真是的

In case you have any lingering suspicions  about the Chinese definition of the '92 consensus, Politburo Standing Committee member Jia Qinglin (贾庆林) reminds us yet again in a story covered solidly by blue media so far:

賈慶林強調，推動兩岸

關係和平發展，必須把

握四個關鍵：一是堅持

大陸和台灣同屬一個中

國作為政治基礎；二是

把深化交流合作、推進

協商談判作為重要途徑

；三是把促進兩岸同胞

團結奮鬥作為強大動力

；四是要繼續反對台獨

，這是推動兩岸關係和

，平發展的必要條件。

Jia Qinglin emphasized that pushing forward peaceful development of cross strait relations necessitates protecting four key requirements: the first is to insist that the mainland and Taiwan both belong to the same "One China" as a political foundation; the second is deepening exchanges and cooperation, with emphasis on promoting discussions and negotiations; the third is to encourage compatriots on both sides of the straight to strive in solidarity, becoming a powerful force; and fourth is to continue opposing Taiwanese Independence. These are the necessary conditions for the peaceful development of cross-strait relations.

It seems China is stepping up expectations on the KMT. The second condition seems to be a threat that "talks must go on," so that when economic and cultural issues are all resolved -- aka, after the election -- then political talks must begin, if not conclude.

The third condition to me seems to be a not so veiled reference to united effort between Taiwan and China on resolving territorial disputes in the Senkaku Islands and the South China Sea. While it's been obvious for some time that China and the KMT were promoting such a policy, this is the first time I've seen China vocalize that, and certainly the first time I've seen them name it as a "necessary condition" for continued peaceful development of relations. 


The fourth condition looks almost like a repeat of the first, but there is a subtle difference: one could argue, as Frank Hsieh did in his 2004 campaign, that constitutionally, like it or not, Taiwan is claiming to legally be the rightful government of PRC territory as well as Taiwan (this is called "the constitutional One China" argument 憲法一中論). This satisfies the first condition. But like Frank Hsieh, one can hold that position and also argue that the constitution does not reflect reality and that only the Taiwanese people have a right to determine Taiwan's future. That would not meet the "requirements" of condition four.


One could suggest this is an attempt to shoot down the possibility of a DPP administration reasserting old Frankie's policy, and claiming that "yes, the constitution says we're the same country" yet at the same time staving off moves toward annexation.  A clever policy the DPP is pushing calls for amending the referendum law to require referendums on agreements with China (as they're doing now). So China may be trying to say this, too, is a "provocative" action that they will not tolerate. 


Of course ultimately, China is just staking out the most aggressive position possible so that in the event of a DPP victory, they have a stronger position from which to begin negotiations. Still, I find this development interesting. 


In other news, Ma Ying-jeou seems to be back on the "referendum before [negotiating] peace accord" train which he had seemingly jumped off of.

That's about right

CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets polled 1612 folks between Nov 4th and 6th that agree with other recent "within margin of error" polls which came out of the pro-KMT China Times and TVBS : in the CLSA poll, Ma was at 44.2％ and Tsai at 43.1％.

Update: TVBS poll shows the same,  with Tsai "winning" by 1%. So this one's gonna be a squeaker. 

Update 2: Liberty Times poll shows the same. So  polls across party lines now agree -- Ma/Tsai support is essentially tied, with Soong getting around 10% of the vote.

Hmm

If you speak Chinese, please see minute 19:04 through 19:35 of this video. Here, Ma stumbles over himself, saying that all decisions he makes consider the benefit to the country and the party. The host helps him get out of the problem, immediately suggesting "but the country's benefit is most important," to which Ma responds, "of course."



In some sense, there's nothing to see here; all politicians consider the benefit of their party. But it's foolish to put these things together as equally important in a public interview.

*Family Feud buzzer*

President Ma had a funny recollection while praising the '92 consensus:

Ma recalled that Harding had a meeting with former President Chen Shui-bian during a visit he made to Taiwan 11 years ago, at which time Chen said he would accept the "1992 consensus" if Beijing would also accept it.

Twenty-four hours later, however, then-Mainland Affairs Council Minister Tsai Ing-wen denied that Chen's statement represented government policy, Ma said. 

Tsai is now the opposition Democratic Progressive Party's chairwoman and presidential candidate.

According to Ma, Tsai's continued denial of the existence of the "1992 consensus" could upset the stability of cross-strait relations in the future if she is elected.

It's such a funny recollection because it's clearly false. Chinese articles on Ma's speech say Ma said the press release about this is still on the Presidential website. So let's go find it!

If you do a search for Harry Harding's name (何漢理) we get a few hits, and sure enough one of them is from 11 years ago (or even in that time range). And in that press release, we see exactly what Ma is talking about:

President Chen expressed that the new government was willing to accept the consensus previously reached between the SEF and ARATS, which is "One China, two interpretations," but that the mainland side won't acknowledge this, instead only mentioning their "One China" policy, which considers the Republic of China [Taiwan] to be a part of the People's Republic of China. The view that "One China" means "The People's Republic of China" is a viewpoint that the people of Taiwan cannot accept, and as a result it is not possible to reopen the door to negotiations, which actually is very disappointing. We hope to restart negotiations as quickly as possible, to find commonalities in our differences, and to find a definition of "One China" that both sides can accept.We have no predetermined position, and [seek] no predetermined conclusion. We are willing to shake hands & sit down to talk with the Chinese Communist leader Jiang Zemin in a situation with a flexible format, location and topics.

總統進一步表示，新政府願意接受海基、海協兩會之前會談的共識，那就是「一個中國、各自表述」，但是大陸方面卻不承認，而另外提出「一個中國」政策，認 為中華民國是中華人民共和國的一部分，所謂的「一個中國」就是中華人民共和國，這種觀點是台灣人民無法接受的，如此也導致無法重新啟開協商大門，實在令人 遺憾。我們希望儘速恢復協商，存異求同，並就「一個中國」的內容，找出雙方都可接受的涵義。我們沒有預設立場，也沒有預設結論，願意在不拘形式、地點與議 題的情況下，與中共領導人江澤民先生坐下來，握手言談。

I'm sure you can see the issue here. Because we've been through this many times before. The "92 consensus Ma defines as "One China, two interpretations" doesn't exist.  There is no mutual non-denial. The PRC flatly denies 'two interpretations.' See for yourself.  As I said back then after reading this People's Daily article:

China objects strongly to any "two interpretations" phrasing, saying that although the political content of 'One China' could be ignored, there simply was no "two interpretations" to the consensus in that November 1992 agreement (既然没有讨论，根本就没有什么“各自表述”的共识。).

Hopefully, Ma's mention of the press release on the Presidential website will help spur people with fuzzier understandings on this topic to look it up and see how he's flat out lying. I'm not so sure Ma's comments can withstand a full assault.

They said it better than I could

An analytical piece from My Formosa has really caught my attention. Peace Agreement news has been flying all week, because since Ma's initial proposal Monday -- where he listed three conditions for the law:

However, Ma, who is running for re-election in the Jan. 14 presidential election, said his administration would only do so if it had strong domestic support and if such a pact met the needs of the country. Any pact would have to be supervised by the legislature, he added.

-- since making that tremendously bold political move, he's managed to make a joke of his own proposal and give the DPP not only tremendous election momentum, but huge momentum for referendum law reform. 

Let me translate a couple paragraphs from the My Formosa article:

The president really ought to plan before acting on something as big as a peace agreemeent, but when Ma suddenly brought up the topic, he had left high-ranking KMT officials in the dark. Two days later [Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits Chairman] Chen Yunlin [mentioned] continuing to uphold a policy of economics first, politics later, and avoided discussing the peace agreement, demonstrating Beijing had not been in on the situation. On a topic this big, a policy decision this arbitrary and peremptory obviously attracted criticism from all sides. 

和平協議如此重大，總統自應謀定後動，但馬突然拋出和平協議，國民黨高層竟一無所知；兩天後陳雲林繼續主張「先經後政」，避談和平協議，也顯示北京完全在狀況外。如此重大議題，決策如此獨斷，自然引起各界非議。 

More ridiculously, due to the unsatisfactory response in public opinion on the 17th and 18th, and to reassure those suspicious that he was promoting unification, Ma made a sharp turn deep in the night of the 19th, hastily putting out a press release stating there would definitely be a referendum [before the agreement]. This stunned those in the unification faction who had been thrilled with the original announcement. By the morning of the 20th, Ma realized he had been too rash, and released yet another press release, this time changing "must" have a referendum to "do not eliminate the option of a referendum."  But Chinese and Hong Kong media couldn't bear it, and began making stern warnings en masse. On the 22nd, the DPP took advantage of their position, calling for a reform of the [referendum] law such that "cross strait political agreements must be passed by referendum." Under Chinese pressure Ma again made a rapid about face, immediately responding to the DPP saying there was no need for such a change in law. The plan to hold the referendum is already stillborn.

更離譜的是，由於拋出議題後10月17-18日輿論反應欠佳，為了安撫「推動統一」質疑，馬竟在10月19日深夜急轉彎，匆忙發出「一定會先公投」新聞稿，引起原本高聲叫好的統派驚聲錯愕。10月20日早上，馬自知過於莽撞，又發出更正新聞稿，把「一定會先公投」修改成「不排除公投」，但中港媒體已經按奈不住，群起發出厲聲警告。10月22日，民進黨借力使力，呼籲朝野共同將「兩岸政治協商須經公投」納入修法，馬在中國壓力下再次急轉彎，立刻表示無此需要，訴諸公投實已胎死腹中。

Now that Ma's oficial stance is "there are other ways to gauge public opinion like opinion polls," you know that it wasn't going to be long for the Executive Yuan's Mainland Affairs Council to release a poll showing 80% support for peace talks. Check.  Meanwhile, despite Ma bringing the referendum topic firmly to the center of the spotlight all by himself, the KMT legislative caucus is accusing the DPP of their old Chen Shui-bian inspired trick of "using the referendum to kidnap the election." 


For those that speak Chinese/Taiwanese (find a friend who does if you don't!), watch this segment of Talking Show from the 20th. From about the 1:30 mark. It was some of my favorite commentary that night on this topic, and I watched 2100 and Talking Show just to make sure I wasn't crazy.

Hold on there cowboy

So Michael Turton has covered Ma's latest public push for a peace treaty pretty well. But I want to add information on the latest twist: the KMT is going to push for a referendum related to the treaty!

But they won't actually put the agreement itself to a referendum and ask people to pass it. Instead, they're going to try to hold a referendum on the concept of the peace treaty and then begin the detailed negotiations.  The administration is claiming this will satisfy the "public support" precondition that Ma attached to a peace agreement.

This strikes me as a smart political strategy -- because if you just ask "do you want peace?" without outlining actual details of the agreement, you're likely to get a positive response -- but the KMT is going to hit the road block the DPP came up against in the past of getting over 50% of voters to cast any sort of ballot on the referendum. 

The good news there is the KMT could consider revising the referendum law, although I think there would be serious reservations about handling that double-edged sword.

The other danger the KMT faces is the referendum turning out "invalid" due to lack of meeting the voter threshold. Will they argue, as they have in the past, that it constitutes the same as a rejection, a win for the "no" vote, and that for at least three years the policy can't be touched again?

The DPP will find it difficult in principle to oppose the referendum, although I doubt they'll find it difficult to boycott this one, since a boycott constitutes the most effective "no" vote.

Also, I should yell "IT'S A TRAP!" but I'll leave that to others.

Bam

Latest DPP survey out of the DPP English blog supports a basic contention most of the pro-green camp has been making for a long time -- that Taiwanese do not support the underlying principles of the '92 consensus; and  they believe the ROC is the same as Taiwan, not merely one of its provinces.

The survey closes with what I consider to be more leading questions about approval of Tsai's latest policy proposals, but overall I feel those first several questions probably present a very representative view of Taiwan public opinion. 

Link

I really enjoyed this article by Will Wilkinson. 

台灣人能接受「台灣中國同屬於同一個國家」嗎？

「台灣共識」又是一碟空心菜 | 社論 | 意見評論 | 聯合新聞網

只有在「中華*民國就是台灣，台灣就是中華民國」的前提下，台灣人才能接受中華民國及中華民國憲法為「台灣共識」。主要的矛盾是，聯合報這個社論指的中華民國憲法則是包含整個中華人民共和國的一個不存在的「中華民國」。硬要人家接受台灣只是全中國的一個省是行不通的政策。因此，社論的作者只好故意不提馬政府針對中華民國及中華民國憲法的定義。所有的民調都很清楚，台灣人絕對不會認同說台灣現行的憲法是個「台灣中國同屬於同*一個國家」的憲法，假如人民有馬政府跟聯合報的這種理解的話，大多數人馬上就一定會開始支持正名制憲的運動。

再來，社論讚美的「一中各表」、「不統／不獨／不武」，「主權互不承認／治權互不否認」通通尚未得中國的承認，反而一直被中國認定為「兩國論」的原則。雖然中國了解說國民黨因為民意給的壓力也不得不喊這種帶著個「獨派味」的口號，但是最近的維基解密也證明說中國一樣認定馬政府接受的「九二共識」就是「一中原則」，中國也到現在認為未來台灣有一個選項而已，那就是必須以一國兩制來進行和平統一。

台灣真的要如馬政府一樣先接受「台灣中國同屬於同*一個國家」的前提嗎？這種立場可以叫做台灣最大公約數嗎？ 

*Thanks anon.

Thoughts on Taiwan Wikileaks

One of the more interesting revelations that came out of the Wikileaks news was the split within Chinese leadership about how to react to Ma Ying-jeou's stances. Obviously, they have chosen to move ahead, but I think it's worth noting the significant reservations within China circles about Ma's policies -- ie, fears Ma's a "two China's" kind of guy, and distrust of the "no unification" marker in Ma's "three no's" policy.

Obviously, this is the best the PRC can hope for though, and they've recognized that and moved forward with negotiations. But it sheds a light on the difficulty the PRC will have internally reacting to a DPP victory.  It seems they're already at their "edge" of acceptance with Ma.

Should Tsai win, will ignoring her be adequate? Will they  cancel existing agreements? Before, I was leaning on the "they'll just whine" side, but this is a little more food for thought.

Tsai in Washington

Listening in live to Tsai's speech at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). As you would imagine, not a lot of surprises. Some notes I'm taking:

"The overarching goal with managing relations with China is to maintain a peaceful and stable environment so that the Taiwanese people can have the opportunity to develop a prosperous economy ... Ultimately, we want to ensure that the right to determine Taiwan's future rests in the hands of the people of Taiwan, and any change to the status quo must be approved by the people of Taiwan through democratic means. "

She defines the status quo as basically meaning independence, and argues that dogmatic positions are "insufficient" for dealing with China, justifying the DPP being vague on exactly how dialogue with China will continue.

"We will refrain from extreme or radical approaches," she says. We acknowledge that Beijing insists on the One China principle, "But Beijing must understand the reality that the Taiwanese people ... are opposed to a one party system and committed to upholding the independence of their sovereignty. "

"The intensity of economic ties is a reality, and China has already become Taiwan's largest investment destination and trading partner. Economic relations have evolved to an extent that interaction cannot be stopped by either side... "

"The DPP's return to government is inevitable, and hopefully it will happen sooner rather than later."

Question: When you meet with US officials how are you going to assure them that you will continue to promote peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait in the absence of the '92 consensus?

"I essentially told you them what I said today to you in this speech. There are some political preconditions that might be too fragile for the future relationship. By now people generally agree that this ['92 consensus] is a fiction... and it's not going to be a solid foundation for both parties to build a long term and broad coverage relationship. So that is why we propose the Taiwanese people need to get together and get a Taiwan consensus before we go to China and negotiate.... the best way to give a consensus a political life without being disruptive by change of government in Taiwan is through legislation. So if we have a Taiwan consensus of some sort, then we would make that a piece of legislation of Taiwan so that it will govern future governments and administrations. And then, externally, we're talking about a legal basis now, we're talking about agreements of some sort with China... this is not something unusual when you are handling an external relationship."

Re: Mutual non-denial?

"It has a risk element in it, when you're not particularly emphasizing or insisting on your sovereignty,then the international community will think that you're legally non-existent, which is a situation becoming worse and worse now with the Ma administration taking that position, Taiwan's international position is weakening. So while of course people want to have a peaceful and stable relationship across the Taiwan Strait, I want to say that we should at the same time be careful about our position international, especially our legal position since you're a lawyer."

One thing that's got to work in Tsai's favor...

She doesn't retreat, she pushes back. That's gotta help. 

Did the DPP miss the boat?

Examining today's news articles about the DPP's cross-strait platform -- that the '92 consensus doesn't exist, that they want to stick with the "Taiwan consensus," that they just want to get along under an unspecified formula -- and examining the scathing criticism from the KMT, I'm getting the impression that the KMT is going to win this propaganda war and therefore the election.

(Just before what I sense is this swing, I'd say the DPP probably had damn near a 50% chance of winning. A year ago, I would have put it only at 30%, so there has been strong improvement. But at the moment I'd project a safe 54% vote percentage for Ma).

Long ago, I started to believe that even the phrase "'92 concensus" was devastating to DPP arguments. The vagueness of the phrase and China's willingness to "accept" it plays directly in to pro-unification hands, because it ignores that China's really only agreed to accept that Taiwan is a part of the PRC, which has only one legitimate government, them.

Rather, the DPP should have always been framing the KMT position in terms of "One China = same country."
"One China" is not some abstract cultural notion; the KMT position is that Taiwan and China are still the same country, politically, just temporarily and most unfortunately divided by civil war. Now that's the real KMT position, and it's the position that's politically untenable in Taiwan. The truth is, even "One China, two interpretations" leaves enough wiggle room in the voter's imaginations they don't realize they've played into the "unification" end game.

That's not to say people don't realize the KMT is ultimately pro-unification. Rather, most voters believe the "no unification, no independence, no use of force" position of Ma's administration is a tenable long-term strategy and the essence of the KMT stance -- because that "status quo" feeling is exactly what the voters want. Of course, the problem for Taiwan's future democracy is that "no unification, no independence, no use of force" is merely cover for a completely and obviously unsustainable "One China, same country, but no unification."

I think the DPP's in trouble. Maybe I should spend less time speculating on how the Chinese might react to a Tsai victory, and more time trying to ascertain what lies in store for Taiwan during a second Ma term.

Fire away

Tang Fei is not a fan of Tsai Ing-wen's cross-strait policy as he understands it, claiming that without recognition of the '92 consensus, there is no way to get along. Expect more of this from the blue side as the election approaches.

But I was much more interested in the Ma campaign spokesman Yin Wei (殷瑋) claiming that "according to media" (unnamed, of course), on June 29th 2000, Tsai said "the new government can accept that 'One China, two interpretations' is a consensus reached between ARATS and the SEF, that this is a clearer phrasing [of the DPP government's position]." But now Tsai denies the consensus. What gives, woman? they seem to be saying.

So I had to figure out what was really going on here.

The article can be found in this KMT think tank National Policy Foundation report [pdf]. It's taken from the China Times (the report is strongly self-filtered for pro-blue media). Actually the whole pdf is worth a read, especially the section this comes from, which is a chronological history of related newspaper articles. The sentiment Tsai really expressed that day, in full:

陳水扁總統廿七日提到新政府願意接受兩岸兩會對「一個中國、各自表述」的會談共識，這是對九二年共識「更明確、更進一步的說法」，但所謂「一個中國、各自表述」，只是我方描述會談過程的用語，這是新政府可以接受的描述方式，並不代 表 我 方 已 接 受 北 京 的 「 一 個 中 國 原 則」。 

一九九二年十月，兩岸所派代表在香港舉行會談時，雙方曾針對如何解決「一個中國」問題進行具體討論，但無法獲致任何結論，因此我方建議以「口頭上各自表述」的方式，暫時擱置此一爭議，中共稍後也致電我方，表示「尊重並接受我方的建議」。這就是對於「一個中國」問題的爭議，兩岸願意以口頭「各自表述」來處理，各說各話最終成為兩岸共識的實際過程。所謂的「一個中國、各自表述」就是我方描述此一過程的用 語 。

And I think the first paragraph is a more complete and compressed version of the whole piece, which appears to be an editorial of Tsai Ing-wen's own writing in the paper.

It says that on the 27th of June, President Chen expressed that the new government can accept that "One China, two interpretations" is a consensus reached between ARATS and the SEF, that this is a clearer phrasing [of the DPP government's position]. But "one China, two interpretations" was how [the Taiwan] side described the language used during the discussion; this is a position that the new government can accept. But it does not mean the Taiwan side accepts Beijing's "One China Principle."

I think that's actually a pretty fair summary of the DPP position. In fact, the DPP should spin this hard in Tsai's favor by having her read the whole article in a TV ad. Perhaps you can start with text that the Ma office's released portion on the screen first, maybe with the Ma campaign's spokesman ranting in false disbelief in the background. Then Tsai could read the whole paragraph out loud, and say a future DPP government would still feel this way -- plainly, that if accepting "one China, two interpretations" doesn't explicitly mean the Taiwan government agrees to Beijing's "One China Principle" [aka, Taiwan is part of the PRC], as long as we don't mean that, the DPP can accept it.

It's genius, if I do say so myself! I'd like to see what would happen then.

==========

Let's take a quick trip through history as relayed by that NPF report. The SEF responded to Chen's comment promptly, as that NPF paper demonstrates, saying:

恢復兩會接觸對話的關鍵，是台灣方面明確承諾不搞「兩國論」、承諾兩會一九九二年達成的各自以口頭方式表述「海峽兩岸均堅持一個中國」的共識，這樣兩會的事情就好辦，接觸對話就可馬上開啟 

The key to resuming dialogue was that the Taiwan side must clearly promise to not meddle with "two countries theory," must recognize the 1992 consensus reached by both sides that "both sides of the strait strongly uphold the One China," and that as soon as these actions were taken, then resumption of dialogue could start immediately.

This is fun, let's keep going with this.

Ma Ying-jiou, 17 September, 2000, China Times:

馬英九說：「目前大陸和台灣都在否定九二共識，大陸只承認一個中國，台灣只承認各自表述，但此刻大家唯有回到一中的原點，才可能讓中斷了的談判恢復起來。」

Ma Ying-jeou said that at the present time, Taiwan and China are both denying the '92 consensus. The mainland only recognizes "One China," and Taiwan only recognizes the "two interpretations." But at this moment, if everyone would just go back to the "One China" starting point, then talks should be able to resume.

Well, that's some consistency for you.

Lots of interesting things in that report, maybe we'll revisit them someday.

South Texas Lager

South Texas Lager