More Peace Agreement thoughts

I don't have a whole lot of time to write about it right now, but this article will interest many readers:


兩岸/蘇嘉宏：兩岸和平協定取向　一些台灣觀點 

I was interested by this line: 

兩岸關係不會是兩岸的任何一方單方面的、片面的自己的決定，所以，並不存在類似給台灣一個政治定位的說法，而是兩岸雙方必須同時給雙方‘簽約當事人’一個簽訂政治框架、和平協定自已與對方都能夠接受的適當身分，說到頭這份協定是誰跟誰簽的，根本不可能迴避。在台灣這一方而言，想要經由中國國民黨與中國共產黨以黨對黨的方式簽訂兩岸和平協定是不可能被早已習於脫內戰化格局、黨政分離的民主政治體系所接受的，兩岸關係不會只是兩岸的兩個政黨之間的關係；在大陸這一方而言，用中華民國與中華人民共和國的名義來簽，應該會被解讀為兩個中國、甚至是兩國論，與北京堅持的一個中國原則有所乖隔，從過去以來的觀察中可以知道，很難期待這種說法能被北京所接受。  

Prediction: Hsieh stays, his policy goes

After Frank Hsieh's recent visit to China, you have seen a lot of discussion in the Green Media dissecting what his trip was aimed at, what his personal intentions are, whether or not it signals a change in DPP policy, etc.

I feel like Su and Tsai treated Hsieh's trip as a trial balloon, wishing him well, saying it showed DPP confidence and putting the ol' "One China Constitution" line out there again for consideration. Floating the idea like this is not a very high cost option, after all.

I think the backlash, while coming from the predictable quarters of the party, will still likely be adequate to keep the DPP from seriously considering any formal change in stance for at least one more election cycle. Hsieh won't suffer personally, but it's doubtful he will be at the head of any transformation here, at least for now.

It goes without saying that any shift in the party stance would still respect the party's Resolution on Taiwan's Future and continue to enshrine the idea that Taiwan is not part of the PRC. But other issues might get a little... fuzzier.

Follow up: Cross Strait Dictionary of Common Phrases

More news on the Cross Strait Dictionary of Common Phrases we talked about here a few days ago.

The China version is finally being published, some 20 odd days after Ma helped unveil the Taiwan version. Oddly, several phrases included in the Taiwan publication have been left out of China's. Left out were phrases such as  「小三」、「給力」、and 「雷人」. So my joke about the censors was obviously too easy.

Irritating

It's so irritating when Ma government guidelines get in the way of telling a story, like in this RTI article.

針對15日發生香港保釣人士赴釣魚台插上中華民國與中國大陸國旗一事...

In response to the incident on the 15th when a fishing boat of Hong Kong-based Diaoyutai [Senkaku Islands] activists raised the flags of both the Republic of China and the Chinese mainland...

There really is a country called the People's Republic of China, it has its own flag, and there's no need to pretend otherwise. 

Ma's really into this dictionary

When I saw this recent article about Ma praising the publication of the new Cross Strait Dictionary of Common Phrases 《兩岸常用詞典》, I was initially just amused that it's not one publication at all -- the mainland published a dictionary arranged by pinyin in horizontal layout, while the Taiwan version is indexed by radical and uses vertical layout.  They're not even being published at the same time. Guess the Chinese censors want more time. Way to go, guys.

Then it struck me that Ma has displayed an unusual interest in this publication. Far more than Chen Shui-bian ever paid in public to the Hakka and Holo Taiwanese dictionaries his government mostly produced (《臺灣客家語常用詞辭典》以及《臺灣閩南語常用詞辭典》). And then I came to think that Chinese government leaders certainly haven't been paying much attention to this.

So I decided to try to substantiate all three observations born of vague memories of past articles. First, I went about digging up articles where Ma talkes about this dictionary. I didn't have to go very far to indicate my memory wasn't fooling me: the first article linked above mentions that "Jointly publishing a dictionary of common phrases was raised by Ma Ying-jiu in the 2008 campaign [for president]."

Next, nearly all news articles within the .cn domain only mention the dictionary's publication in Taiwan and Ma's participation without adding any comments from the Chinese side. They're merely retellings of the Taiwan wire stories.

Finally, on the day the Ministry of Education put the Holo Taiwanese dictionary online, the MOE took charge of the related press conferences and speeches, and President Chen didn't have a thing to say.

This project must be a personal interest of Ma's, maybe a nerdy fantasy he has fostered for years or decades. Certainly nobody else has noticed political advantages in promoting these publications. 

My bad

I'll have to say, when the DPP created it's China Affairs Office shortly after Su took the chairmanship, I assumed it would be an organ for serious analysis of the government's China policy and constructive discussions on both the KMT and potential DPP approaches to relations. I really didn't expect it would just become another platform from which to spew rhetorical vitriol and create new and regular press conference opportunities. I guess I was wrong. 

Premier Sean Chen (陳沖), talking about the need to preserve aboriginal languages in Taiwan, said that the Executive Yuan's Council of Indigenous Peoples and the Ministry of Education need to establish a unified writing system for aboriginal languages, because only then will it be possible to promote those languages better.

Of course, such a system was established years ago (the pdf linked there is from 2005), and you can see that system sometimes being used in aboriginal programing. But outside of that agency, the writing system hasn't done a lot of good because the political class and the MOE are not genuinely interested in mother language preservation. 

"Mutual non-denial," eh?

China Times Headline: Taiwan Affairs Office: We oppose Taiwan signing agreements that have imply sovereignty (國台辦：反對台簽主權意涵協議)

Because the Republic of China doesn't exist in any capacity or form whatsoever.  

Wang Yi's title

Wang Yi is the head of China's Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council (国务院台湾事务办公室), aka the Taiwan Affairs Office (国台办). Taiwanese media has for a good long while now been mostly out of the practice of altering, or abolishing, or "quote marking" the titles of Chinese officials.

Now Wang Yi seems to hold a second title that you probably haven't heard of even though it's no secret -- he's the head of the Communist Party of China Central Committee Taiwan Task Office (中国共产党中央委员会台湾工作办公室), and a recent NOWNews article mentions only this CCP-centric title when talking about how Wang met with some insignificant KMT youth group.

Google searches demonstrate that it was mostly Chinese media that prefer this title, and that for the most part, .tw domains using this phrase are either KMT or government sites, not mass media. Searches on the UDN or China Times domains do pick up hits, but a cursory glance seems to show that the China Times normally lists both titles if they use the party title.

UDN most often calls Wang Yi the "Mainland Taiwan Affairs Office Chair" or the "Chinese Communist [Party's] Taiwan Affairs Office Chair." China Times seems to prefer the "Mainland Taiwan Affairs Office Chair." Liberty Times prefers "China's Taiwan Affairs Office" and the Apple Daily is all over the place. 

1363?

This is my 1363rd post, which I find rather remarkable.

As everyone's noticed, I've cut way down on blogging politics since moving back to the US. The blog will never be officially suspended or anything, but expect the recent sort of posting frequency to continue.

I just want to thank all the people who have commented on and read the blog for making this whole enterprise such a fulfilling and important part of my life. Thank you!

Pingtan: What's the Deal?

One of the more interesting stories developing over the last few weeks has been China's efforts to push the Pingtan Experimental Development Zone. First, what is it? Focus Taiwan gave an overview when China first unveiled the proposal in late February:

China has devised a new plan under which certain areas on Pingtan Island off the coast of Fujian Province will be consigned to local Taiwanese governments or private groups to develop, or be put up for joint development by the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

According to China's plan, those specific areas will be managed by Taiwanese experts, and up to 1,000 Taiwanese professional managers and researchers will be recruited to work in the areas.

What makes this development proposal different than other major Taiwanese investments in cities like Shenzhen or Xiamen?

Pingtan has been chosen for this trailblazing initiative mainly because it is the China-held area closest to Taiwan. Although the small islet is still in a very early stage of development, China has decided to invest heavily in the region.
It will pour 60 billion Chinese yuan (US$9.66 billion) into its infrastructure in 2012 alone, and an additional 250 billion yuan will be pumped into the area under China's 12th five-year development plan....

To attract top-notch Taiwan talent to work in Pingtan, China may even offer tax incentives and allow simultaneous circulation of Taiwanese and Chinese currencies there.

China is already painting the proposal as a success, and pointing to the "joint management"aspect of the project. See, they don't just want to bring in these top-notch Taiwanese talent for the sake of filling up the payroll, but they also want them to help run the development zone.

Taiwan professionals are responding to the Pingtan economic development zone's recruitment plan, said Pingtan official Gong Qinggai, a deputy to the National People's Congress, on Monday.

This year, Pingtan plans to offer more than 400 jobs to talented individuals from other countries and regions. Of those jobs, some positions, including an opening for deputy director of the Pingtan management committee, the governing body of Pingtan, and four deputy heads of departments under the committee, are targeted for professionals from Taiwan.

Taiwan professionals who go to work in Pingtan will enjoy a package of benefits in such areas as taxation, housing, and children's education.

You might think that this development zone sounds like it's attempting to move into the political sphere without stepping on too many toes. If that's what you thought, you wouldn't be alone. The MAC believes the same thing:

China should refrain from political overtones when promoting cross-strait cooperation on Pingtan Island because more than 80 percent of Taiwanese reject China’s “one country, two systems” formula, the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) said yesterday....

Stopping short of saying that the government discourages investment in the Pingtan Comprehensive Experimental Zone, located on Pingtan Island in China’s Fujian Province, the council reminded Taiwanese that it is not a “co-pilot” project sponsored by the Taiwanese government.

Taiwan's Council for Economic Planning and Development had the same impression and notes how the plan could easily hurt Taiwaense industry:

The key factor in avoiding a brain drain to China is to strengthen Taiwan’s investment environment and entice more industries to maintain their operational base here, Yiin said.

“Having more industries to stay in Taiwan will help create more jobs and further raise employees’ salaries,” he said during the question-and-answer session.

Pingtan does not offer a lot to investors, which is why Fujian has to make an effort to recruit professionals and offer favorable terms to potential investors, he said.

Fujian Governor Su Shulin (蘇樹林) announced last month that the province would offer management positions to Taiwanese professionals at annual salaries of between 200,000 yuan (US$31,600) and 2 million yuan, along with three to five years of free housing.

And regardless of the fact that there is some clearly political content to this arrangement -- it is, after all, a different model than other development zones -- both sides are going to try and paint it as an economic arrangement, at least for now. Taiwan's premier said so:

Premier Sean Chen said Friday that Taiwan and China should use the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) to discuss a "joint management" economic development project proposed by China to avoid any political ramifications.

And Taiwan is also going to try to kill the "joint management" aspect, at least for now and at least before negotiations are complete:

Taiwanese nationals are not allowed to work for the Chinese government, Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Minister Lai Shin-yuan said Wednesday in a reminder to local citizens who have reportedly applied for jobs in a Chinese economic development zone.

Perhaps feeling a bit rebuffed by Taiwan authorities,China responded and claimed no political motive:

Meanwhile, China's Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi denied speculation that China sees Pingtan as a test zone for using its "one country, two systems" formula with Taiwan in pushing for unification between the two sides.

The formula is used by Beijing to rule Hong Kong and Macau, but it has always been rejected by Taipei.

"We've never entertained such thoughts," Wang said.

Although he said Pingtan is supposed to serve as a "joint homeland for people on both sides of the strait," Wang insisted there are no political motivations involved.

He said that Pingtan is geographically very close to Taiwan and the Chinese government hopes to establish a more comfortable environment, more convenient transportation and looser business policies for Taiwanese people through the experimental zone.

But does anyone believe this is not political? Jens Kastner writing in the Asia Times Online certainly doesn't, and Jens also outlines some of the more juicy incentives China is rolling out:

Those Taiwanese willing to move will find a long list of preferential treatments and US$40 billion-worth of brand-new infrastructure that includes several ports of over 200,000 tonne capacity and 18 square kilometers that will also accommodate a cross-strait financial service center for banks, insurers and securities.

Tax benefits are to be offered and bank loans generously granted, while Taiwanese professional qualification certificates will be accepted. Taiwanese lawyers and doctors will be allowed to operate freely. Exclusively for Taiwanese investors in Pingtan, the mainland's strict restrictions on imports of certain products, such as steel, are to be eased, which will give them an edge over their foreign competitors in the mainland.

To make the bait even more irresistible, both the mainland currency, the yuan, and the New Taiwan Dollar will circulate next to each other in the zone.

New roll-on, roll-off passenger ferries have been awaiting the starter's gun at Pingtan, ready to make the trip to the central Taiwanese city of Taichung in two-and-a-half hours - about the same time it takes a car drive from Taichung to the Taiwanese capital of Taipei on a good day.

Eventually, the Pingtan Comprehensive Experimental Zone, together with Taichung, is envisaged as a cross-strait free-trade zone. Once established, Taiwanese people, ships and cargo could enter Pingtan freely and from there the huge mainland market. The status of Taichung - Taiwan's third-largest city - would be lifted significantly, which is undoubtedly an important factor in the Chinese strategy as the area is generally assessed as being amongst Taiwan's key electoral battlegrounds.

This reminds us: why should China bother to attack Taiwan if it can achieve unification by buying it?

Revisiting single member districts

Much to my surprise, there seems to be some rather thorough dissatisfaction in the legislature with the current single member district system. Not only has Speaker Wang Jin-pyng restated his long held belief the single member district is "not good for democracy," but the DPP is likely to introduce a constitutional amendment next legislative session, and also will ask the Constitutional Court to rule on the constitutionality of the current system.

One of the issues the media has raised is that the single member districts have turned "blue" areas bluer and green areas greener, further polarizing the country along north-south lines.

Since larger parties benefit from a single member district system, it's interesting to see them regretting a policy that has increased their own clout. We'll see what changes are actually proposed. Right now, the legislature seems just to be in the complaining phase. 

What next?

So the DPP loss is not unexpected, though I find it disappointing. But the big question now is how the KMT and CCP will conduct their relations over the next four years. No doubt, the closeness of this election and the uncertainty of a future KMT candidate's popularity -- combined with the fact that most non-political topics have already been discussed between the two sides -- will result in CCP intentions to "ratchet down" the '92 consensus through a written agreement and a possible peace agreement.

From Beijing's perspective, the best course of action is to lock Taiwan in to some sort of political framework before anyone else can win or lose. From the KMT's perspective, this is also beneficial, as it gives them the option of painting any non-'92 policy the DPP may advocate as "dangerous," as they've just done, but perhaps with a stronger effect. Indeed, both the KMT and CCP hope that they can ultimately force the DPP to adopt the '92 consensus and eventually the "inevitability" of political integration.

It seems nearly certain that the CCP and KMT will reach some sort of compromise on this front over the next term, leaving the DPP completely out of the discussions.

The question is, how effective will Beijing's pressure be, and how much are they willing to compromise? Similarly, to what extent can the KMT hold out from various pressures, and how much can they convince China it must accept a more Taiwanese-conscious oriented solution? 

As you may know, I've long speculated on what form any peace accord could take, and mostly drew blanks, but I'm starting to believe we may see something quite modest in terms of substance but full of the same pomp you'd expect from a full blown "peace agreement." It might yet be labeled a peace agreement, but I wouldn't be surprised if it avoided such language in favor of merely declaring the basis of cross-strait discussion to be the '92 consensus, and finding a way to define that term. 

Voting result breakdown by county

Legislative breakdown: Apple Daily is reporting the KMT wins 64 seats, a majority; the DPP 40 seats, the PFP and TSU 3 seats each, and nonpartisans or NPSU candidates winning 3 seats. This is a relative loss of 17 seats for the KMT and an increase of 13 for the DPP. 

On the presidential side, note the relative balance of areas where a party wins more than say, 55% of the vote.  The DPP is not really all that dominant even in most places it wins. 


2012 Presidential Elections percentages and votes

	Ma / Wu ticket	Ing / Chia ticket	Soong / Lin ticket
Taipei City	57.87%、928717 votes	39.54%、634565	2.58%，41448
Taipei County	53.72%、1245673	43.45%、1007551	2.81%、65269
Taichung City	52.15%、792334	44.68%、678736	3.16%、48030
Tainan City	39.80%、435274	57.72%、631232	2.47%、27066
Kaohsiung City	44.18%、730461	53.42%、883158	2.38%、39469
Yilan County	44.88%、115496	52.52%、135156	2.58%、6652
Taoyuan County	57.20%、639151	39.85%、445308	2.94%、32927
Hsinchu County	65.76%、190797	30.93%、89741	3.30%、9599
Hsinchu City	57.43%、134728	39.48%、92632	3.07%、7216
Miaoli County	63.84%、206200	33.18%、107164	2.97%、9597
Zhanghua County	50.58%、369968	46.49%、340069	2.92%、21403
Nanto County	54.62%、158703	42.36%、123077	3.00%、8726
Yunlin County	41.67%、159891	55.81%、214141	2.51%、9662
Chiayi County	39.04%、120946	58.57%、181463	2.37%、7364
Pingtung County	42.92%、211571	55.13%、271722	1.94%、9562
Taitung County	66.47%、72823	30.50%、33417	3.02%、3313
Hualian County	70.29%、118815	25.94%、43845	3.76%、6359
Penghu County	49.75%、22579	45.65%、20717	4.58%、2082
Keelung City	59.28%、128294	36.76%、79562	3.94%、8533
Chiayi City	46.26%、69535	51.04%、76711	2.68%、4042
Jinmen County	89.23%、34676	8.21%、3193	2.54%、990
Lianjiang County	86.60%、4507	8.03%、418	5.36%、279
Total votes	51.60%、6891139	45.63%、6093578	2.76%、369588

Re: Taishang

After reading articles like this, I wonder: doesn't anyone consider whether Taishang in China will lie about their voting intentions while in China? Or even after they get back to Taiwan? After all, it's a secret ballot. Why take any risk? 

watch election results LIVE

Watch Taiwan election results tonight live using this link.

Just sayin'

The Tsai campaign has been making some noise about a "post partisan era" that they intend to usher in. This is all well and good if you have some expectation that the KMT will cooperate, and I think the DPP is clearly aware that they wouldn't.

So why say these things as the election nears? First, and most obviously, this stance attracts middle voters who do not subscribe to the traditional blue-green divide and who yearn for cooperation and consensus, values highly treasured in Taiwan society if not in its political culture. But secondly, maybe this position is an early outreach to Soong Chu-yi and the PFP.

In some crazy world where the PFP actually manages to win enough legislative seats that it could form a coalition government with the DPP, Tsai's call to post-partisanship might be a stealth signal to the PFP. And if Soong wishes to remain relevant, he might just give legs to a "Taiwan consensus" policy by allowing the DPP to negotiate with the most viable "pro-unification" party, resulting in some sort of "One China Constitution" position that the KMT will have a great deal of trouble refuting directly.

If this scenario miraculously plays out, the question will be: does Soong love the spotlight more than his strict adherence to pro-unification principles? I suspect he loves the spotlight more.