One thing that's got to work in Tsai's favor...

She doesn't retreat, she pushes back. That's gotta help. 

Did the DPP miss the boat?

Examining today's news articles about the DPP's cross-strait platform -- that the '92 consensus doesn't exist, that they want to stick with the "Taiwan consensus," that they just want to get along under an unspecified formula -- and examining the scathing criticism from the KMT, I'm getting the impression that the KMT is going to win this propaganda war and therefore the election.

(Just before what I sense is this swing, I'd say the DPP probably had damn near a 50% chance of winning. A year ago, I would have put it only at 30%, so there has been strong improvement. But at the moment I'd project a safe 54% vote percentage for Ma).

Long ago, I started to believe that even the phrase "'92 concensus" was devastating to DPP arguments. The vagueness of the phrase and China's willingness to "accept" it plays directly in to pro-unification hands, because it ignores that China's really only agreed to accept that Taiwan is a part of the PRC, which has only one legitimate government, them.

Rather, the DPP should have always been framing the KMT position in terms of "One China = same country."
"One China" is not some abstract cultural notion; the KMT position is that Taiwan and China are still the same country, politically, just temporarily and most unfortunately divided by civil war. Now that's the real KMT position, and it's the position that's politically untenable in Taiwan. The truth is, even "One China, two interpretations" leaves enough wiggle room in the voter's imaginations they don't realize they've played into the "unification" end game.

That's not to say people don't realize the KMT is ultimately pro-unification. Rather, most voters believe the "no unification, no independence, no use of force" position of Ma's administration is a tenable long-term strategy and the essence of the KMT stance -- because that "status quo" feeling is exactly what the voters want. Of course, the problem for Taiwan's future democracy is that "no unification, no independence, no use of force" is merely cover for a completely and obviously unsustainable "One China, same country, but no unification."

I think the DPP's in trouble. Maybe I should spend less time speculating on how the Chinese might react to a Tsai victory, and more time trying to ascertain what lies in store for Taiwan during a second Ma term.

Fire away

Tang Fei is not a fan of Tsai Ing-wen's cross-strait policy as he understands it, claiming that without recognition of the '92 consensus, there is no way to get along. Expect more of this from the blue side as the election approaches.

But I was much more interested in the Ma campaign spokesman Yin Wei (殷瑋) claiming that "according to media" (unnamed, of course), on June 29th 2000, Tsai said "the new government can accept that 'One China, two interpretations' is a consensus reached between ARATS and the SEF, that this is a clearer phrasing [of the DPP government's position]." But now Tsai denies the consensus. What gives, woman? they seem to be saying.

So I had to figure out what was really going on here.

The article can be found in this KMT think tank National Policy Foundation report [pdf]. It's taken from the China Times (the report is strongly self-filtered for pro-blue media). Actually the whole pdf is worth a read, especially the section this comes from, which is a chronological history of related newspaper articles. The sentiment Tsai really expressed that day, in full:

陳水扁總統廿七日提到新政府願意接受兩岸兩會對「一個中國、各自表述」的會談共識，這是對九二年共識「更明確、更進一步的說法」，但所謂「一個中國、各自表述」，只是我方描述會談過程的用語，這是新政府可以接受的描述方式，並不代 表 我 方 已 接 受 北 京 的 「 一 個 中 國 原 則」。 

一九九二年十月，兩岸所派代表在香港舉行會談時，雙方曾針對如何解決「一個中國」問題進行具體討論，但無法獲致任何結論，因此我方建議以「口頭上各自表述」的方式，暫時擱置此一爭議，中共稍後也致電我方，表示「尊重並接受我方的建議」。這就是對於「一個中國」問題的爭議，兩岸願意以口頭「各自表述」來處理，各說各話最終成為兩岸共識的實際過程。所謂的「一個中國、各自表述」就是我方描述此一過程的用 語 。

And I think the first paragraph is a more complete and compressed version of the whole piece, which appears to be an editorial of Tsai Ing-wen's own writing in the paper.

It says that on the 27th of June, President Chen expressed that the new government can accept that "One China, two interpretations" is a consensus reached between ARATS and the SEF, that this is a clearer phrasing [of the DPP government's position]. But "one China, two interpretations" was how [the Taiwan] side described the language used during the discussion; this is a position that the new government can accept. But it does not mean the Taiwan side accepts Beijing's "One China Principle."

I think that's actually a pretty fair summary of the DPP position. In fact, the DPP should spin this hard in Tsai's favor by having her read the whole article in a TV ad. Perhaps you can start with text that the Ma office's released portion on the screen first, maybe with the Ma campaign's spokesman ranting in false disbelief in the background. Then Tsai could read the whole paragraph out loud, and say a future DPP government would still feel this way -- plainly, that if accepting "one China, two interpretations" doesn't explicitly mean the Taiwan government agrees to Beijing's "One China Principle" [aka, Taiwan is part of the PRC], as long as we don't mean that, the DPP can accept it.

It's genius, if I do say so myself! I'd like to see what would happen then.

==========

Let's take a quick trip through history as relayed by that NPF report. The SEF responded to Chen's comment promptly, as that NPF paper demonstrates, saying:

恢復兩會接觸對話的關鍵，是台灣方面明確承諾不搞「兩國論」、承諾兩會一九九二年達成的各自以口頭方式表述「海峽兩岸均堅持一個中國」的共識，這樣兩會的事情就好辦，接觸對話就可馬上開啟 

The key to resuming dialogue was that the Taiwan side must clearly promise to not meddle with "two countries theory," must recognize the 1992 consensus reached by both sides that "both sides of the strait strongly uphold the One China," and that as soon as these actions were taken, then resumption of dialogue could start immediately.

This is fun, let's keep going with this.

Ma Ying-jiou, 17 September, 2000, China Times:

馬英九說：「目前大陸和台灣都在否定九二共識，大陸只承認一個中國，台灣只承認各自表述，但此刻大家唯有回到一中的原點，才可能讓中斷了的談判恢復起來。」

Ma Ying-jeou said that at the present time, Taiwan and China are both denying the '92 consensus. The mainland only recognizes "One China," and Taiwan only recognizes the "two interpretations." But at this moment, if everyone would just go back to the "One China" starting point, then talks should be able to resume.

Well, that's some consistency for you.

Lots of interesting things in that report, maybe we'll revisit them someday.

South Texas Lager

South Texas Lager

I just wrote about the difficult the DPP is having formulating their cross strait policy amist greater pressure for details from both the KMT and CCP. I concluded:

So the DPP plan is apparently to first remain clear about red lines (i.e. rejection of an explicit  'One China' framework). Next, express willingness to maintain all the agreements signed so far, and finally throw vague pleasantries out there in the hopes that someone will take the bait if Tsai is the winner come 2012.   

I would say the CCP-KMT effort to force the DPP into a very precise policy formulation is pretty smart politics, and likely to work. I expect the DPP will be forced to forge an internal consensus on exactly what language they're willing to embrace for the sake of talks, and on exactly what they cannot accept. And I don't see how the additional clarity will actually benefit the Green camp.

Unfortunately, since Beijing has their own veto on what formulation will work, and a precisely articulated DPP policy is unlikely to allay fears of Taiwanese Independence forces in Beijing, it'll be up to the relatively dovish faction in China to find a way to continue relations in the event of a DPP victory.

And it appears the DPP's chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen is pushing back calls for too many specifics, as the government funded Central News Agency reports:

有關媒體問及有人指民進黨兩岸政策太抽象，她則說，兩岸經貿政策牽涉很多專業層次問題，處理的政策都是依大方向來做說明，或許有人覺得處理不夠細部，但現階段還是要依大方向政策來做說明比較恰當。

蔡英文說，很多事情是要執政才能處理，很多事會在不同的階段、不同的場合，提出相關的說明；她也強調，對於兩岸政策，黨內的看法大致上是一致的。

Responding to media questions about the DPP cross strait policy being too abstract, Tsai said that because cross-strait economic policy deals with a number of specialized topics, explaining the policy is best done by explaining a general direction for how things will be dealt with; perhaps some people feel that this is not dealing with the issues in enough detail, but at this point outlining a general direction is still the most suitable way to explain the policy. 

Tsai Ing-wen said that many issues could only be dealt with after the DPP was administrating, that many issues need will be explained in different stages and in different settings. She also emphasized that in regards to cross-strait policy, the DPP has a general consensus.

Tsai's analysis strikes me as quite accurate, and also as the only way the DPP can keep Beijing from playing the veto card before the election. That obviously didn't stop Ma's office from blasting Tsai's "irresponsible" and "confusing" position.

As a bonus comment, I'll throw in that I particularly like Joseph Wu's (吳釗燮) statement today:

民主化後的台灣，民意一方面不願與中國統一，卻也願意與中國和平相處，這樣的形勢，是中國與國際社會必須接受的客觀事實。

Since Taiwan's democratization, public opinion rejects unification with China, but seeks peaceful coexistence with China. This situation is an objective fact that China and the international community need to accept.

Posturing

A series of articles that give insight into the posturing about cross-strait policy as the election approaches.

吳敦義暗批蔡：光喊台獨不敢推 是詐欺 中國時報 2011-07-29 03:00
綠：藍黨綱求統 馬真要跟中國統一？中國時報 2011-07-29 03:00
馬辦：蔡英文願不願宣示不獨 中央社 2011-07-29 13:42
遭吳批立場反覆 蔡英文：態度一向清楚 中央廣播電台 2011-07-29 07:56
蔡英文：兩岸立場一致 馬辦：一致閃躲 yam蕃薯藤新聞 2011-08-01 15:00

In chronological order, we see:

• KMT VP candidate and current Premier Wu Dun-yi accusing Tsai Ing-wen of being a vocal Taiwanese Independence supporter who won't actually promote the goal, making her a liar.
• The DPP spokesman Chen Chi-mai responds by calling out the KMT charter for promoting unification, so that means Ma and Co. are a bunch of liars, or that the KMT is institutionally a liar.
• Ma Ying-jeou's campaign office accusing Tsai Ing-wen of avoiding a clear statement ruling out Taiwanese independence, throwing a few glancing blows at the DPP charter as well.
• Tsai Ying-wen saying that her policy view has been steady and clear.
• Ma's campaign office pointing out DPP policy flip flops.

I think it's funny that the incumbent president and his running mate can accuse Tsai Ing-wen of opposite charges initially, and it goes to show how the KMT can attack the DPP's delicate position from both the center and the Deep Green.

The Blue camp intends to stir up fear on the Deep Green side of a DPP sell out -- which they hope can mean lower or split green turnout. Certainly lower turnout would be a real possibility, but I don't have any fear of a DPP vote split; they're neither prone to that problem historically nor is there someone with charisma willing to oppose Tsai.

At the same time, the KMT is exploiting and trying to perpetuate public confusion about DPP cross-strait policy, which is admittedly rather vague. But the DPP has to be vague; because the greens rejects the '92 consensus, the DPP really has no option but to remain tight-lipped on how they'll manage to negotiate with China. Speak too soon and the CCP pounces to denounce your formula as unworkable, and should you then win the election, it's harder to find a face-saving way to continue talks or the current framework. 

And formulating yourself clearly carries only this risk, but no benefits, because certainly China would not be willing to let a non-'92 consensus framework get a public green light from CCP authorities before the election. That would virtually eliminate the largest anxiety people have about electing the DPP, and such a change doesn't benefit Beijing's goal of unification.   


Still, the skill in the KMT strategy is that while ambiguity is a very useful negotiating tool, it's not a very good election strategy. Just makes it easier for opponents to accuse you of standing for nothing, being a sell out, being incompetent, etc etc.

So the DPP plan is apparently to first remain clear about red lines (i.e. rejection of an explicit  'One China' framework). Next, express willingness to maintain all the agreements signed so far, and finally throw vague pleasantries out there in the hopes that someone will take the bait if Tsai is the winner come 2012.   

I would say the CCP-KMT effort to force the DPP into a very precise policy formulation is pretty smart politics, and likely to work. I expect the DPP will be forced to forge an internal consensus on exactly what language they're willing to embrace for the sake of talks, and on exactly what they cannot accept. And I don't see how the additional clarity will actually benefit the Green camp.

Unfortunately, since Beijing has their own veto on what formulation will work, and a precisely articulated DPP policy is unlikely to allay fears of Taiwanese Independence forces in Beijing, it'll be up to the relatively dovish faction in China to find a way to continue relations in the event of a DPP victory.