taiwan to gradually gain control over the island.

I believe Ma's response carries high political risk in Taiwan and makes him an easy target for DPP criticism ("which article of the constitution," the Greens are saying, "allows recognition of two governments?").  Ma's comment is directed at Beijing, and I imagine he hopes to signal to the CCP that only this kind of framework can win support at home.  When else has the KMT has so boldly stated support for a particular formula? 

I think this is a tell

The People's Daily reports:

人民网北京6月15日电（记者刘洁妍 李叶） 蔡英文日前表示，民进党将会以更加积极的态度与大陆对话，但是不会接受“一个中国”原则。对此，在今天上午举行的国台办新闻发布会上，发言人杨毅表示，两岸关系和平发展迄今的进展和成果都是在认同体现一中原则的“九二共识”的基础上实现的。没有了这一基础，否认“一中框架”，继续顽固坚持“一边一国”的分裂主张、分裂立场，很难想象两岸关系如何维持与发展。 

Tsai Ing-wen yesterday said that the DPP would engage in dialogue with China with a more energetic attitude, but would not accept the One China principle. In response, at the press conference today held by the Taiwan Affairs Office, Spokesperson Yang Yi expressed that cross straight relations and peaceful development, to date, had  advanced and produced results because they were being realized on the foundation of the common recognition of the One China principle of the '92 consensus.  Without this foundation, and by denying the One China framework & continuing to stubbornly uphold the One Side, One Country 
splittist position, it is difficult to imagine how cross strait relations could maintain or develop.  [emphasis mine]

I think Tsai was clever here, setting herself in opposition not to the ever-undefined and undefinable '92 consensus, but instead to China's "One China" interpretation of it. That means the ball is in China's court to respond, not the KMT's court; and because the KMT wishes to downplay the Chinese interpretation anyway, you won't hear them talking about it. Certainly, a Chinese official could easily create backlash in Taiwan should they repeatedly remind everyone that all agreements signed since 2008 are signed on their understanding that the Taiwan government now recognizes Taiwan and China are part of the same country.

And even worse for pro-"reconciliation" propaganda is the place where Yang Yi explicitly refutes the average Taiwanese's understanding that the "status quo" means One Side, One Country.

And yet I'm struck by the way the statement closes: it's merely difficult to imagine, not impossible, for relations to remain intact with a DPP that denies "One China." That seems to hint to me that the Chinese leadership is at least still debating this question, though unlikely already resolved to maintain current agreements like the ECFA (however, uncertainty on this question would surely assist the KMT come  2012); and the Chinese leadership is doubtlessly eager to see just how "energetic" of an attitude the DPP will display during this time where the Chinese government need concede nothing.

Maybe I'm reading too much into it, but I think this article suggests that all bodes well for the Greens. First, Tsai picking her fight with the CCP position instead of the KMT's version of '92 could and should be the start of a brilliant campaign strategy. Second, repeated and explicit Chinese rejection of the One Side, One Country formula is exactly the sort of thing that would help bolster explicit support in Taiwan for that same formula (so don't expect to see much about it in the blue press).  And finally, maybe there's already hope that a Tsai win and rejection of One China wouldn't mean the end of finding a way to conduct dialogue.

What if...

What if China is encouraging extreme overproduction in housing, cars and infrastructure for the purpose of moving quickly into the socialist phase of development? 

I'm embarrassed to not have thought of this...

But it's fair to wonder if the continued international pressure Beijing exerts indirectly against Taiwan, such as in the WHO title issue, is aimed at forcing the KMT into political negotiations by forcing them to bleed a little on these issues every now and then. 

GG, Taiwan Affairs Office.

Well there you go: 

　第二個問題，“九二共識”是兩岸建立政治互信、開展協商談判的重要基礎。回避或否認這一基礎，兩岸協商、兩岸關係和平發展將無從談起。

As for the second question, The '92 consensus  is the vital foundation of political trust and development of negotiations. If that foundation is avoided or denied, then cross strait negotiations and the peaceful development of cross-strait relations have no place to begin. 

In other words, China is already threatening a drastic or even war-like shift in relations should Tsai Ing-wen be elected, or the DPP gain a legislative majority (the more important goal).

China reminds us of the cost of current relations

人民网北京4月27日电（记者刘洁妍 方晔云）日前民进党就2012年的选举，党内初选部分举行了第四场政见发表会，蔡英文和苏贞昌谈到了两岸关系。对此 国台办发言人杨毅在今天上午举办的国台办发布会上指出，如果把两岸关系政策建立在“一边一国”的“台独”分裂立场上，不管作了多么巧妙的包装，都势必干扰 两岸交流合作、冲击两岸协商、破坏两岸关系和平发展，影响台海局势稳定。

By  Liu Jieyan and Fang Yeyun
Published: April 27, 2011
 
People's Daily, BEIJING  -- The Democratic Progressive Party recently held its fourth televised policy session as part of its primary process for selecting a candidate in the 2012 presidential election, and Tsai Ing-wen and Su Chen-chang both brought up cross-strait relations.

In response, Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman Yang Yi said at a TAO press conference today that if a cross-strait policy is built on the splittist "Taiwanese independence" position of "One side, one country," no matter how clever the packaging of the policy, it will inevidably disturb cross-strait exchanges, impact cross-strait negotiations, destroy the peaceful development of cross strait relations and effect the stability of the situation in the Taiwan Strait. [emphasis mine]

Spotlight

It seems that all of the attention being dedicated to Tsai Ing-wen, much of it negative, has really squeezed Su Chen-chang out of the spotlight. At this point I would place my bet on Tsai to win the nomination. We'll know May 5th, I think, when the DPP announces the finished results of their survey which will be done at the end of this month over a 5 day period or something like that.

Update: "Official polling will start on April 25, with results available as early as April 27. The official DPP presidential candidate will be announced no later than Saturday, April 30."

... and for that matter what the hell is this all about?

If you are one of the unfortunate few to have run across this editorial [zh-tw] disguised as some kind of feature, then you will be as annoyed as I am with the author's attempt not only to link Tsai Ing-wen as closely as possible with A-bian, but with the cryptic hint that all of the former DPP chairmen are collectively trying to push Tsai Ing-wen towards victory; at the very least, we gather, "only they know the reasons for their leanings."

If you want to know everyone's motives, just think about it for a minute. A-bian wants the DPP to win the election so he has a chance to get out of jail early and because he just likes to beat the KMT.

Shih Ming-te likes being in the newspaper, and was feeling left out that Hsu Hsin-liang has been all over the news lately.

And Hsu himself is trying to steer the public debate and DPP opinion in a pro-'92 consensus direction -- probably because he honestly feels it's better for Taiwan.

It doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure this stuff out.

Who ever heard of Bruce Linghu anyway?

When I read Michael Turton's post about the impending harassment of signatories to the recent Open Letter to Ma Ying-jeou, I was particularly struck by one of the paragraphs from the Taipei Times report:

Bruce Linghu (令狐榮達), head of the ministry’s Department of North American Affairs, said yesterday the ministry would contact each of the signatories to check if they initiated the petition themselves or just added their names to it, what their concerns were and what exactly they knew about the matter.

Now we all know that if Taiwan were China, a variety of disasters could befall those signing such a letter. As foreigners, they would most likely just be expelled or denied visa extensions. (Keep an eye out for anything like that happening here in Taiwan; at this stage I wouldn't be the least bit surprised to see pressure on universities to remove these academics from their current posts.)

But if the signatories were Chinese and this were in China, everything depends on the mode the authorities are in. In the wake of the aborted attempt at a Jasmine Revolution, they would likely be detained for a significant period of time or sentenced to a year of hard labor by the police without going through the courts. At best they'd be shadowed by state security on a regular basis or put under house arrest.

But in a "feel good" political cycle in China, signatories would likely be asked to come "drink tea" with the authorities. You can find many accounts of those type of meetings, which typically involve the police asking someone to verify your attachment to the cause they've signed off on; a "friendly" discussion and "debate" with a point of trying to convince them to give the cause up and discouraging them from advancing it; and the ever looming possibility of follow up discussions or winding up on a round up list.

And Bruce's comment aboves reminds me a bit of a "tea drinking" session.

Tim Maddog over at Taiwan Matters! (where I am too frequently a contributor), Ben Goren, Michael Turton, and the Taipei Times have all worked hard to try and keep track of the myrid ways the KMT has curtailed free speech, brought political influence into government news organizations and chilled speech in public protests and letters.

I am alternatively furious and terrified at the direction this is going.

Tsai Ing-wen will win because of Obama?

My wife has a theory that neutral Taiwanese voters will come out in force for Tsai Ing-wen as a sort of "competition" against the rest of the world. Since America has a black president, she thinks they'll reason, why can't Taiwan have a woman president?  Along those lines, she figures Su would not be able to overcome Ma in a head-to-head match up because he won't generate that special excitement.

I'm not so sure this is a good theory, but it could make for good conversation here. :)

My own thinking is that while Tsai being a female candidate isn't a hot news topic (thank goodness), there could be some slither of truth to her claim. 

And that's a coathanger

I get the impression things are going very well for the DPP lately, or at least for Tsai Ing-wen. Her strong anti-nuclear stance is sure to resonate with the public since Japan, and it's good to see the DPP reclaim an issue that once animated it.  As Tsai noted, if Ma Ying-jeou insists on putting fuel rods in the 4th nuclear power plant before 2012, thus committing the island to that plant for at least 40 years, he may have a real problem getting re-elected.

Second, the DPP has made an election pledge to send the ECFA to the WTO to make sure it complies with WTO obligations. This is a great position for election purposes, because 1) it provides stark contrast with the KMT position and 2) it's quite moderate and reasonable -- very easy sell.

Third, that whole judge controversy is a great demonstration of the Ma administration's ineptitude and fundamental out-of-touchedness. The timing of all this is pretty good.

I still have concerns on how the winning DPP candidate will formulate a cross-strait policy, but over all 2012 is looking better than it used to.

And something else on my mind. The DPP often paints incidents where Taiwan-China issues are treated as domestic instead of international as "chipping away at sovereignty." I think they should focus on how the "'92 consensus" is a complete capitulation on the very foundation of sovereignty issues, not merely a "chipping away." 

Tsai, Su discuss cross-strait policy

Tsai Ying-wen and Su Chen-chang are in campaign mode, in preparation for the DPP "primary by opinion poll." I've seen Su's commercials on TV lately and obviously both are trying to outline their positions on the issues.

I found this article about DPP Chair Tsai Ying-wen and from the pro-blue China Times to be most interesting for it's relative lack of content.  The CNA articles about Su Chen-chang and Tsai Ying-wen's interviews are a little more comprehensive.

We'll start with Su, who's position (in this interview) we can outline as below: Taiwan is a sovereign independent country called the ROC according to the constitution; the Ma government's "One China, Two Interpretations" is hollow rhetoric, as evidenced by the fact that no high ranking KMT official can manage to say "Republic of China" while visiting the mainland.

He notes Taiwan struggled for the democracy it enjoys today, and China is still stuck in an authoritarian situation, which rules out discussions of "unification" for now, but Su adds China is a dynamic and changing society, and he expressed confidence China will continue to change [politically, seems to be the hint]. He said he would continue to uphold the ECFA and other such agreements with China if elected.

For her part, Tsai Ying-wen expressed her hope that the question of Taiwan's future can be left to the next generation; that the Ma administration is bringing Taiwan too close to China and that the "point of no return" could soon be reached [a topic I have blogged on]. She said she wants to maintain stable development of economic relations with China, but that a "completely new viewpoint" was needed in approaching these relations.

I note several things about both of these interviews. First is the common thread of hoping to maintain the current economic arrangements and "stable relations" with China, which obviously both Tsai and Su feel will be critical to winning a majority of the vote.

Everyone knows, though, that the so-called "'92 consensus," while endorsed by neither Su nor Tsai, is indeed the foundation for political dialogue with China as we know it, and it's not at all clear how the DPP hopes to reconcile their proposed policy direction with that fact. But it's noteworthy that neither Tsai nor Su is outright ruling out that framework, now that the campaign has started.

We know that China responded to Tsai's slightly less speech on cross-strait relations by telling the DPP to renounce Taiwanese Independence and give up the idea that Taiwan and China aren't the same country. Now certainly, the DPP as an organization is nowhere near ready to move in that direction, and any attempt by either Su or Tsai to break with the party line on "One side, one country" would split the opposition terribly.

So, in summary, the DPP is in a bit of a mess on this. The two leading candidates are trying to keep doors open for dialogue, which means talking about "new perspectives" while not explicitly insisting on a "one side, one country" starting point.  But that position leaves them far from the party faithful.

Can they pull off such a highly nuanced position as the election approaches? I doubt it. The DPP candidate will be forced to explicitly endorse or reject "one China, two interpretations" or the "'92 consensus," and likewise will be endorsing or rejecting the "one side, one country" position which is core to the DPP mission.

Rejecting "one China, two interpretations" will surely, immediately result in tons of cold water being poured on the DPP by the CCP & KMT, who will say how irresponsible the party is to adopt such a position; but the potential upshot to this is that if the DPP remains strong in the pre-election polling, China will have to engage in an internal debate on (1) whether or not to grant more 'favors' to the KMT government  in the area of international space to prop up voter confidence and (2) whether they really want to rule out talking to the DPP administration in the case of a DPP victory.

Rejecting "one side, one country," on the other hand, is going to alienate the core constituency of the DPP who may either stay at home or vote for a splinter candidate, possibly Annette Lu or a TSU candidate.

I'll throw in there that the CCP has had a long term dream of marginalizing the DPP's independence platform, if not the party itself, by trying to make it political suicide to endorse a "one side, one country" position. They have thus far failed, but perhaps the winds are shifting.