I'm embarrassed to not have thought of this...

But it's fair to wonder if the continued international pressure Beijing exerts indirectly against Taiwan, such as in the WHO title issue, is aimed at forcing the KMT into political negotiations by forcing them to bleed a little on these issues every now and then. 

GG, Taiwan Affairs Office.

Well there you go: 

　第二個問題，“九二共識”是兩岸建立政治互信、開展協商談判的重要基礎。回避或否認這一基礎，兩岸協商、兩岸關係和平發展將無從談起。

As for the second question, The '92 consensus  is the vital foundation of political trust and development of negotiations. If that foundation is avoided or denied, then cross strait negotiations and the peaceful development of cross-strait relations have no place to begin. 

In other words, China is already threatening a drastic or even war-like shift in relations should Tsai Ing-wen be elected, or the DPP gain a legislative majority (the more important goal).

China reminds us of the cost of current relations

人民网北京4月27日电（记者刘洁妍 方晔云）日前民进党就2012年的选举，党内初选部分举行了第四场政见发表会，蔡英文和苏贞昌谈到了两岸关系。对此 国台办发言人杨毅在今天上午举办的国台办发布会上指出，如果把两岸关系政策建立在“一边一国”的“台独”分裂立场上，不管作了多么巧妙的包装，都势必干扰 两岸交流合作、冲击两岸协商、破坏两岸关系和平发展，影响台海局势稳定。

By  Liu Jieyan and Fang Yeyun
Published: April 27, 2011
 
People's Daily, BEIJING  -- The Democratic Progressive Party recently held its fourth televised policy session as part of its primary process for selecting a candidate in the 2012 presidential election, and Tsai Ing-wen and Su Chen-chang both brought up cross-strait relations.

In response, Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman Yang Yi said at a TAO press conference today that if a cross-strait policy is built on the splittist "Taiwanese independence" position of "One side, one country," no matter how clever the packaging of the policy, it will inevidably disturb cross-strait exchanges, impact cross-strait negotiations, destroy the peaceful development of cross strait relations and effect the stability of the situation in the Taiwan Strait. [emphasis mine]

Spotlight

It seems that all of the attention being dedicated to Tsai Ing-wen, much of it negative, has really squeezed Su Chen-chang out of the spotlight. At this point I would place my bet on Tsai to win the nomination. We'll know May 5th, I think, when the DPP announces the finished results of their survey which will be done at the end of this month over a 5 day period or something like that.

Update: "Official polling will start on April 25, with results available as early as April 27. The official DPP presidential candidate will be announced no later than Saturday, April 30."

... and for that matter what the hell is this all about?

If you are one of the unfortunate few to have run across this editorial [zh-tw] disguised as some kind of feature, then you will be as annoyed as I am with the author's attempt not only to link Tsai Ing-wen as closely as possible with A-bian, but with the cryptic hint that all of the former DPP chairmen are collectively trying to push Tsai Ing-wen towards victory; at the very least, we gather, "only they know the reasons for their leanings."

If you want to know everyone's motives, just think about it for a minute. A-bian wants the DPP to win the election so he has a chance to get out of jail early and because he just likes to beat the KMT.

Shih Ming-te likes being in the newspaper, and was feeling left out that Hsu Hsin-liang has been all over the news lately.

And Hsu himself is trying to steer the public debate and DPP opinion in a pro-'92 consensus direction -- probably because he honestly feels it's better for Taiwan.

It doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure this stuff out.

Who ever heard of Bruce Linghu anyway?

When I read Michael Turton's post about the impending harassment of signatories to the recent Open Letter to Ma Ying-jeou, I was particularly struck by one of the paragraphs from the Taipei Times report:

Bruce Linghu (令狐榮達), head of the ministry’s Department of North American Affairs, said yesterday the ministry would contact each of the signatories to check if they initiated the petition themselves or just added their names to it, what their concerns were and what exactly they knew about the matter.

Now we all know that if Taiwan were China, a variety of disasters could befall those signing such a letter. As foreigners, they would most likely just be expelled or denied visa extensions. (Keep an eye out for anything like that happening here in Taiwan; at this stage I wouldn't be the least bit surprised to see pressure on universities to remove these academics from their current posts.)

But if the signatories were Chinese and this were in China, everything depends on the mode the authorities are in. In the wake of the aborted attempt at a Jasmine Revolution, they would likely be detained for a significant period of time or sentenced to a year of hard labor by the police without going through the courts. At best they'd be shadowed by state security on a regular basis or put under house arrest.

But in a "feel good" political cycle in China, signatories would likely be asked to come "drink tea" with the authorities. You can find many accounts of those type of meetings, which typically involve the police asking someone to verify your attachment to the cause they've signed off on; a "friendly" discussion and "debate" with a point of trying to convince them to give the cause up and discouraging them from advancing it; and the ever looming possibility of follow up discussions or winding up on a round up list.

And Bruce's comment aboves reminds me a bit of a "tea drinking" session.

Tim Maddog over at Taiwan Matters! (where I am too frequently a contributor), Ben Goren, Michael Turton, and the Taipei Times have all worked hard to try and keep track of the myrid ways the KMT has curtailed free speech, brought political influence into government news organizations and chilled speech in public protests and letters.

I am alternatively furious and terrified at the direction this is going.

Tsai Ing-wen will win because of Obama?

My wife has a theory that neutral Taiwanese voters will come out in force for Tsai Ing-wen as a sort of "competition" against the rest of the world. Since America has a black president, she thinks they'll reason, why can't Taiwan have a woman president?  Along those lines, she figures Su would not be able to overcome Ma in a head-to-head match up because he won't generate that special excitement.

I'm not so sure this is a good theory, but it could make for good conversation here. :)

My own thinking is that while Tsai being a female candidate isn't a hot news topic (thank goodness), there could be some slither of truth to her claim. 

And that's a coathanger

I get the impression things are going very well for the DPP lately, or at least for Tsai Ing-wen. Her strong anti-nuclear stance is sure to resonate with the public since Japan, and it's good to see the DPP reclaim an issue that once animated it.  As Tsai noted, if Ma Ying-jeou insists on putting fuel rods in the 4th nuclear power plant before 2012, thus committing the island to that plant for at least 40 years, he may have a real problem getting re-elected.

Second, the DPP has made an election pledge to send the ECFA to the WTO to make sure it complies with WTO obligations. This is a great position for election purposes, because 1) it provides stark contrast with the KMT position and 2) it's quite moderate and reasonable -- very easy sell.

Third, that whole judge controversy is a great demonstration of the Ma administration's ineptitude and fundamental out-of-touchedness. The timing of all this is pretty good.

I still have concerns on how the winning DPP candidate will formulate a cross-strait policy, but over all 2012 is looking better than it used to.

And something else on my mind. The DPP often paints incidents where Taiwan-China issues are treated as domestic instead of international as "chipping away at sovereignty." I think they should focus on how the "'92 consensus" is a complete capitulation on the very foundation of sovereignty issues, not merely a "chipping away." 

Tsai, Su discuss cross-strait policy

Tsai Ying-wen and Su Chen-chang are in campaign mode, in preparation for the DPP "primary by opinion poll." I've seen Su's commercials on TV lately and obviously both are trying to outline their positions on the issues.

I found this article about DPP Chair Tsai Ying-wen and from the pro-blue China Times to be most interesting for it's relative lack of content.  The CNA articles about Su Chen-chang and Tsai Ying-wen's interviews are a little more comprehensive.

We'll start with Su, who's position (in this interview) we can outline as below: Taiwan is a sovereign independent country called the ROC according to the constitution; the Ma government's "One China, Two Interpretations" is hollow rhetoric, as evidenced by the fact that no high ranking KMT official can manage to say "Republic of China" while visiting the mainland.

He notes Taiwan struggled for the democracy it enjoys today, and China is still stuck in an authoritarian situation, which rules out discussions of "unification" for now, but Su adds China is a dynamic and changing society, and he expressed confidence China will continue to change [politically, seems to be the hint]. He said he would continue to uphold the ECFA and other such agreements with China if elected.

For her part, Tsai Ying-wen expressed her hope that the question of Taiwan's future can be left to the next generation; that the Ma administration is bringing Taiwan too close to China and that the "point of no return" could soon be reached [a topic I have blogged on]. She said she wants to maintain stable development of economic relations with China, but that a "completely new viewpoint" was needed in approaching these relations.

I note several things about both of these interviews. First is the common thread of hoping to maintain the current economic arrangements and "stable relations" with China, which obviously both Tsai and Su feel will be critical to winning a majority of the vote.

Everyone knows, though, that the so-called "'92 consensus," while endorsed by neither Su nor Tsai, is indeed the foundation for political dialogue with China as we know it, and it's not at all clear how the DPP hopes to reconcile their proposed policy direction with that fact. But it's noteworthy that neither Tsai nor Su is outright ruling out that framework, now that the campaign has started.

We know that China responded to Tsai's slightly less speech on cross-strait relations by telling the DPP to renounce Taiwanese Independence and give up the idea that Taiwan and China aren't the same country. Now certainly, the DPP as an organization is nowhere near ready to move in that direction, and any attempt by either Su or Tsai to break with the party line on "One side, one country" would split the opposition terribly.

So, in summary, the DPP is in a bit of a mess on this. The two leading candidates are trying to keep doors open for dialogue, which means talking about "new perspectives" while not explicitly insisting on a "one side, one country" starting point.  But that position leaves them far from the party faithful.

Can they pull off such a highly nuanced position as the election approaches? I doubt it. The DPP candidate will be forced to explicitly endorse or reject "one China, two interpretations" or the "'92 consensus," and likewise will be endorsing or rejecting the "one side, one country" position which is core to the DPP mission.

Rejecting "one China, two interpretations" will surely, immediately result in tons of cold water being poured on the DPP by the CCP & KMT, who will say how irresponsible the party is to adopt such a position; but the potential upshot to this is that if the DPP remains strong in the pre-election polling, China will have to engage in an internal debate on (1) whether or not to grant more 'favors' to the KMT government  in the area of international space to prop up voter confidence and (2) whether they really want to rule out talking to the DPP administration in the case of a DPP victory.

Rejecting "one side, one country," on the other hand, is going to alienate the core constituency of the DPP who may either stay at home or vote for a splinter candidate, possibly Annette Lu or a TSU candidate.

I'll throw in there that the CCP has had a long term dream of marginalizing the DPP's independence platform, if not the party itself, by trying to make it political suicide to endorse a "one side, one country" position. They have thus far failed, but perhaps the winds are shifting.

That was the whole plan

Obviously.

Tsai for Prez?

Tomorrow, DPP Chair Tsai Ying-wen is likely to announce her plans to run for President. I'm happy to see it and expect a (survey based, not voting based) primary that pits Su Chen-chang against Tsai, with Annette Lu Hsiu-lien's run being little more than a side show -- and I'd bet she'd run as an independent if she doesn't lose the nomination.

And in fact I would expect it to be a very close contest between Su and Tsai. My own preference would be to see Su come out on top as I feel he's a more capable campaigner. And the two of them on the same ticket would be powerful despite their common Pingtung origin. I say that because Mayoral elections showed that both Su and Tsai have surprisingly robust bases in the north that Lu or other contenders can't really match.

Two major questions for the DPP: one, can they articulate three or four problems with KMT domestic policy and "fixes"  that resonate with the public? And two, can they articulate a "One Side, One Country" policy stance that leaves room for China to decide to maintain current relations?

DPP thinks it up

The DPP just officially established a pair of think tanks.The Taipei Times reports:

The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) yesterday introduced two new think tanks to enhance its policy initiatives while strengthening dialogue with China and the rest of the world....

The Economic and Social Affairs Research Center and the Security and Strategy Research Center are part of the party’s revamped New Frontier Foundation, created under former DPP chairman Lin I-hsiung (林義雄), and include retired government ministers and former representatives abroad.

The value of these think tanks as mechanisms for dialogue with China should not be underestimated. A great deal of communication and probing is done through academic channels and the DPP could use a few more of those in formulating it's China stance.

At the ceremony for the founding of the think tanks, DPP Chair Tsai Ing-wen also gave a speech about cross strait policy. While short on details about the future, Tsai's speech did place the cross-strait relationship through the lens of the international community and she sees Taiwan's current status as a result of modern East Asian history (read: not merely a Chinese civil war). She rejected political preconditions for discussions (read: One China) but said Taiwan must do it's part to maintain peace and stability across the strait (read: maintain dialogue with China). These think tanks are part of that effort.

I'm psyched about the think tanks and imaginative policy initiatives, but I wonder if the DPP can come to any further internal consensus on Taiwan's status and future which will be received warmly by Beijing. Unfortunately, Beijing holds the veto on that and has no reason to show flexibility with the DPP right now when things are going so swimmingly with the KMT. 

Su's "Taiwan Consensus"

I fully expect Su Chen-chang's phrase of "Taiwan Consensus" will end up defining the DPP position vis-a-vis the KMT come 2012, though I imagine we can expect some internal wrangling between heavy weights for a share of the credit.

Su's statement is summerized in this article:

蘇貞昌認為，台灣歷經四次總統直選，是主權獨立的國家，不隸屬於中華人民共和國，依據憲法，目前名稱是中華民國，改變現狀要全民同意，已是全體國人最大的共識。

Su Chen-chang believes that Taiwan has had four direct presidential elections; that it is a sovereign and independent country,  not part of the People's Republic of China; that according to the constitution, the national name is currently the Republic of China; that changing the status quo [thus defined] must be agreed to by the people as a whole; and that these points already form the broadest consensus [of cross-strait relations] in the country.

Is there a '92 consensus?

We all know the answer is no, and the evidence is in the open every day.

When Ma talks about the importance of the '92 consensus and "One China, two interpretations" to cross-strait relations, China reports it positively, but without mentioning the "One China, two interpretations" part. And it's considered a "good first step" by the Ma administration to tell public officials to refer to China as "the mainland" or "the other side" of the strait.

Thanks, President Ma, for reminding us that Taiwan officials should never use "China" but only "mainland" or "the other side of the Strait" when referring to the PRC.